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ABSTRACT
The concept of Media Diplomacy is examined, focusing on the influence of the media in
the realm of international relations in general, and the military negotiator, in particular.
Three geo-political government types are discussed, the United States as representative of a
democratic government answerable to a free press; the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
as a state-controlled system in the midst of transition to a liberated press; and a Third World
military regime, specifically Brazil from the 1960s to the 1980s, with its development,
control, and subsequent loss of authority over the press. Each geopolitical area study
examines both the official and unofficial practitioners of Media Diplomacy. Offered in
direct contrast to the authoritarian military regime is the establishment and development of
the U. S. constitutional military. Although the Department of Defense efforts are reviewed,
the focus is on the U. S. Navy and its past diplomatic efforts, the military's official and
unofficial efforts at media diplomacy are explored. The military negotiator's dilemma in the
current Media Diplomacy environment is presented. Four areas which offer the potential
for improvement are included: media reform, military public affairs preventive
maintenance, limited censorship, and designing an information strategy, as a possible
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L INTRODUCTION
The media as an adjunct to diplomacy is not a contemporary phenomenon. The media as
diplomacy has its historical origins in the telecommunications revolution. To communicate
is to negotiate. The key element then becomes the ability to communicate in real-time and
space. This new dimension of diplomacy was instantaneous communication of words and
images over vast distances.
In news reporting, electronic newsgathering equipment - comprised of a small color
camera, a video recorder, and mobile satellite transmitters - enables news reports to be
"bounced back" to a satellite ground station from where they are then beamed to news
organizations. Prior to this, television reporting had been based on film, a process which
was both slow and costly. The rise of the mini cam permitted the one-man crew, or at
most two-man crew, to replace the extended crew coverage of earlier years. Television
news which had once been confined to summarizing events which had taken place earlier,
now had the capability to interrupt the live broadcast with late-breaking stories. The
development of the satellite enabled the reporter, print or broadcast variety , to send back
the dispatch instantaneously, with a vastly increased quantity of copy, and speed of
transmission. I
The result of this simultaneity has been a diminishing of the absolute authority of the
diplomat, a centralization of the decision-making process in the home capital,2 and the
introduction of a third player onto the scene, the journalist. This research effort will
examine the influence of the media in the realm of international relations in general, and the
1Yoel Cohen, MdaDlomK(New Jersey: Frank Cass and Co., Ltd., 1986), 159: Jean-Louis Servan-
Schreiber, ThC Power to Inform trans. Pais Research Associates, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co.,
1974) 193-7.
2Livingston Merchant, "New Techniques in Diplomacy" in The Dimensions of Diplomacy ed. E. A.
Johnson (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1964) 123.
military negotiator in particular. iowever, prior to examining this phenomenon, its
historical context must be established. Initially, the reader will be reintroduced to man's
unique capability to communicate the abstractions of thoughts and ideas through the spoken
word. Communications theory will be reviewed, and selected, yet representative
examples from the history of communications will be presented as illustrative of the
interconnection between the human desire to exchange information, and the constant drive
to improve the technology to do so.
Diplomacy is a specialized variant of communications, conducted by individuals but
representative of a greater entity, the sovereign state. A brief examination of the history
and the development of diplomacy will be explored. Media Diplomacy is a phrase coined
by Yoel Cohen to explain the rise of yet another aspect of diplomacy as it has evolved over
time. Three geo-political governments will be examined, the United States as
representative of democratic government answerable to a free press, the Soviet Union as a
state - controlled system in the midst of transition to a liberated press, various Latin
American military regimes and their control of the press. Each study will examine the
official and unofficial practitioners of media diplomacy. The power of the Latin American
military will be contrasted with the all-volunteer Constitutional military of the United
States and how the U.S. military has developed its own version of media diplomacy.
Additionally, the tension between the free press in the U.S. and its ability to cover military
operations will be examined by reviewing symposiums conducted in the wake of the Viet
Nam War and the Grenada operation "Urgent Fury".
The final focus will be on the dilemmas posed by the onset of media diplomacy for the
military negotiator in the realm of national security and intelligence issues.
Constraints and benefits will be examined in terms of their ability to act as force
multipliers or force dividers for the military negotiator. In an effort to alleviate the
2
natural tension which exists between freedom of the press and national security, four
options will be examined. The purpose of this research effort is to draw attention to a
topic which has not been fully addressed in the literature of diplomacy and only
periodically addressed in regard to its impact on the U.S. military. Raising the level of
interest and reinstituting the dialogue is its aim.
3
H. MEDIA DIPLOMACY- ORIGINS AND MEANINGS
A. HISTORY OF COMMUNICATIONS
Human beings are social animals constantly seeking out ways to interact with their own
kind and their environment writ large. To that end, mankind congregates in groups whose
interests embrace the whole of the human condition; mankind constructs a social order
ranging from the nuclear family and its evolution into the twentieth century phenomenon of
the progressive or serial family to the local neighborhood or city life and its values, then,
exponentially multiplies this to form a nation with a distinct character and identity.
Finally, mankind overcomes vast obstacles in terms of time, distance, and space in order to
confront the international confraternity of self-like images , thoughts, and contradictions.
International man is sought out, either for the waging of war, or for the negotiating and
exchanging of peace, commerce, and ideas. The mainspring of all this human activity, the
core upon which it is built, is man's ability to communicate.
Challenged by the aspiration to exceed limitations imposed upon earlier generations, the
chronicle of man is replete with examples supporting Harold A. Innis' theory that the
history of man is the history of communications. Thus every major change in the
method of communications has been followed by a major change in the structure of
society. 3 He argues that the introduction of movable type by Gutenberg hastened the
collapse of feudal institutions by dissolving the monopolistic control of the written word;
the development of the popular press, the telegraph, and the telephone may be credited
with the large-scale democratization of society. Marshal McLuhan pursues this line of
reasoning and in an era of television, microwave relays, and satellite signals envisions the
3 Harold A. Innis, The Bias of Communication (Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press,
1951). See also his work Emoire of Communications (London: Oxford University Press, 1950).
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"global village". 4 wherein man is as one, or very nearly so. To date this wonder has not
occurred, however the world events in the waning hours of the 1980s from the massive
student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square to the fall of the Berlin Wall does point to
the pervasiveness of the media in the spread of ideas, and the simultaneity with which it is
now graced to report on the outcome of that diffusion of visions.
1. The Language of Speech
The paradox of the modem age is that despite man's creative ability to conquer time,
distance, and space through an illimitable network of communications in a diverse array
of media, through the development of increasingly complex technology which simplifies
the process; the ability to communicate, in the absolute sense of the word, with his fellows
remains beyond his grasp to a certain degree. There is a classic line in the motion picture
Cool Hand Luke when Boss Man tells Luke "What we have here is a failure to
communicate." 5 Or viewed through a different prism, a failure by one man to use
language to exert social control over another. Language is doubtless, man's most powerful
means to convey his thoughts, give form to his activity, formulate his hopes and plans for
the future, and preserve his memory of the useful past. Basic principles which have
emerged from various studies of the relationships among brain , mind, and speech are as
follows:
1) Speech is universal among men.
2) Rate of internal change in all languages is about the same.
3) Intellectual capacity, set at a minimum of 750cc's by anthropologists for
speech, is basic to the development and management of oral communication.
4 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media : The Extensions of Man (New York: McGraw Hill
Book, Co., 1964).
5 .Cooland Luk , a Warner Brothers , Jack Lemmon, Executive Producer, production, 1967.
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4) Ability to speik is an inherited characteristic of man which is carried in his
genetic pool, despite which each individual must develop this power for himself.
5) Growth of human culture is predicated upon five essentials: freedom in
general from instinctive behavior, physiological adaptability for a larger brain
for learning, a persistent drive for innovation, ability to think in terms of
symbols, mastery of oral communications.
6) Talk of humans is translated whereas sounds of animals are interpreted.
7) The evolution of speech in man has followed the Darwinian theories by making
changes through natural selection which met the test of survival for existence.
8) Some primitive tongues are much more complicated than modem languages.
9) Similarities among members of the Indo-Aryan-Germanic languages result from
a common heritage derived from an extinct ancestral form of speech.
10) Three fourths of the average working day are spent listening or talking.
11) Two essentials for human speech are a brain and a suitable physiological
apparatus for the production of the message. 6
To communicate through speech is to announce one's existence , to be interactive in
relation with others, to pierce through to the outer world. Communication in the raw is
essentially an interchange, an interrogative-response-rejoinder cycle, an action and its
counterpart -- the not-so-scientific reaction between an individual and the environment in
which he lives. As noted in the findings above, the process of oral communications and the
society of man have evolved together; mirror-imaging the complexity of their respective
6 A survey of the following works will substantiate these findings. Charles L. Barber, The Fl f
Langua (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.. 1964) Ch. 1-3; J. P. Firth, The Tongues of Men
andLSph (London: Oxford University Press, 1966) Ch 1-5; Louis H. Gray, FoumdatigM of
LAnguag( New York: The MacMillan Co., 1939) Ch 13; Stevan R. Harnard, Horst B. Steklis, Jane
Lancaster, eds. Origins and Evolution of Language and Speech (New York: The New York Academy
of Sciences, 1976). See specifically Hans Aarsleff "An Outline of Language-Origins Theory since the
Renaissance" 4-13; Paul Kiparsky "Historical Linguistics and the Origin of Language" 97-103; Ernst
von Glasserfield "The Development of Language as Purposive Behavior" 212-26; Ashley Montague
"Toolmaking, Hunting, and the Origin of Language" 266-74; Horst D. Steklis and S. R. Hamad "From
Hand to Mouth: Some Critical Stages in the Evolution of Language" 445-55; David Premack
"Mechanisms of Intelligence: Preconditions for Language" 544-61. Curtis W. Hayes, Jacob Ornstein
and William W. Gage ABC's of Languages and LingUistics (Maryland: Institute of Modern
Languages, Inc., 1977) Ch 2, 3; Herbert Landar Lanmage and Culture (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966) Chjl, 3, 5; Frank Smith and George A. Miller, eds. Geneis f
Lang=zag( Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M. I. T. Press, 1966) see specifically Eric H. Lenneberg
"The Natural History of Language" 219-52; Richard Allen Chase "Evolutionary Aspects of Language
Development and Function" 253-68; Mario Pei, The Story of Language (New York: J. P. Lippincott,
Co., 1949) Part I "The History of Language"; also his. Voic.QoMan (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1962) 1-26.
6
maturation. There is a certain logical symmetry to this development, for each entity is
merely a different aspect of the same, larger concept. Language is a form of social
behavior, a cultural indicator, simultaneously expressing and shaping the beliefs and
attitudes of people in group settings - whether it is the basic family unit, social classes or
castes, villages or cities, tribes or nations -- man and his methods of communication are
present.
2. The Written Word
In his quest for immortality, man developed signs, symbols, ideograms,
pictographs, alphabets to ensure his intellectual legacy, to create a living memory of ages
past. Written words extend far beyond the meaning on the page. Although lacking the
nuances of speech, the immediacy and power of an orator, they are, nonetheless, a
record of the process of man's thought. Effective writing demands that man engage his
logic, his ability to discriminate, and thus, stylistically to impart his message for the ages.
Longinus, an early Greek writing in the pre-Christian era, and W. Somerset Maugham
are in accord when discussing "...the great stylist's ability to choose, not a good, but the
inevitable word and place it appropriately in the composition."7 Histories of man best
remembered are those which follow the elements of the best style:
1) The speaker or writer must be endowed with creative imagination of a high level
of insight.
2) His creative drive must be sustained by strong emotion from beginning to end of
his composition.
3) He must exhibit able command of metaphor and other figures of speech.
4) He must have good diction, an excellent vocabulary, and be able to use it.
5) The structuring of the piece should exhibit awareness of order. 8
7 W. Somerset Maugham TheiSmming Ug (New York: The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1938)
22; H. J. Rose A Handbook of Greek Literature ( New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 1942) 400.01.
8 Maugham, 33-36.
7
Without the ability to read and write, man returns to the pre-literate society, rudimentary
in nature, and trapped in a time vacuum. Information exchange is dependent upon speech
and audio-visual devices, but there are no historical guides to what man has accomplished
before. Without writing, those skills, sciences, arts, philosophies, and bodies of laws and
customs which man has perfected over the centuries would perish. Generations-in-being
and those yet-to-come would be shorn of their "vace mecum", guidebook, and thereby forced
to retrace those steps on the protracted, perilous road to civilization. Pre-literate societies are
primitive in nature. The power of the written word, however, contributed to urbanization,
highly developed forms of trade, government, law, religion, literature, and the systemized
growth of knowledge, not merely information and yet, not quite that of wisdom. Man is
still attempting to achieve the latter.
Writing surfaces and the development thereof, soon became the quest of man. A
variety of elements and combinations were attempted, but it was not until the Egyptians' use
of the papyrus plant in the third millennium B.C. that the essentials were achieved:
lightweight, easily stored, not too bulky. Papyrus was soon followed by parchment, which
had been perfected in the Asia Minor city of Pergamum in the second century B.C.
Although libraries had been in existence as early as 2500 B.C. in Egypt, the production of
this durable, velvet-smooth surface, suitable for writing on both sides, enhanced and thereby
increased the copying of numerous manuscripts for the Hellenistic world. Under Julius
Caesar, a system of public libraries was established but in actuality, access to books was, and
would continue to be for centuries, the preserve of the wealthy. Whereas the West developed
parchment, the East, specifically the Chinese , experimented with silk. Reducing silk to a
pulp yielded a very high-grade, if expensive, paper. In 105 A.D., they succeeded in turning
the husks of cheaper fibers, i.e. cotton, into paper pulp. When the Arabs conquered
8
Samarkand in 712 A.D., they inherited the craft of papermaking, eventually passing it to the
West in the twelfth century.
Once the suitable surface issue had been resolved, the next challenge was to match
supply to demand. Monastic orders laboriously copying and illuminating texts, house
calligraphers, and private ateliers were, by definition answerable to the elite alone and yet,, the
audience of readership was ever-widening. Johann Gensfleisch, more commonly known as
Gutenberg, resolved the problem in a revolutionary manner. By inventing movable type,
developing casts of individual letter molds, and creating an ink which would adhere to metal
type, Gutenberg took an impressive technological leap forward. Books, and thus
information, could now be disseminated to the literate masses as never before. The
Industrial Revolution would build on the Gutenberg legacy with the introduction of still
cheaper paper manufactured from wood pulp, automatic typesetting, steam-operated and
rotary presses, and lithography. Mass production of books in conjunction with the rise of
mass education brought literature, science, philosophy, history, etc., into the "everyman's"
western European and American homes.
Publication of news for public consumption had its origins in the Roman Acta Diurna,
which were official announcements first posted for societal reading in 131 B.C. The Acta
Senaw, ordered by Julius Caesar in 59 B.C., provided transcripts of the Senate debates.
However, this was viewed as a mistake by the ruling elites, who promptly imposed
censorship, thus implying that political matters and the control thereof, were better left in the
hands of the few. Peking published the first printed newspaper in 748 A.D. 9. however the
West did not acknowledge the commercial possibilities of news until the first half of the
9 Robert W. Desmond The Information Process: World News Reoorting to the Twentieth Cnu
(Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1978) 10-11; Anthony Smith The Newsnaper An International
lli, ia(London: Thames and Hudson, 1979), 13-5.
9
sixteenth century. The Augsburg House of Fugger' °. a private commercial firm, published
handwritten "newsletters". These publications were written specifically for employees and
select favored customers with the emphasis on financial transactions, shipping information,
and government intrusion into the business world such that a knowledgeable grasp of
political occurrences became essential. Semi-private newsletters gradually evolved into
newspapers.
3. Newsbooks, Newspapers, and the Rise of Reporters
Printers, casting about for additional profitable enterprises, began to see the potential
in publishing news for an unrestricted audience and so by the middle of the 16th century,
journals in the form of pamphlets, christened "newsbooks" were born in Britain.1 1
Newsbooks were not, however, true newspapers due to the reality that a newsbook was
limited in its scope i.e. only one subject was addressed per issue. Approximately a century
would pass before the general interest newspaper would appear with any regularity. The
first was a German publication , Avisa Relation oder Zeining dating from 1609; which was
followed by Nienne Tijdinghen of Antwerp (1616), and the Gazette de France in Paris
(1631).12 Although dubbed the weekly press, publication dates were co-dependent on the
mail system which was infamous for its unreliability consequently, these early press efforts
were characterized by the spasmodicity of their arrivals. True "daily" newspapers first
appeared in the London of 1702 with the publication of the Daily Courrant which was soon
followed by published dailies in Switzerland and France.
Newspaper presses were not yet independent, as a diverse array of censorship
regulations had been enacted to ensure that the press did not too effectively challenge the
10 Desmond, 23-6; Smith, 18-20, 26-7.
11 Joseph Frank. The Beginnings of the English Newspaner 1620-1660 (Cambridge, Massachusetts:
Harvard University Press, 1961).
12 Desmond, 31-4; Smith. 48-52.
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government. Great Britain began with the Star Chamber Court as a device to cast rebellious
Puritan printers into prison, however it was abolished in 1641 but reincarnated as the
Parliament's own press control organism - a single licenser who thus controlled the printers.
John Milton's speech before Parliament in 1644 attacked the control of the written word by
such forceful eloquence as :
Though all the winds of doctrine were let loose to upon the earth, so truth be in the
field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting, to misdoubt her strength.Let her
and falsehood grapple; whoever knew truth put to the worse, in a free and open
encounter. 13
It was not however, until 1695 that Parliament would rescind the Licensing Act. The new
freedom was once again curtailed by the Stamp Tax of 1712, which artificially increased the
price of newspapers, which effectively reduced as well as restricted circulation. Libel laws
were the next weapon in the government's arsenal , the purpose of which was to prohibit
attacks on members of parliament, whether justified or not. Subterfuge was then employed
as journalists set parliamentary debates in mythical locations, eg. Gulliver and his travels to
Lifliput. This practice continued with periodic challenges to its authority until the passage of
the Libel Act of 1792, which empowered juries, instead of judges alone to determine if in
fact, a libel had been committed. Hohenberg states "It was in England, however, that the
hounding and persecution of noncomformist printers and vendors reached a depth that was
not exceeded by even the cruelties of the Spanish Inquisition." 14 Censorship has been an
issue since the first negative statement was uttered against a government. The British
example serves as one element of extremism when different worlds collide. America in
13 John Milton "For the Liberty of Printing" from the Azgpagitica in A Jibroy..fLth Word'sB
Literature Vol XXV ed. by Charles Dudley Warner (New York: The International Society, 1947)
10073-4.
14 John Hohenberg, Free Press/Free People: The Best Cause (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1971) 19.
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1734 challenged the idea of truth as libel when John Peter Zenger, a New York editor, was
acquitted despite his critical comments about the colony's governor. The idea of a free press
in America may be dated from that event. 15. and the concept was enshrined in the First
Constitutional Amendment, which specifically bars Congress from enacting any law
"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press."
As discussed earlier, the Industrial Revolution was a catalyst to the advancement of the
information process. True, it was the cylindrical steam-powered press and inexpensive
newsprint, in combination with the rotary press, linotype, and monotype machines which
made the publication of truly mass-based newspapers a reality, but two additional inventions
were to have incalculable effects on the press. Telegraphy and photography were to provide
world news in a matter of hours, in contrast to days, weeks, or "spasms"; and to provide it
"in the raw", in contrast to woodcuts, or steel engravings, which had been used in the past to
illustrate the news. Technology's imprimatur had begun shaping the news. When man and
machine met, yet another advance was possible, the creation of the international news
agency. Hundreds of reporters stationed around the globe provided the necessary
eyewitness accounts to subscribers thousands of miles distant. The first such operation was
the French Agence Havas, founded by Charles Havas in 1835. Germany soon followed
with the Wolff Agency in the later 1830s. The original two were then joined by Reuters of
Great Britain in 1851 and the Associated Press of the United States in the 1890s.16
Progress in newsgathering, newsreporting, and newsprinting would have been both
pointless and senseless without two vital elements: 1) a literate audience, 2) a co-equal
desire for, and interest in, reading the news. The compulsory education laws of the
15 Ibid. 39-43.
16 For a more detailed acccount of these organizations see Desmond, Ch 9; Smith, 126-8,140; Oliver
Gramling, AP: The Story of the News(New York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc., 1940); Jonathan
Fenby, The International News Services(New York: Schocken Books, 1986); Joe Alex Morris,
Deadline Every Minute: The Stor of the United Press(New York: Doubleday and Co., 1957).
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nineteenth century provided the former, while human nature in the form of curiosity and
farsighted publishers provided the latter. Two examples of such effective entrepreneurship
are illustrated by John Walter and his son in their design and development of the Times of
London, and by James Gordon Bennett and his son in their design and development of the
New York Herald.
First published in 1785 under the title The Daily Universal Register, (rechristened the
Times in 1788) John Walter viewed the paper as a vehicle for commercial news and
scandal. Interestingly enough, it was the latter, searching out scandal which led Walter to
construct one of the most efficient reporting staffs then in existence. 17 At the beginning of
the nineteenth century, John Walter I assumed management of the paper, established a new
perspective, and had the foresight to install Thomas Barnes as editor. Together, they
transformed the Times into an organ ideally suited to the tastes and needs of Britain's rising
middle ciass. Barnes is credited with being "...probably the first journalist to recognize the
power of public opinion, when properly channeled through a newspaper."18 The Times
became synonymous with the middle class, its strong right arm in its epic battles for political
reform. By 1841, the Times no longer had to fear governmental disapproval, for it was the
government that now warily eyed the power of the press wielded by this one entity. John
T. Delane, who succeeded Barnes found himself editing a paper which had become the semi-
(un)official spokesman for the government itself, irrespective of which party was in power.
Two significant precedents were established by the Times : 1) the concept that a newspaper
was a wholly independent body, accountable not to the government but rather, to public
opinion; 2) the employment of the first war correspondent, William Howard Russell,
17 john C. Merrill, The Elite Press: Great Newspaners of the World (New York: Pitman Publishing
Corp., 1968) 170-7.
18 Maurice Fabre, A History of Communications (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963) 63.
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whose journalistic dispatches from the Crimean War contributed to the cabinet's downfall in
1855.19
On the other side of the Atlantic, the Bennetts blazed a journalistic trail in the United
States. Originally from Scotland, James Gordon Bennett Sr. launched the New York Herald
at only a penny a copy. Popular journalistic practices in 1835 recognized the value of the
sensational, and it soon became a staple feature of the Herald. James Gordon Bennett Jr.
assumed management duties in 1867 and may be credited with the rather notorious idea that
not only should a newspaper report the news, but it should, in fact, make it.20 This
convention still exists even today. "Making the News" was exactly what Bennett Jr. was in
pursuit of when he consigned Henry Stanley to to the jungles of Africa in search of the
legendary missionary, Dr. David Livingstone in the year 1869. Twenty-four thousand
dollars poorer but immeasurably wealthier in terms of newspapers sold, subscriptions
requested, and publicity garnered, Bennett created the story of the age.
What the Bennetts had begun, Joseph Pulitzer and William Randolph Hearst brought to
fruition. Following a ten year apprenticeship as a reporter, columnist, and owner of a failing
newspaper, Pulitzer emerged in 1878 as the publisher-editor of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
His causes, and therefore the newspaper's crusades included revelations concerning
municipal corruption and calls for its reform, advocacy of labor's rights, disclosure of tax
evasion by prominent citizens, and the ongoing problem of crime. A Pulitzer-owned
newspaper was distinguished by the following characteristics: 1) stress on the news rather
than editorializing; 2) autonomy for the reporter and the use of by-lines; 3) professional,
19 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty of War (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1975).
20 F. L. Mott, American Journalism A History: 1691)-1960 3:d ed.(New York: The Macmillan Co.,
1962) 415-21; Don C. Seitz, The James Gordon Bennetts (Indianpolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1928)
chronicles the rise and fall of the New York Herald.
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ethical, well-educated reporters. 21 The New York World became his next project in 1883
and in the premier issue, he outlined his goals.
There is room in this great and growing city for a journal that is not only cheap but
bright, not only bright but large, not only large but truly democratic - dedicated to the
cause of people rather than that of the purse-potentates - devoted more to news of the
New than the Old World - that will expose all fraud and sham, fight all public evils
and abuses - that will serve and battle for the people with earnest sincerity. 22
His created World and its ensuing popularity answered the public's desire for an animated,
attractive, crusading, and intelligently liberal journal.23 Unfortunately, it was also tainted by
the appearance of sensationalism.
William Randolph Hearst was Pulitzer's nearest rival. His newspaper career began as
publisher-editor of the San Francisco Examiner in 1887. However it wasn't until 1894,
with his purchase of the Morning Journal (later christened the New York Journal ), that he
posed a direct challenge to Pulitzer on his home turf. Both the World and the Journal
specialized in sensationalism, but whereas Pulitzer insisted upon accuracy, Hearst focused
on the competition and the clock. As the "father of yellow journalism", his journalistic
ethics were questionable even as circulation was soaring. The classic example of Hearst's
inclination to allegedly manufacture the news in the style of J.G. Bennett Jr. is his famous
telegram to Frederic Remington in Cuba 1897. Remington, who was sent to investigate a
war, found none and reported this fact to Hearst. According to Creelman, the following
exchange of telegrams took place.
21 Two comprehensive biographies of Joseph Pulitzer and his journalistic innovations are James W.
Barrett, Joseph Pulitzer and His World (New York: Vanguard Press, 1941); George Juergens, Jseh
Pulitzer and the New York World (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966); see also
Julian S. Rammelkamp, Pulitzer's Post-Dis atch (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1966); Don Seitz, Joseph Pulitzer His Life and Letters (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1924);
W. A. Swanberg, Puit(New York: Scribner's, 1967).
2 2 New York World dtd May 11, 1883 quoted by Robert Sobel in The Manipulators: America in the
Media AgC (New York: Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1976) 21.
23 Ibid, 21-23; Edwin Emery, The Press and America 3rd ed.(New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1972)
314-21.
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Hearst, Journal, New York: Everything is quiet. There is no trouble here. There
will be no war. Wish to return. Remington
Remington, Havana: Please remain. You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish
the war. Hearst 24
By the turn of the century popular journalism had come of age, and there has been little
essential change since then.
Circulation continues to grow, however the actual number of newspapers available is
steadily contracting. Escalating costs have forced hundreds of papers to cease publication
during the post World War II era. Increasingly monopolistic chains such as Gannett, a result
of leveraged buyouts and consolidations, and the technological competition from broadcast
journalism have seen the rise of the single paper town, and the decline of the morning,
afternoon, and evening editions. Without such competition, it becomes doubtful whether the
press is, in reality, able to meet its obligations to its readers. Historically, the Cold War era
placed an additional burden on the press, for the editor was periodically confronted with the
delicate dilemma of balancing his obligation to inform the public against the government's
need to suppress information in the interest of national security. Recent changes in the
international world order have only served to intensify this conflict. It will be argued later
that a free press is the foundation of America's liberties, and hence its national security. As
Thomas Jefferson said, "Were it left to me to decide whether we should have a government
without newspapers or newspapers without government I should not hesitate a moment to
prefer the latter."2
24 James Creelman, On the Great Highway (Boston: Lothrop Publishing Co., 1901) 177-8 cited by F.
L. Mott, 529; W. A. Swanberg, CitizenHers (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1961) 107-08;
John Tebbel, The Life and Good Times of William Randolph Hea-st (New York: Dutton, 1952.
2 A. A. Lipscomb and A. E. Bergh, ed. The Writings of Thomas Jefferson Vol IV (Washington, D.C.:
Acropolis Books, Ltd, 1903-5), 25.
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B. TECHNOLOGY OF COMMUNICATIONS
The daily newspaper delivered to one's door or purchased at the local convenience store
enroute to work represents a blend of one of the older methods of communications with
many newer forms, dating from the mid-nineteenth century to the present. Local news may
be telephoned into the city room via modem by a remote computer terminal. National and
international news items, once available only via the telegraph or teletype, are now
transmitted through satellite broadcast hook-ups, microwave relay stations, and their ilk.
Graphic images may be the result of a human photographer's efforts or an "eye in the sky"
transmitted through the medium of wirephoto, radiophoto, telephone facsimile. On the
entertainment pages of the newspaper will appear reviews of movies, television
programming, radio highlights, and media issues. Telecommunications, derived from the
Greek "tele" meaning "at a distance, far off" and the Latin "commmunicare" meaning "to
make common", has begun the McLuhan process of global correspondence through the
mystery of electricity.
1. Telegraph, Telephone, Tell the World
Space Age communications actually existed long before Sputnik, "the space
autograph of Socialism" 26 was launched. Primitive methods such as Indian smoke signals,
African drum beats, and Viking light beacons permitted communication to occur. Although
Greeks, Romans, Carthaginians, et. al developed a variety of techniques to relay news, these
were both insufficient as their empires expanded, and notoriously inefficient as well.
Unreliability was to be their hallmark for the sheer numbers of human intermediaries
between the original source and the final recipient virtually guaranteed that the message
would be garbled in transit, lost in the translation, or worse, misinterpreted by mischance. In
26Academician Vsevolod Avdevsky "The Development of Space Rocketry and Technology in the
USSR(1946-1957) in Yuri Gagarin History of the USSR: Now Research 5 (Moscow: "Social
Sciences Today" Editorial Office, 1986) ed by "Social Sciences Today" editorial board, 93.
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the waning hours of darkness before the dawn of the electric era, Claude Chappe, a French
engineer, invented an optical telegraph in 1794. Widely used, its stations were equipped with
a signaling system consisting of three movable pieces of wood operated by strings and
pulleys. Erected atop high buildings or mountains at close intervals, manned by operators
who would signal from one station to the next, this system had by 1844, connected twenty-
nine French cities through five hundred stations encompassing mc, z than three thousand
miles. Cooperative weather patterns could permit the transmission of a message between
Paris and Toulon, a distance of five hundred miles in only twenty minutes.27
By the early 1800s man had gained some understanding of the properties of electricity,
and preliminary attempts to harness it for service to mankind were occurring. The German
physiologist S.T. von Sommering invented the water voltameter telegraph in 1809, followed
by Karl Gauss and Wilhelm E. Weber, inventors of an electromagnetic telegraph, whose
functional range was in excess of nine thousand feet. Patent rights were obtained in 1837 by
Sir Charles Wheatstone and William F. Cooke for their electric telegraph. However, it was
the American Samuel F.B. Morse whose invention of a code of dots and dashes made it
both possible and practical to transmit messages over great distances in a matter of minutes.
Americans, always anxious to embrace the latest technology, ensured that within the space of
a few years telegraph lines had united the majority of the major American cities. Twenty-
one years after the introduction of the telegraph, the transatlantic cable was laid, thus linking
the Old World with the New, a harbinger of the end of the United States' self-contained,
isolationist Weltanschauung. Although the corrosive elements of salt water would cause
communications to be disrupted and ultimately fail, the capability had been proven.
Resurrected in 1866, the transatlantic telegraph cable would experience the inauguration of
transatlantic cable telephone service ninety years later.
27 Raymond Williams, omouznicatzin (London: ChaUo and Windus, 1966).
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Alexander Graham Bell's ability to synthesize the work of past experimenters in concert
with innovations of his own, resulted in the development of the first practical telephone. His
quest to "...make a current of electricity vary in intensity precisely as the air varies in density
during the production of sound" 28 was realized on June 3, 1875 when he succeeded in
transmitting speech electrically. Unveiled at the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition in 1876,
the public's curiosity was piqued and fellow inventors such as Thomas Edison intrigued.
Transcontinental telephone service had been inaugurated in North America by 1915.
Telegraph and telephone share two intriguing commonalities: both employed wires in
the past, fiber optics in the present, and both represent, essentially, a method of person-to-
person communication. Defining the mass media at the close of the nineteenth century was
an uncomplicated task, it consisted of the newspaper, the magazine, and the book.
Monopolies eventually come to an end, and the printed word was no exception. Wireless
telegraphy, which foreshadowed the invention of the radio was to be the root cause of the
nineteenth century mass media's downfall. 29 James Clark Maxwell, a Scottish physicist,
provided the theoretical base for experiments in transmitting sound through space without
wires, postulating the idea that electromagnetic waves move through space at the speed of
light. 30 The year was 1869. Heinrich Hertz, a German scientist, realized Maxwell's theories
through a series of experiments conducted in 1887. By means of a spark discharge, he
created electromagnetic waves, detected them on a somewhat primitive receiving antenna,
28 A. Graham Bell, "Researches in Telephony", reprint of a paper read before the American Academy
of Arts and Sciences, May 10, 1876 in The Teleohone: An Historical Anthologv (New York: Arno
Press, 1977) ed. by George Shiers; Thomas A. Watson, "How Bell Invented the Telephone" reprint of
an address delivered at the annual meeting of the American Institute of Electrical Engineers, New
York May 18, 1915 in Shiers.
29 Sidney H. Aronson, "Bell's Electrical Toy: What's the Use? The Sociology of Early Telephone
Usage" in The Social Impact of the Telephone ed. by Ithiel de Sola Pool (Cambridge,Massachusetts:
The MIT Press, 1977) 15-36; John R. Pierce, "The Telephone and Society in the past 100 Years"
159-94, John Brooks, Telephone: The First 100 Years (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers,
1976) Ch 1. 2.30 H. Poincare, Maxwell's Theory and Wireless Teleraphv Part One: Maxwell's Theory and Hertzian
OcillatIns trans by Frederick K. Freeland (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1904) Ch 1, 2.
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and measured their velocity. "Hertizian Waves" which did, in fact, move at Maxwell's
postulated speed of light formed the basis of radio.31 Guglielmo Marconi was the last link in
the chain of wireless telegraphy and in an amazingly short time, he was transmitting signals
over a nine mile distance in 1896, across the English Channel in 1899, and across the
Atlantic Ocean in 1901.
2. Radio and TV: The Voice and Eyes of the World
Radio was the next logical step in man's desire to announce his existence by
transmitting speech through the air. Reginald Aubrey Fessenden theorized that a continuous
radio wave was similar to a sustained musical note which could be modulated to the shape of
articulate speech. By 1900 he was broadcasting speech over a distance of one mile and five
years later, the exponential improvement was 200 miles. However, it was the emerging
science of electronics which would fashion radio into the first medium of instant mass
communications. Devising the electronic vacuum tube in 1904, Sir John Ambrose Fleming
had harnessed the electron's power to modulate, amplify, and detect electromagnetic waves.
Improving upon this invention in 1906, Lee DeForest created the three-element tube or audio
which would become the basis of modem radio, television, and radar as well as a multitude
of other means of communication.
America's entry into World War I elevated the status of the radio from a mere
entertainment toy for amateur ("ham") wireless operators to an operational asset for military
communicators. The postwar boom of the 1920s and David Sarnoffs vision of radio as a
means of entertainment, information, and education collided. As commercial manager of
Radio Corporation of America in 1920, Sarnoff realized his dream articulated six years
earlier to his superior at the American Marconi Company.
31 joid, a 4.
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I have in mind a plan of development which would make radio a household utility.
The idea is to bring music into the home by wireless. The receiver can be designed
in the form of a simple "radio music box", and arranged for several different wave-
lengths which should be changeable with the throwing of a single switch or the
pressing of a single button. The same principle can be extended to numerous other
fields, eg. receiving lectures at home...events of national importance can be simul-
taneously announced and received...baseball scores...proposition would be especially
interesting to farmers and others living in outlying districts. 32
Perhaps, only "the shadow knew" just how effective this device was to be.
While radio was making a reality of the instantaneous transmission of the voice and
music through space, Thomas Edison's phonograph was undergoing a metamorphosis from
a crude sound recording device to electronic phonographs which amplified the previously
rather faint and scratchy sound. The cinema was also in its developmental stages. Edison's
Kinetograph and Kenetoscope were soon joined by the Lumiere brothers Cinematograph.
However, it was Georges Melies' creative imagination, technical innovation, and prolific
output which set the standard 33 for an industry which has entertained, informed, educated,
infuriated, shocked, and at times, misled hundreds of millions of people for well over half a
century.
Television experiments may be dated as early as 1873, when it was discovered that the
element selenium, when exposed to different degrees of light, exhibited a variation in its
electrical conductivity. Reactions of selenium were too slow for practical applications, but
with the use of a mechanical scanning disk invented by the German Paul Niprow in 1884,
projection of diffuse images over short spaces was achieved. Most early experiments took
this mechanical approach, but with the invention of the cathode ray tube in 1895, the
electronic method appeared to offer more promise. During the 1920s, the Russian-American
scientist Vladimir K. Zworykin designed a electronic scanning device or "eye" which could
32 Carl Dreher, Sarnoff: An American Success (New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book
Co.. 1977) 39-40.33 See Kevin Brownlow, The Parade's Gone By (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1969) for an in-
depth analysis and history of the early days of motion picture making.
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produce images of fine definition, the iconoscope or cathode-ray tube for transmitting, and
the kinescope or tube with a fluorescent screen for receiving. The Radio Corporation of
America invested in Zworykin's inventions and on April 30, 1939 at the World's Fair in
New York, it inaugurated a regular semi-weekly television service.
America's entry into World War I signaled a governmental ban on all civilian television
production, although continued military research was to yield a number of advances in
television that would later be adapted to postwar use. Postwar television sets were
characterized by small seven or ten inch screens and high cost, but these two factors did not
deter the American public. Eventually mass-production techniques and refinements on
existing processes enlarged the screen, reduced the cost, and provided stereophonic sound.
3. Mass Media Minus the Monopoly
No mass medium has a monopoly on the functions of communications in the present
age, although television comes close. The various media interact in such a way that each new
development has repercussions on them all. Radio, in its earliest incarnation, was considered
by some editors as a direct threat to the very existence of the press. In reality it was not, as it
could only provide a skeletal framework for the news, unlike the in-depth analysis and
comprehensive coverage that newspapers and news magazines could supply. To some
degree, radio whetted the appetite of the public who would then gorge themselves on a surfeit
of riches provided by the print medium. Television's impact on radio, cinema, and the
publishing world has resulted in the emergence of some interesting patterns. First, formats
have to be altered. Television assumed the mantle of comedy shows, thrillers, dramas, and
quiz programs. Radio reverted to music, news, talk shows, all enhanced by FM and the
mobility of the automobile. Television plagiarized the subject matter of motion pictures but
could not compete in terms of scale, spectacle, and in some instances quality. Videotape and
audio cassettes have blurred the distinction among the various aspects of the mass medium.
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A book may become a movie, reduced to videocassette, and later sold to television.
A television movie may appear in book format at the local bookstore. A book may be
recorded on audio cassettes to while away a driver's commuting time.
Each new advance stimulates others in a chain reaction that has accelerated so rapidly,
especially in the field of communications, that new inventions, as well as refinements of old
ones, seem to be announced almost daily. Mass communications are upon us resulting from
such technologies as laser, computer, facsimile, television, tape, diode, silicon chip, satellites,
etc. The history of communications is replete with examples of man's attempts to project his
thoughts, his words, and ultimately himself farther, faster, and with greater fidelity to the
original than was previously thought possible.
Persistence of vision is a scientific phenomenon in which an individual continues to see
an image long after it has disappeared. The question of the persistence and pervasiveness of
the media should also be addressed; What is being accomplished for mankind by the
acceleration, voluminous reproduction and transmission of messages, both public and
private, around the world? The scope of the question is too broad for this effort, however
man's efforts at diplomacy and the media's effects upon this specialized area of
interpersonal/interstate communications bears further examination.
C. HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY
1. Origins
Linguistically, the word diplomacy is derived from the Greek "diplomata", which
means "folded documents". Actual usage in the English speaking world dates from the end
of the eighteenth century. Prior to that time an emissary was appointed, entitled herald,
messenger, orator, or negotiator, and dispatched to bargain over hunting territory, settle claim
disputes, or arrange inter-tribal marriages. Contemporary diplomatic traditions have been
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influenced primarily by the classical Greek experience. 34 Their multi-state system,
characterized by fragmentation, pluralism, and formal equality of status permitted diplomacy
to flourish within certain limitations, and defined a vocabulary of diplomatic terms for
various aspects of conciliation including "arrangements", "truces", "conventions", alliances",
"commercial treaties" and "peace". Roman law was to formalize these contractual
relationships and establish the model for later European treaties. Ambassadors were first
used in twelfth century Byzantine courts as both supplicants and reporters, however, their
practice of gathering information gave birth to the reputation of ambassadors as spies, a
persistent impression which continues to the present day.
Fifteenth century Italian city-states introduced the concept of a permanent mission or
legation to the European continent. No longer operating within the assumption of obedience
to a supreme authority as embodied in the Roman Catholic Church and its canon law, these
city-states secularized diplomacy and focused on the particular interests of the states. By
systematizing the procedures and the service of diplomacy, a certain permanence and stability
was now associated with the process. According to Holsti the functions of these diplomats
included obtaining information, safeguarding political and military interests, and extending
commerce, 35 roles little changed to the present. Although the Italian city-state system
collapsed due to conquest and occupation in the late 1490s, the conquerors became heir to the
methods, procedures, and atmosphere of Italian diplomacy. By 1626, Armand-Jean du
Plessis, Cardinal-Duke of Richelieu, functioning in his role as diplomatic advisor to Louis
XIII, established a Ministry of External Affairs, thus centralizing the management of foreign
relations. Duplicated throughout Europe, French diplomatic leadership was the sine qua
non, and the French language became the vernacular of diplomacy. It may be said that when
34 Michael Grant, The Rise of the Greeks (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1987) 65-9.
35 K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis 4th ed.(New Jersey: Prentice-Hall
Inc., 1983) 165-6.
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the Congress of Vienna convened in 1815, the rules and customs of diplomacy embodied in
the Reglement were the endorsement of practices established by Richelieu almost two
hundred years earlier.36
2. The Congress System in Concert with Europe
Commencing with the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and ending with the dissolution of
the Concert of Europe in 1914, the Golden Age of Diplomacy was in existence for nearly a
century. The Quadruple Alliance between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia
convened the Congress of Vienna in an effort to reorder the world following the Napoleonic
period, to design a realistic framework ensuring the continued existence of the peace
settlements, and to safeguard against the recurrence of war. Although not wholly successful,
it did establish a number of precedents for the conduct of interstate relations. When France
joined the alliance three years later, die pursuit of peace through negotiation, mediation, and
pragmatism was considered the logical and preferable method for maintaining the status quo.
Great Powers did not fight among themselves or against each other, they simply partitioned
the lesser developed countries, added to their colonial coffers, and acknowledged the
sovereignty of their privileged brethren above all others. Concert soon replaced Congress as
the indicator of agreement and willingness to compromise. The fate of the world was now
orchestrated by such players as Austria-Hungary, Czarist Russia, Ottoman Turkey, Prussia,
Great Britain, France, and Italy. With the exception of the Crimean War (1854-1856) Great
Britain, France, Prussia, Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Italy engaged in war with one another
for a period totaling a mere eighteen months over the next century. Contrast that with the
previous two centuries, which were characterized by an average of sixty to seventy years of
significant warfighting, and this era appears even more impressive.
36 Ibid.
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A short digression is appropriate at this point. Policy makers are confronted by a
fundamental choice when attempting to execute policy, option A - instruments of
violence, or option B - instruments of nonviolence. Karl von Clausewitz summarized the
inter- relationship of these alternatives in his now classic maxim, "War is nothing but the
continuation of politics by other means. "37 War is the ultimate failure to communicate and
as the horrors of war have multiplied, and man's inhumanity to man has assumed ever more
grotesque forms, a solution has been sought in the realm of diplomacy. However, the
inability of diplomacy to resolve conflicts of interest may lead to war. Conversely, the
inability of war to prevail in terms of total capitulation or total annihilation may require
diplomacy to negotiate a truce or face-saving settlement. Haas and Whiting mark the
distinction between these two aspects of diplomacy.
In peace, diplomacy represents the accumulative political and economic pressures upon
each side, formalized in the exchange of demands and concessions between negotiators.
In terminating a war, diplomacy represents the accumulative political, economic, and
military pressures, formalized in ratification of a peace treaty between victor and van-
quished.38
In the heyday of the Concert of Europe, the concerns of the elites dominated all others, and it
was not in their interest to engage in cost-consuming wars. This symphonic peace coincided,
and probably contributed to, the economic, scientific, industrial, and technological revolution
which was in its infancy, thus inspiring a pattern of multilateral diplomatic institutional
approaches to occur.39 Therefore, the diplomacy of peace aspect was assiduously practiced.
37 Karl von Clausewitz, On r an by Michael Howard and Peter Parer (New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1976).
38 Ernst B. Haas and Allen S. Whiting, Dynamics of International Relations (New York: McGraw
Hill, 1956), 153.
39 Holsti, 164; Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books,
1989) 143-5.
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As a direct result of this era of peace, the Great Powers may be credited with elevating
diplomacy to that of a distinguished vocation, requiring specialized professional skills, and
exerting a particular appeal to social and intellectual elites. The Congress of Vienna in 1815
established the four diplomatic ranks in descending importance: ambassadors and papal
nuncios, envoys extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary, ministers resident, and charges
d'affaires. With the exception of a brief period following the Russian Revolution of 1917,
when the Soviet government made an abortive and self-defeating attempt to create its own
diplomatic usage and procedures, 4° these titles remain in use today to determine the ranking
of diplomatic officials at ceremonial and political functions. This bureaucratization process
resulted in the codification of diplomatic communications and exchanges, standardization of
diplomatic roles, and the fundamental alteration in the manner in which international
agreements would be orchestrated. The Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818 witnessed the
agreement in principle for international consultation to occur on a regular basis as a means of
ordering the world's affairs. The Congresses of Troppau and Laibach, 1820-1821
inaugurated the idea of collective intervention in an effort to delay the spread of nationalism, a
goal in which they would succeed for almost one hundred years. The 1822 Congress of
Verona marked the end of the first era of the Congress system in Europe. Unable to
prevent intervention in Spain, and refusing to cooperate with the other powers, Great
Britain's intransigence doomed the system itself. The 1856 Congress of Paris initiated the
codification of international law in terms of naval warfare, admission of Turkey to the
European concert, and the maintenance of the status quo. The 1871 London Conference,
although not strictly a Congress, is significant in that it was convened to reaffirm the
principle that international obligations could not be arbitrarily abrogated by one power, but
40 Sensitive to the aristocratic or royal sound to the word "ambassador", it was banished from the
Soviet vocabulary and replaced by "polpreds". The obscurity of the title prevented the Soviet envoys
from asserting their precedence in the diplomatic corps so a return to the bourgeois conventions and
titles was permitted.
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only by obtaining the consent of all the signatory powers. Russia was the offending party in
this instance, as it had attempted to annul the liabilities it had incurred as a result of the Treaty
of Paris. The Congress of Berlin 1872 marked the end of the second era of the Congress
system in Europe, and resulted in the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire.
Diplomacy began to shift from a focus on the resolution of wars and the restructuring
of the world as determined by the Congress, to the problem of codifying international law by
a series of conferences. These conferences considered such a diverse array of issues as
agriculture, regulation and production of sugar, international standards of sanitation, tariffs,
international telegraphy, navigation rights on the Danube, the prime meridian, traffic in
alcohol, statistics, postal unions, maritime signaling, and weights and measu, s. The two
most famous are the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. This concept of multi-lateral
conerence diplomacy would foreshadow the League of Nations, and come to realization
with the creation of the United Nations.
3. The New World Foreign Policy
What was perhaps the most fateful innovation in the twentieth century was tl'f
ending of the European monopoly brought about by the entry of the United States into this
small elite group of senior members in the diplomatic community. America's late entry may
be attributed to an historical tradition articulated first by George Washington in his Farewell
Address of 1793.
The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is in extending our com-
mercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible. So far as we
have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. - Here let
us stop... our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different
course...why forego the advantage of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand
upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiry with that of any part of Europe,
entangle our peace and prosperity?41
41 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States 5th ed. (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1965) 109.
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The Doctrine of Two Spheres 42 articulated by John Adams, Thomas Jefferson, and James
Monroe reinforce this idea. "Our policy in regard to Europe which was adopted at an early
stage of the wars which have so long agitated that quarter of the globe, nevertheless remains
the same, which is, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any of its powers..."4 3
Foreign policy was essentially isolationist in nature, therefore a diplomatic corps was an
unnecessary, costly, non-effective way to go about one's business. Europe, the Old World,
represented all that had gone awry, what had compelled the establishment of the New World.
This same rugged, almost idiosyncratic, individualism would turn inward and westward,
focusing on the ideal of Manifest Destiny, carving a country out of nothing, and a
community answering to no one. Until 1893 no single American diplomat serving abroad
held a rank higher than minister. In 1906 the U.S. maintained only nine embassies abroad,
the remainder simply legations. Foreign service employees at the end of World War HI
numbered less than eight hundred and fewer than half of those serving as heads of mission
were career diplomats.
D. DIPLOMACY OF COMMUNICATIONS
Although entering the diplomatic arena somewhat later in time, America adapted
quickly to the elements of protocol which had evolved since the time of Richelieu. The issue
of determining rank and precedence has already been discussed, but the key to effective
diplomacy, communication has not. French was considered the universal diplomatic
language as early as the seventeenth century and retained this distinction until the Versailles
Conference of 1919, when English was designated the co-official language with it. Mario
Pei, a renowned linguist, argues that the French language is particularly well suited to be the
42 See Max Savelle's The Origins of American Diplomacy (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1967)
26-30. 210-15 for an interesting discussion of the historical European roots of this concept.
43 J. D. Richardson, ed., Messages and Papers of the Presidents (Washington. 1896). II ,218-9.
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language of diplomacy due to its regular syntax, well-developed vocabulary, and precision.
Conversely, Spanish and Italian are prolix and overelastic; English, German, and Russian
are blunt and overdirect. 44 As of 1967, although there were five official languages at the
United Nations, French and English were the most commonly used among delegates of
countries to which none of the five languages represented their native tongue. Today the
problem of finding a common vernacular is compounded by the use of simultaneous
translations into the listener's native tongue.
1. Purposes of Diplomatic Communications
What exactly, are the purposes of diplomatic communications? At its root level
diplomacy is negotiation by professionals, as if between actual governmaLs in an effort to
influence the government abroad to which the individual diplomat is accredited, while
maintaining his own credibility and influence at home. The key however, is the process of
negotiation, whose goal is either to change or sustain mutual objectives and policies, or so
reach an accord over some disputed issue. Motivations underlying diplomatic
communication may be said to occur on a tri-level basis. 45 At the first level are routine
contacts whereby views are exchanged, intentions probed, actions proposed or support
offered. This is negotiation "in good faith". Hard bargaining is not in evidence here. At the
second level, either a bilateral or multilateral conference is arranged as a delaying tactic, or to
create the illusion of governmental interest in negotiating, when, in fact, no such desire
exists. This is negotiation to "buy time" in order to amass additional power elsewhere. At
the third level, the negotiation arena becomes a platform for propaganda, to attempt an appeal
to the public, as well as influence the public. This is negotiation to "embarrass", forcing the
44Mario Pei, ed., Language Today: A Survey of Current Linguistic Thought (New York: Funk and
Wagnalls, 1967) Ch 3. Note: Pei had been a lecturer for the Foreign Policy Association, the Modem
Language Association, the Voice of America, and Radio Free Europe prior to his passing.
45 Holsti, 226-8; Haas and Whiting, p 135-40.
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other party into an ideologically unfavorable position. Diplomacy, at its core, is the effort to
change the policies, actions, objectives, and attitudes of other governments and their
diplomats by persuasion, offering rewards, exchanging concessions, or making veiled
threats.
2. The Personnel of Diplomacy
Earlier it was stated that animal sounds are interpreted whereas language is translated.
Who translates a country's foreign policy, the indicator of where the country wants to go in
adjusting itself to its environment , its relationships to other governments and people?
Traditionally, the diplomat did this in his office as ambassador with staff of career experts.
These are the professionals characterized by such attributes as: experience, delegated
authority, knowledge of local conditions, relative anonymity, and freedom from other duties.
They should also possess what Harold Nicolson termed the "Seven Diplomatic Virtues" i.e.
truthfulness, precision, calm, good temper, patience, modesty, and loyalty."46 The reality in
U.S. diplomatic circles is that career diplomats are frequently shunted aside in favor of
inexperienced political appointees. Additionally, individuals too long absent from their own
country may experience the phenomenon of "going native", assuming the prejudices and
opinions of the host country, and thereby destroying their utility as representatives of their
own country and as an advocate of its policies. Finally, accreditation to one country by
necessity, narrows the ambassador's field of vision such that his intensity of focus may
become a drawback as well.
Secretaries of State and foreign ministers, when operating in the realm of diplomacy
provide different advantages when negotiating on behalf of their country. By virtue of their
rank, these individuals are accorded a substantial degree of authority, gain an intimate and
comprehensive knowledge of foreign policy in all its aspects, and are given immediate access
46 Sir Harold George Nicolson, Dili1o1acy 2nd ed. (London: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1952).
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to extensive briefings on the details of specific problems. Frequent contacts with their
foreign counterparts permits greater ease of communication and more rapid clarification of
misunderstandings. Disadvantages do arise with this form of diplomacy as well:
personalization of policy may become a liability, foreign secretaries are responsible not
simply for one country on any given day but a multitude, including issues which may arise
in the United Nations. Policy decisions made in his absence will be the result of telephone
conferences or the initiative of the second-in-command, both of which represent second-best
options.
Heads of State negotiating foreign policy in face-to-face encounters has its origins in the
Congress system. During this period specific conditions for negotiation were established:
participants shared the same values in terms of a pragmatic outlook on the balance of power.
Heads of state wielded absolute power and were the sole spokesman for the state; sovereigns
were immune, and the needs of the sovereign and his state were the national interest.
Twentieth century heads of state do not meet on such equal territory. The only advantage
appears to be the opportunity to commit one's country to a greater extent than a foreign
minister or an ambassador. 47 However, the disadvantages far outweigh the singular
advantage. These include: lack of experience in diplomatic negotiations, inability to
communicate aims, varied executive duties supersede diligent preparation and total
concentration on the issue, as well as limiting the duration of the negotiations, risking of
personalization of policy, and pressure to produce results in the glare of publicity. Failure on
the part of a head of state to effectively negotiate a solution results in double jeopardy,
maneuverability is destroyed.
47 Even this advantage is questionable in terms of the U. S. which contains its own system of checks
and balances on the executive branch.
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Two other types of negotiators have been used with increasing frequency, particularly
by the U.S., since World War H. These are the civilian special representatives or "amateur
diplomats", and the military soldier-statesman. The former may be drawn from the worlds
of politics, business, or academia, selected for his or her expert knowledge in a particular
field of endeavor, an original outlook, or novel approach as opposed to the bureaucratized
career diplomat. Unfortunately, these advantages may be outweighed by such human foibles
as inexperience in the politics of negotiation, less of a personal stake in the negotiation's
outcome or engendering professional jealousies on the part of career diplomats. Selection of
a personal representative is essentially a judgement call based on personal knowledge of, and
admiration for, an individual who though he may excel in his chosen field, has not
undergone the test of time nor trial by fire of the career diplomat, whose livelihood depends
on mastering the finer points of negotiating. To phrase it another way, diplomacy is not for
dilettantes.
The latter negotiator, the military soldier-statesman continues to be part of an ongoing
debate.48 In this context, the military negotiator is considered apart from his traditional
duties i.e. defining terms for the cessation of hostilities, mediation of formal surrenders, etc.
Instead, military negotiators, particularly those assigned to military assistance missions, may
find themselves in the midst of basing rights discussions, arms control initiatives, or
overseas economic and social programs. A military mindset which combines politics with
strategy, by viewing the world in terms of ally and enemy, may be disadvantageous when
the value of a neutral entity is underrated or disregarded entirely. This brief survey of
48 See Jerome Slater "Military Officers and Politics I", commentary by John P. Lovell, 749-60, John
H. Garrison, "Military Officers and Politics II", 760-7; and John E. Ralph, "Military Officers and
Politics i1", 767-70 in American Defense Policy 5th ed. ed. by John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm
(Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982) for an interesting debate of the
role of the U. S. military in the formulation of foreign policy; Donald F. Bletz, Rle o th
Military Professional in U. S. Foreign PQlicy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972) presents a
convincing argument as to their unique qualities in the realm of foreign policy.
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diplomats and the "men who would be" suffices to illustrate how the multiplication of
personalities in the realm of formal negotiations has both contributed to and complicated the
outcome of said negotiations. At the other end of the spectrum, one should consider the
technology otdiplomacy.
E. TECHNOLOGY OF DIPLOMACY
1. Rapid Speech Transmitted But Slowly
Previously, an examination of man's attempts at communication was conducted.
Various technological advances contributed to man's ability to communicate ever more
efficiently across three dimensions, time, distance, and space. What effect, if any, did this
have on the fine art of diplomacy which, after all, is communication through the art of
negotiation? To begin at the beginning, early exchanges were in the form of oral orders or
directives to a messenger who would commit the terms, conditions, demands, etc. to
memory. Dispatched on horseback or on foot, the messenger was invariably hampered by
two deficiencies, relative slowness in transmittal time, unreliability in terms of failure to
arrive at the intended destination due to a multitude of factors, both natural and man-made.
Messengers, as trusted emissaries, could answer questions as well as interpret the meaning
of the memorized information. Interpretation, ho-wever, can be a double-edged sword, for
failure to ascertain exactly what the originator's intent was could lead to grave errors and
dangerous misunderstandings.
The next two innovations were the development of an alphabet which permitted the
creation of a written text, and a writing surface which could be made portable. Not only
could information now be stored and recovered for later perusal, but it could also be
transmitted with greater accuracy than was previously possible. Individual messengers could
w be augmented by instituting a relay system of messengers, who by journeying day and
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night could conceivably increase transmission time exponentially. As with most
innovations, the relay system had its drawbacks as well. As the original messenger was not
the fnal messenger, the latter was limited to conveying only what appeared on the written
note. Incapable of answering questions or interpreting the originator's intent, the written
missive had to stand on its own merits. The ruler was then left with a Hobson's Choice, he
could either attempt to exercise more than the most general degree of control over political
affairs by putting himself in the midst of the diplomatic effort, or he could remain within the
boundaries of his kingdom, retain local leadership and presence, and entrust an emissary
with the specific letters of instruction, or conversely with general directives and the
understanding that once left to his own devices, the emissary's actions would be supported as
if coming from the king himself. Both contained a element of risk.
2. The Middle Ages of Diplomatic Exchanges
Literacy during the early Middle Ages had a tendency to be confined almost entirely
to ecclesiastical organizations. Therefore, not surprisingly, diplomatic communications were
commonly between kings and Pope when attempting to resolve international disputes. The
key difference between monarch-to-monarch diplomatic initiatives, and monarch-to-Pope
was that a monarch could disregard, pretend to misunderstand, or wage war on his earthly
equal, no such latitude was permissible with the Pope. The issuance of Papal Bulls merely
confirmed the supernational authority of the Pope in international affairs, and confirmed his
decisive authority, both as an arbiter of international disputes, and as the final authority in the
disposition of non-Christian peoples and their territories. 49 By the sixteenth century the
infallibility of this individual would be questioned and his control over monarchs in
diplomatic issues as well.
49 Savelle, 194-8.
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Inexpensive paper in combination with the ongoing experiments with movable type and
printing were finally successful in the mid 1400s. Between 1500 and 1850, despite the fact
that printing techniques were not significantly altered, its productivity was noticeably
increased with the appearance of the newspaper industry. CriLical to the rise of the
bureaucratic system and hence, the development of a diplomatic corps, was the spread of
printing. Improved administrative techniques and portable printing presses lent a certain
cachet but, more importantly, permitted an embryonic staff to form. Monarchs began to rely
on the gradually evolving royal mail systems for communication with their minions in the
field.
Technologically, the speed at which messages were transmitted was not significantly
increased. Though there had been some improvement in road systems, carriages were still
carriages, and horsepower was still measured in terms of the actual beast. Within a sixty to
ninety kilometer radius, strict control could be maintained by means of detailed letters of
instruction. Beyond that point , and certainly across an ocean's expanse, the diplomatic
envoy set sail or rode off with a written or printed general set of guidelines, and was trusted
thereafter, especially during the long silences, to rely on his intuition, resourcefulness, and
sense of what was in the country's best interest.
3. The Industrial Revolution
Claude Chappe's telegraph, constructed in 1794 represented the first significant
breakthrough in terms of speed of transmission. Limited by the weather, the terrain, the skill
of the operators, and the length of the message itself, it was nonetheless, the first truly
effective mechanical long-distance communications system to be established. Inventions
have a tendency to breed more inventions, so it is not too surprising that the 1800s
witnessed the creation of the electromagnetic telegraph. Although this latest incarnation of
the telegraph owed its final existence to a number of creative geniuses, as previously noted, it
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was Samuel Morse whose name became synonymous with it. Railway managers were one
of the first groups to realize the potential. However, once the transatlantic cable was laid in
the mid-1800s, embassies were soon recipients of this new technology. Home governments
were now in a position to give their ambassadors increasingly precise and detailed
instructions, while receiving more exact information within a matter of hours. However,
monarchs, presidents , and foreign ministers continued to exercise only an indirect influence
in terms of mechanically transmitting their views and attitudes. Personal contact was
hampered by slow mass transportation systems, particularly when one contemplated a
transoceanic voyage.
Telephones, computers, and satellite communications have permitted the rise of
instantaneous dialogue, the advent of secure conversations resulting in fewer records, and
diplomatic offices inundated with information which they have neither the time nor the
personnel to effectively absorb, analyze, and disseminate. Air travel added a new dimension,
and once the sound barrier was broken, the speed of commercial aircraft was limited only by
the ingenuity of man. Suffice it to say that the long tortuous travel endured by Churchill,
Roosevelt, and Stalin during World War II is equally true today, but only because twice the
amount of aeronautical miles are being logged, even if in roughly half the time. Heads of
state meet with far greater frequency than in the past, thus altering the level at which
government business is raised, such that the ambassador's role is relegated to a
fundamentally ceremonial one, head of an information clearinghouse, and occasional country
expert whose recommendations may or may not be taken under consideration. Vesting a
diplomat with discretionary powers in negotiation has become almost an anachronism as the
twenty-first century dawns.
Finally, radio and television, particularly the latter have "sped not only words, but
pictures of events before considered diplomatic accounts of the happenings and their
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significance could reach foreign ministries.-50 Technology, to some degree, has caused
diplomacy to come full circle whereby present day "monarchs" rely increasingly upon
themselves instead of intermediaries to ensure national interests are properly represented in
the international arena.
F. OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
Thus far the historical development of communications and diplomacy have been
explored with a specific focus on the changes wrought by various technologies in the world
of diplomacy. At this juncture it is useful to establish a line of demarcation for these various
terms, to establish operational definitions. The terms to be so defined are: mass media,
diplomacy, and media diplomacy.
1. Mass Media
Mass Mdia is comprised of radio, television, newspapers, magazines, books, and
motion pictures. These represent the technical apparatus for communicating with millions of
people.51 On a national level it may be said to operate on four major communication grids,
varying for different parts of a country, but its coverage is comprehensive in regard to every
sector of the community.52 This is not to state that all countries have access to all forms of
the mass media, but that some form does exist and is characterized by its pervasiveness.
Mass media may either "hot" or"cool". A hot medium is one that extends one single sense
in "high definition" i.e. well filled with data but low in audience participation. Radio is an
50 David D. Newsom, "Ihe New Diplomatic Agenda: Are Governments Ready?" International Affairs
(Winter 1988/9) Vol 65, No. 1. 29-41.
31 Jack C. Piano and Roy Olton, The International Relations Dictionary 4th ed. (Santa Barbara,
California/Oxford, England: ABC-CLIO Inc.. 1982) 80-81.
5 2 Stuart Hall and Paddy Whannel, The Popular Arts: A Critical Guide to the Mass Media (Boston,
Massachusetts: Beacon Press, 1964) 20.
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example of a hot medium in contrast to television which is a cool one. The former requires
the listener to create images in his mind while the latter accomplishes the task for him.53
2. The Eight Faces of Diplomacy
Mplomacy has almost as many definitions as there are practitioners of it. Sir Ernest
Satow who has written the definitive work which sets the standard for the practice of
diplomacy, states that "Diplomacy is the application of intelligence, and tact to the official
relationships between states. "54 Basically, it is the practice of conducting relations between
states through official representatives, involving means and mechanisms and actual practices
whereby foreign policy is made effective.5 5 Plano and Olton in their dictionary distinguish
among the following: 56
Conference Diplomacy - Open and multilateral in nature
Machiavellian - Conspiratorial, deceitful, and unscrupulous
Parliamentary - Conference which emphasizes search for agreement by building
majorities, within continuing international institutions. Attributed to
Secretary of State Dean Rusk.
Summit - Conducted by heads of state or government in contrast with that at the
ambassadorial level. Historical roots are in the Congress system however,
the phrase was coined by Winston Churchill.
Still more types of diplomacy, as gleaned from the various sources include:
Public - Attributed to Woodrow Wilson in the first of his Fourteen Points published
in 1919. "Open covenants openly arrived at, after which there should be no
private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed
always franily and in the public view."57 Through the passage of the time
this has acquired a whole new interpretation, the idea of public opinion
driving the negotiator's efforts.
53 McLuhan, Ch 2 22-32.
54 Lord Gore-Booth, ed., Satow's Guide to Diplomatic Practice (London: Longman Group, Ltd.,
1979).
55 Piano and Olton, 241.
56 [bid, 242-5.
57 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson The World Settlement Written From His Unpublished and
ErxsnaLMaJaI, VoL II "Original Documents Of The Peace Conference" (Mass: Peter Smith,
1960) 42-43.
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Private or People-to-People - Quakers, church leaders, heads of peace research
institutes, professors, senators, and journalists attempts at solving or
alleviating conflicts. Examples include the Pugwash Conferences and the
Dartmouth Conferences.
Although these "unofficial diplomats" 58 may contribute to the climate of
confidence building, they do so without any visible authority.
Quiet - Descriptive of UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold's style of
negotiating with skill, tact, persistence, impartiality but minus the fanfare.59
The reality is that in the waning days of the twentieth century, all of these forms of
diplomacy function simultaneously but not synchronously, which further complicates what
is, by its nature, a delicate operation, successful negotiation. Yoel Cohen, in his landmark
study of the British Foreign Office and the effects of the mass communications age on it not
only christened this latest form of diplomacy but defined it as well.
3. Media Diplomacy Defined at Last
Diplomacy and media are essentially two types of communication running on a
parallel track. Periodically, a switch or overlap occurs whereby the two meet and dialogue is
joined. Yoel Cohen succinctly summarizes both the patterns of this overlap and their
relationship.
1. The media are a source of information and ideas at several stages in the foreign
policy process; to diplomats abroad; to ministers and officials in London; and to
the wider public, MPs, and interest groups.
2. The media link the public to policymakers in terms of acting as a forum of debate
on foreign policy and in terms of reflecting this debate in public opinion to
policymakers.
3. Media diplomacy is associated with the concept of influence; the media determine
what areas and subjects are covered by the media; and the media change policy.
4. Media diplomacy concerns the way the media link policymakers to foreign
governments and to the public by including British government and attitudes
5 8 Maureen P. Berman and Joseph E. Johnson, eds., Unofficial Diplomas (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977).
59 A. Leroy Bennett, International Organizations Principles and Issues 4th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1988) 147.
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in editorial matter and by disclosing information which has the political effect
of changing policy.6°
The question then becomes: who are these official and unofficial practitioners of foreign
policy? On a national level, a country such as the United States has the United States
Information Agency 61 (USIA). On the international level, official media diplomacy is
usually found at the international organizational level under the auspices of the United
Nations. This intergovernmental organization (IGO) has assigned the overall responsibility
to the Office of Public Informadin. It was created in 1946 to promote an informed public
understanding of the work and purposes of the United Nations among the peoples of the
world. The UNOPI works closely with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organnization (UNESCO). This too, was established in 1946 and its early efforts
were concentrated on the elimination of illiteracy and on basic skills training. 62 This program
has evolved to include such functions as: 1) holding conferences; 2) acting as an information
clearinghouse; 3) gathering/publishing statistics; 4) issuing publications; 5) social science
teaching and research; 6) preservation, presentation, and development of various countries'
cultural heritages; 7) production of color slides and commentary on painting and sculpture. 62
Unofficial media diplomacy is defined for the purposes of this research effort as that
practiced by the independent news media in an effort to influence the course of international
events. It is advocacy journalism, but with a twist, i.e. independent reporting with or without
consequence. The key to understanding this phenomenon is to examine the type of person
reporting the news, the self-perception and public perception of the media, and international
cooperation among these individuals. The next chap"r will examine media diplomacy as it
is practiced in a democratic society, the U.S..
60 Cohen, 5-8; It should be nced that if one substitutes Congressmen for Ms, Washington, DC for
London, and U. S. for British government attitudes, that the observations are still valid.




III. MEDIA IN THE U.S. - LEVELS OF DIPLOMACY
IN A DEM( RATIC SOCIETY
A. OFFICIAL PRACTITIONERS OF MEDIA DIPLOMACY
1. Embassy Information Officers
The diplomat and the journalist, be he foreign correspondent, international desk
anchor, or war correspondent, deal with relations between states, i.e. gathering information,
disseminating that information, and thereby influencing or attempting to influence public
opinion about selected international issues. The concept of this public diplomacy or people-
to-people dialogue has resulted in a change in the composition of ambassadorial staffs; the
addition of the press/information attache and his staff. This individual's efforts, by
extension, are considered to be part of the official diplomatic efforts. Press attaches are
usually experienced journalists in their own right. Broadly speaking, their tasks are
threefold: 1) to further the foreign policies of their governments; 2) to counter hostile
propaganda; 3) to inform their own governments (in the person of the Ambassador) of
foreign attitudes.6,
The iaformation officer/press attache will be responsible for activities that directly
concern the mass media - press, publications, radio, and television. Normally, this
individual serves as the embassy press spokesperson on U.S. government policies,
provides background information, and publicizes embassy activities. Additionally, the
information officer coordinates the arrangements for visiting U.S. journalists, provides a
point of contact for resident correspondents, and usually is busiest when visits by
congressional delegations or senior officials require special briefings, interviews, or press
conferences. On a routine basis, this individual works closely with local media
64 John Lee, ed. The Diplomatic Persuaders (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1968) xi-xii;
Gore-Booth, 220-i.
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representatives and government officials in a continuous effort to ensure that the U.S. point
of view is available to the people of the host country through their print and electronic
media. The primary tool in this effort is the Wireless File, a compendium of news and
features that is transmitted daily to posts around the world, where it is made available by
information officers to the local media.65
The definition of a press/information attache in fact, alters somewhat when the
practitioner himself is asked to elaborate on the functional aspects of his job.
Laxon Fred Kaemba, Information Attache, Republic of Zambia
1. Publicize his country.
2. Establish contacts with representatives of all major media elements in the host
country.
3. Be as helpful as possible.
4. Ill-informed press results in an ill-informed public so educate the host country
press.
5. Keep abreast with home country developments.
6. Advise the head of the mission on all public relations matters.66
Jaime de Urzaiz, Counselor of Information, Embassy of Spain
. Public relations man.
2. Correct the "Black Legend", i.e. counter inaccuracies in the press.
3. Promote tourism.67
Aqil Ahmad, Press Attache, Embassy of India
1. Give advice on policies and give words to explain the policies.
2. Disseminate suitable and timely information about a country and to be aware of
the trends of public opinion in the country of assignment. The three operative
words being "dissemination", "suitable", "timely".
3. Sell an image.
4. Alter the attitude of the news media from one of indifference to one of interest.68
65 Andrew L. Steigman, The Foreign Service of the United States: First Line of Defense (Boulder
and London: Westview Press, 1985) 160-1.
66 L. F. Kaemba, "Building the Image of a New Nation" in Lee, 39-42.
67 j. D. Urzaiz, "The Modem Age of Spain" in Lee, 55-9.
68 A. Ahmad, "Instant Labels; Instant Trouble" in Lee, 74-5, 83.
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The above comments were generated as part of a series of seminars conducted in the
spring of 1967 by the Washington Journalism Center and the American University in
Washington, D.C. in an effort to understand this emerging aspect of diplomacy. Fourteen
countries were invited to participate. These three are a representative sampling of the
perceptions of the relationship between the official diplomatic media and the unofficial
diplomatic media.
As organized by the U.S. State Department, the typical information officer press
attache post will be located within an embassy. Traditionally, such posts are headed by a
public affairs officer (PAO), who is entitled "Counselor for Public Affairs" if the size of
the mission and his/her overall personal rank warrant it. The PAO has overall responsibility
for the management and supervision of the public affairs activities of the embassy, and also
advises the ambassador and other members of the mission staff on the pulse of the host
country's public opinion, and their implications for U.S. foreign policy.
2. United States Information Agency - " Public Diplomacy?"
The United States Information Agency (USIA) is another example of official media
diplomacy. Originally established in 1953 as the U.S. International Communications
Agency, it was a vehicle to explain American policies and actions to peoples of other
nations69 through the mass media. It has continued to evolve and assumed its present
form in April 1978. USIA's Director reports to the President of the United States and
receives policy guidance from the Secretary of State. The agency maintains 204 posts in
127 countries. Overseas, USIA is known as the United States Information Service (USIS).
The USIA has set the following program criteria:
1. Programs and activities are designed to strengthen cross-cultural communication.
69 Robert W. Akers, "An Indispensable Diplomacy" in Lee, 9.
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2. Programs are balanced and non-partisan in character, shall meet high standards of
quality, and shall represent the diversity of American political, academic, social,
and cultural life.
3. The international exchange of people, information, and ideas is a long-term respon-
sibility.
4. Activities should, where possible, complement public, private, and binational
program events which fall within the priorities of the department.
5. Programs and activities should take into account host-country concerns, the views
of our missions abroad, the role of binational commissions or institutions, and the
wide-ranging concerns of all constituencies in the United States that are interested
in the the programs.
6. Programs and activities should involve well-qualified Americans and potentially
influential, in some cases highly motivated, self-selected individuals abroad - that is,
those who seek out USIS programs and services.
7. Programs and activities should be designed to accomplish specific
goals within the context of furthering U.S. national interests.7o
Additional objectives have been identified as follows: 1) promoting the flow of ideas about
the U.S. to the world; 2) presenting U.S. policies and programs to the world,
3) supporting current U.S. foreign policy; 4) furthering goodwill and public under-
standing between the U.S. and other peoples; 5) providing counsel on public relations to
the U.S. government on foreign policy; 6) advancing U.S. education and the arts and
sciences of the U.S. to the world; 7) countering propaganda inimical to the U.S., wherever
and whenever it appears.71
The USIA is actually composed of four media services. They are: 1) the
broadcasting service (IBS) more commonly known as Voice of America (VOA) 72;
70 United States Information Agency. The Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs, An Introduction,
1-2.
71 See John W. Henderson The United States Information Agency (New York: Frederick A. Praeger
Publishers, 1969); Robert E. Elder, The Information Machine: The USIA and American Foreign
EPlkx(New York: Syracuse University Press, 1968); H. Bradford Westerfield, The Instruments
America's Foreign Policy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1963) Part 3, 241-60.
72 Offshoots of VOA include: Radio in the American Sector (RIAS), established in Berlin in 1946
with the target audience located in East Germany. Prior to the reunification of the two Germanies,
West Germany co-funded the operation with the U. S. Its status is in limbo at the present, although
through its radio and television service, it had been providing guidance in the area of establishing a
government to the newly emerging Eastern Bloc countries; Radio Marti , a semi-autonomous branch
of VOA, target audience Cuba since 1985. TV Marti began experimental broadcasts in 1990.
Congress passed an authorization bill in 1989 tasking VOA with broadcasting at least twelve hours per
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2) the Press and Publications Service (IPS); 3) the Motion Picture and Television Service
(Worldnet) (IMV)73 ; 4) the Information Center Service (ICS). The latter is composed of
six divisions which support four types of programs abroad: 1) libraries/cultural centers for
the study of U.S. political, economic, and cultural affairs, history or science, and
technology; 2) a commercial book program to place more U.S. written books both in
English and in translation in bookstores and classrooms; 3) teaching English overseas
among the influential and the potentially so, ie. students, in order to increase their ability to
read U.S. publications or listen to/comprehend English language broadcasts; 4) exhibitions
demonstrating U.S. achievements and know-how in such diverse fields as medicine and
public health, transportation and industry, or the graphic arts.74 The USIA utilizes the
entire spectrum of the media in its official public diplomacy role. Due to its status as an
official agency of the U.S. government, it has not been immune from criticism. In fact, it
has engendered an ongoing debate which questions the idea of U.S.- sponsored propa-
ganda, information imperialism, and journalist credibility and objectivity, to name just a
few.75
day to China. It should be noted that Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Inc. (RFE/RL) is not affiliated
with the USIA, is not an agency of the U. S. government, and is not the official voice of the U. S.
unlike VOA. It is, however a non-profit corporation funded by the U. S. government for the purpose of
broadcasting to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Congress assumed funding oversight for this
organization in 1971 and established the Board for International Broadcasting to serve as liaison.
(Prior to 1971 it was run by the Central Intelligence Agency as a covert operation, similar to some
KGB operations as will be discussed in Chapter Three.) Radio Free Afghanistan commenced
operations in 1985 and is operated by Radio Liberty. An overlap in target audiences does occur
between VOA and RFEIRL.7 3 Launched in 1983, regular broadcasts of Worldnet were terminated by Congress in 1988 as a result
of decreasing number of viewers. Currently, it is authorized to produce "interactives", ie. foreign
mrEialists interview U. S. government officials and other experts.
Eider, 182-3, 214-5, 234-7, 254-5; Donald Hausrath, "USIA International Library Activities",
Special Libraries (Winter 1990) Vol 81 No. 1, 10-20;, Kim Andrew Elliott, "Too Many Voices of
America, Foreign Policy (Winter 1989/90) No 77, 113-31.
75 Robert F. Delaney, "Communications, Subt'ersion, and Public Diplomacy: The View from
NATO", Naval War College Review (Winter 1977) Vol XXIX No. 3, 73-8; Elliott, 123-6) Carnes
Lord, "In Defense of Public Diplomacy". _Commentary (April 1984) Vol 77 No. 4, 42-50;, Thomas
L. McPhail, Electronic Colonialism (California: Sage Publications, 1987); LTCOL John M Oseth,
USA, "Repairing the Balance of Images: US Public Diplomacy for the Future", Naval War College
Review Jul-Aug 1985) Vol XXXVIII No. 4, 52-66; G. Scott Sugden, "Public Diplomacy and the
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3. Presidents, Press Secretaries, and the Power of Words
Television is a medium which emphasizes immediacy, brevity, and personality. In
this respect it has proven itself to be an extremely useful forum for Heads of State in
general, and U.S. Presidents in particular to address issues of both national and international
importance.76 The presidential press conference , the ability of the president to
commandeer the airwaves for a special announcement, the Rose Garden ceremonies, etc.,
are just a few of the numerous examples whereby the president makes the news. What
exactly is this pr-sidential-press relationship? How does it function?
Grossman and Kumar 77 have identified three phases in the continuing relationship
between White House officials and the representatives of news organizations, i.e. alliance,
competition, and detachment. Alliance, sometimes termed the honeymoon phase, coincides
with the early months of an administration and is based on two elements: 1) the common
definition by both parties of what are newsworthy items; 2) reporter's willingness to
provide an unfiltered conduit from the White House for messages that the administration
wants conveyed to the public. Competition is usually apparent by the close of the first year
Missiles of October", Naval War College Review ( Oct 1971) Vol XXIV No. 2, 28-41; The above
are only a sampling of the ongoing debate during the last twenty years.
76 Studies that emphasize the "television advantage" in terms of U. S. presidents include: Michael
Baruch Grossman and Martha Joynt Kumar, Portraying the President(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1981); Lynda Kaid and Joe Foote, "How Network TV Coverage of the President
and Congress Compare", Journalism Quarterly Vol. 62, 59-65; Samuel Kernell, Going. ubi
New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Press, 1986);
George Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency (New York: Mentor Books, 1970; Paul Duke, ed.,
Beyond Reagan: The Politics of Upheaval (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1986) 235-84 "TV
Politics"; At the opposite, one might say opposing end of the spectrum, is news coverage of Congress
in contrast to that of the White House. Findings indicate that Congress fares slightly better in the
print media due to its organizational, bureaucratic personality. Individuals may periodically emerge
to capture public interest and imagination but a corporate body is not as attractive nor as easy to
assimilate. The U. S. military has the same media problem with the occasional exception, i.e.
Douglas McArthur, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Oliver North. See Samuel Kernell and Gary C. Jacobson,
"Congress and the Presidency As News in the Nineteenth Century", The Journal of Politics (Nov
1987) Vol 49 No. 4, 1017-35; William L. Armstrong, "Television Coverage of the Senate: Public
Scrutiny", Vital Speeches of thePay (Nov 1, 1985) Vol LII No. 2, 37-9.7 7 M. B. Grossman and M. J. Kumar, "The White House and the News Media: The Phases of Their
Relationship, Political Science Quarterly (Spring 1979) Vol 94 No.1, 37-53.
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and is characterized by the president's attempts to manipulate his relations with the media by
using such devices as news management, ingratiation, and attack. The final phase,
detachment, is dependent upon a series of events that leads both the White House officials
and reporters to cease attempts to mold the others behavior, but is usually initiated by the
White House. Media policy is characterized by efforts to secure maximum exposure with
minimal risk, delegate presidential relations with the press to surrogates, i.e. his press
secretary. Presidential press encounters are tightly controlled and structured, and there is a
greater emphasis on contact with the regional press and interest groups. As is apparent
from the preceding, this is a mutually advantageous but often frustrating relationship.
A president, as official media diplomat, has certain inherent advantages. By the nature
of his office, he may present himself as the vox popuUi8s thereby challenging the media to
prove otherwise, set the news agenda, select which medium will be used and the ground
rules to be enforced, and invoke the prerogative of executive secrecy in the national interest.
Of course, the disadvantage is he may encourage more press coverage than is desirable or
necessary to carry out the business of the nation. The presidential press secretary is an
extension of the man himself, facing reporters in the president's absence, attempting to
convey the president's thoughts, and to do so without jeopardizing the power of the
communications effort through misunderstanding, miscalculation, or plain disbelief on the
part of the recipient. Failure to use the power of words effectively is to forfeit one of the
president's most potent weapons in the political world of rhetoric. As an extension of the
man, the press secretary may assume four guises: 1) in the president's image - sharing his
attitudes and qualities; 2) presidential confidant or the individual who is not constrained by
the word "yes" but will argue and disagree with the man himself; 3) the delegate who
78 Lyn Ragsdale, "Presidential Speechmaking and the Public Audience: Individual Presidents and
Group Attitudes", The Journal of Politics Vol 49 No. 9, 1987, 704-36.
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assumes all the self-promotion duties of the president; 4) personality in his own right,
transcends the role of press advisor.79 Presidential press secretaries cannot afford to be
underrated, for some hold immense power in their dealings with the press as the president's
alter-ego.
B. UNOFFICIAL PRACTITIONERS OF MEDIA DIPLOMACY
Unofficial media has been defined for the purposes of this research effort as that
practiced by the independent news media in an effort to influence the course of international
events. It is advocacy journalism. The key to understanding this phenomenon is to
examine the type of person reporting the news, the self-perception of the media, and
international cooperation among these individuals.
1. Styles of Journalism
In the beginning there was objective reporting, taught in journalism schools as the
presentation of facts in order to answer the key questions "who? what? when? where?
how?". The basic tenets of objective reporting included: 1) do not stray from the
observable, verifiable fact; 2) include both sides in a controversy; 3) do not allow personal
beliefs and biases to interfere witl the narrative.so This assignment is achieved by the cub
reporter or legman whose goal is to collect news and facts, usually by conducting solitary
research, and then transform them into a newsworthy story. Known as the classic
methodSi of moving idea to print, the elements are: on-the-spot investigation, background
research, writing, rewriting, and polishing. The editor hovers in the background to ensure
the quality and the quantity of the product will fit both the column and the deadline.
79 Colin Seymour-Ure, "Presidential Power, Press Secretaries, and Communication", Political
Studies, Vol XXVIII No. 2, 253-70.
80 Peter Hannaford, Talking Back to the Media (New York: Facts on File Publications, 1986), 32.
81 Servan-Schreiber, 140.
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Frederick Buchstein, Director of Research for Dix and Eaton, Inc., in a speech before the
Internal revenue service on April 20, 1988 outlined the process of a typical news story.
JOB WHAT HE DOES WHAT CAN GO WRONG
Newsmaker Makes news Refuses to talk to the reporter in
search of facts. Purposively
misleads reporter or gives only
part of the story. Doesn't know
how to explain what happened so
any dummy can understand it.
Reporter Gathers facts. Fails to understand what the story
Writes the story. means, to get the facts right, to
Forwards it to the editor, put the story into context for the
reader. Writes a dull story that no
one reads. Is too dumb, lazy,
busy or facing too tight a deadline
to overcome the above. Is anti-
business, -military, -gove .anent,
etc. Ignores the facts so he can tell
a good yam.
Topic Editor Manages reporters to make All of the above.
sure the news is covered Ignores reporter's advice and over
and features writtten. or underplays a story. Fails to
Fights with all other editors differentiate between a good story
for page 1. Lives with or a bamboozle. Bows to policies
managing editor's policy and whims of the publisher's
decisions. Tries to balance
coverage.
Copy Editor Edits the story for language, He's in a hurry, misunderstands
logic, and accuracy. Writes the story, fouls the headline or
the headline. rewrite. Readers can't yell at hin
because they don't know who he
is.
Makeup Editor Oversees the printers who Trims the meat out of the story to
physically produce the paper. make it fit in the alloted space.
Paper Boy Delivers the paper. Tosses the paper into a bush or
puddle. Never delivers it when
you want it. Wants a tip for
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delivering bad news on your
doorstep.
Reader Selectively reads the news. Avoids business news when its
on the business page. Only reads
the headlines. Is more interested
in the sports page and the funnies.
Newsmaker Reads the story about him- I didn't say that. That stupid
self. reporter got his facts wrong.
Why didn't I say more? Why
wasn't my story on page one?
Why didn't I get more space?
gll never talk to a reporter again.
Where's my p. r. man, I want
my name in the paper again.82
Although the humor is apparent, so is the contradictory nature of the newspaper game. The
communications chain is long, and each link has the potential to disrupt the accurate flow of
communications, as is so aptly illustrated by Mr. Buchstein.
Group journalism was devised by Henry Luce of Time magazine. He essentially
divided the researching and writing between two employees with a third performing the
function of foreign or on-scene correspondent. The end product was a collective work
lacking a byline but full of facts, entertainment, ideas, and a distinctive style in a uniform
package.
Changes in technology have produced an evolution from the solitary journalist on the
street searching out the news to the newsroom communicator sitting at a desk receiving
information via the wizardry of electronics, microchips, and fiber optics. This journalist-
communicator assumes a new role in which he selects, condenses, simplifies, and
synthesizess3 the news based on what he believes the audience can absorb, understand, and
wants to know. This has resulted in the rise of advocacy journalism or New Journalism.
82 Frederick D. Buchstein, "Public Relations: Contacts with Editors and Reporters". Vital Speeches
of the Day (June 15, 1980) Vol LIV No. 17, 535-9.
3 Servan-Schreiber, 145.
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The characteristics include: 1) the author's own "voice" is heard; 2) first person is used;
3) the investigation is reconstructed in narrative form; 4) part of the story may be invented
in order to make it more real.84 Advocacy journalism has actually been common in
Europe for years, but only since the late 1960s has it found a niche in the U.S. news
marketplace. It began with underground newspapers, editorials, and point-counterpoint on
60 Minutes, but it would soon become part of the evening news, and the front page. "All
the news that's fit to print" by implication means a selection process has occurred. So who
is selecting, condensing, simplifying, and synthesizing?
2. The Media Elite
A landmark study of the media originally conducted in 1979 and 1980 by S. Robert
Lichter and Stanley Rothman presented a profile of this "media elite".ss The statistical







Annual Income over $30,000 78%
Annual Income over $50,000 46%
84 See Servan-Schreiber, 149; Hannaford, 6-9; Robert Sobel, The Maniulamtrs:America in the
MediaAgg (New York. Anchor PressDoubleday, 1976) 324-35 for a complete discussion of this
phenomenon.S Robert Lichter, Stanley Rothman, Linda S. Lichter, eMdia E (Maryland: Adler and
Adler Publishers, Inc., 1986) contains the results of this study, in-depth content analysis of specific
media coverage, results of the Thematic Apperception Test. Initial research was supplemented by
follow-ups conducted in 1985; The Media Research Center published their report "And That's the Way
it Isn't" in July 1990 which combines interviews, content analysis, and surveys. Their findings also
indicate a liberal bias in the U. S. media, although Stephen Hess of the Brookings Institution indicated
he did not agree with the findings according to the San Jose Mercury News of July 22, 1990, "Report
Says Media have Liberal Bias"; Nick Thimmesch, ed. A Liberal Media Elite? report of a conference
sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research in 1985. Guest panelists
included: Robert Lichter, Rupert Murdoch, Ben Bradlee, and Michael Massing. There was no
consensus among the newsmen represented in identifying themselves as liberals or elites. The debate
continues.
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These statistics are based on hour-long interviews with approximately 240 journalists at:
The New York Times, Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, Time, Newsweek, U.S. News
and World Report, and the news organizations at CBS, NBC, ABC, and PBS. Random
selection of participants included: Print-reporters, columnists, department heads, bureau
chiefs, editors, executives; TV - correspondents, anchors, producers, film editors, news
executives; men and women.86 This initial profile has remained unchanged since the
follow-up studies conducted in 1985 by Lichter's group.
"News" is being realized to a great extent by the individual profiled above. This is the
same person who is conducting unofficial diplomacy. The problem occurs when the reality
being reconstructed is determined by such decisions as: What story is worth covering?
How much play should it receive? What angle should it be given? Which sources are both
reliable and informative? Each question represents a value judgement of sorts. This
judgement may represent the individual or corporate body organizational consensus or
political party or that of a particular government.
According to Lichter and Rothman's studies and findings, the "media elite" view
themselves as politically liberal, alienated from traditional norms and institutions, favored a
strong welfare state within a capitalist framework, critical of America's world role, and
lastly, would like to strip traditional powerbrokers, i.e. business, of their influence and
empower black leaders, consumer groups, intellectuals, and the media.s7
3. The Fourth Estate
Theorists and philosophers have assigned the media the role of a fourth estate, a
watchdog of democracy. The media have been eager to assume such a worthy function as
will be noted in the later discussion concerning the freedoms of the press. It is difficult to
86 Uchter, et. al., 21.
8 7 Ibid, 294; Both Hannaford, 25 and Servan-Schreiber. 259-63 come to similar conclusions.
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imagine current political events, or political life itself, without the presence of the media.
Studies indicate that the media do have an independent impact on political life, ranging from
something as minor as how a candidate packages himself to something as major as
molding, influencing, and possibly changing public opinions and political behavior.88
Alarms have been raised periodically, as to the media's ability to set agendas, and that they
are becoming an "imperial media."s9
The above is not completely accurate, as the media themselves must still resolve
some basic dilemmas in order to truly be the "watchdog". Reporters must answer to the
needs or demands of their parent news enterprise, and since this is based on economic
reality in a competitive market, patterns of cooperation among newsmen are not always
apparent. If each reporter is relying on the White House party line, and the deadline is
approaching, then there is little opportunity to take advantage of Grossman and Rourke's
recommendations.90 These include: 1) organization among the reporters themselves;
2) broaden their network of contacts; 3) engage in investigative reporting (which is rapidly
becoming a lost art due to time constraints); 4) compel the president to release
information;91 5) attempt to negotiate changes in the manner in which information is made
available to them. The fourth estate is neither as free nor as constrained as appearances
would indicate, however they are increasingly influential as indicated earlier and it is this
88 McPhail- Electronic Colonialism; Mark Hollingsworth, The Press and Political Disnt-A
Question of Censorship (London: Pluto Press, 1986); Jeremy Hawthorn, ed., Poaganda. Persuasion
and Plemic (London, Arnold, 1987); Jean Seaton and Ben Pimlott, eds., The Media in British
lticsIAldershot- Avebury, 1987); Servan-Schreiber, Hannaford; Sobel..
89 Michael Baruch Grossman and Francis E. Rourke, "The Media and the Presidency: An Exchange
Analysis", Political Science Quarterly (Fall 1976) Vol 91 No. 3, 455-70.
90 Ibid. 461-7.
91 Grossman and Rourke examine three methods for achieving this: embarrass the president at a
televised news conference by asking him why he has not released a particular document (I term this
technique "outerviewing"), and their newspapers publish editorials raising the same question; seek
congressional help in obtaining the information they seek; go to the courts and use the process of legal
compulsion to acquire it.
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influence that is of concern in the realm of international relations and to the practitioners of
official media diplomacy.
C. MEDIA DIPLOMACY METHODS
1. Official: Sanctioned Manipulation of the Press
a. News Conferences and Rebuttals
The embassy press attache may, on behalf of the ambassador, schedule a news
conference in order to: a) make an .nnouncement, or b) rebut a negative story. News
conferences typically last twenty minutes and are considered to be formal. A "news
availability" may be scheduled in lieu of a conference. This has an informal tone, lasts ten
to fifteen minutes, and gives the impression that "we've-got-to-get-back-to-work".92
Oftentimes a press attache is tasked with responding to negative and/or erroneous
coverage in the press. Six possible avenues are open to the embassy in this instance: 1) no
response; 2) a letter to the writer of the story; 3) a letter to the editor, not for publication;
92 Hannaford, 96; Douglass Cater in The Fourth Branch of Government (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Co., The Riverside Press Cambridge, 1959), 58-9, cites the classic disquisition on the publicity
requirements for an "investigation". It consists of seven points: 1) Decide what you want the
newspapers to hit hardest and then shape each hearing so that the main point becomes the vortex of
the testimony. Once that vortex is reached, adjourn; 2) In handling press releases, first put a release
date on them, reading so.,-thing like this: *For release at 10:00 A. M. EST July 6," etc. If you do
this, you can give releases out as much as 24 hours in advance, thus enabling reporters to study them
and write better stories; 3) Limit the number of people authorized to speak for the committee, to
give out press releases or to provide the press with information to the fewest number possible. It plugs
leaks and helps to preserve concentration of purpose; 4) Do not permit distractions to occur, such as
extraneous fusses with would-be witnesses, which might provide news that would bury the testimony
which you want featured; 5) Do not space hearings more than 24 or 48 hours apart when on a
controversial subject. This gives the opposition too much opportunity to make all kind of counter-
charges and replies by issuing statements to the newspapers; 6) Don't ever be afraid to recess a
hearing even for five minutes, so that you keep the proceedings completely in control as far as
creating news is concerned; 7) And this is most important: don't let the hearings or the evidence ever
descend to the plane of a personal fight between the Committee Chairman and the head of the agency
being investigated. The high plane of duly-authorized Committee of the House of Representatives
examining the operations of an Agency of the Executive Branch for constructive purposes shnuld be
maintained at all costs. Although these recommendations were proposed with the Congress in mind,
they are an excellent example of techniques used by official practitioners.
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4) a letter to the editor, for publication; 5) a counter-interview with another journalist; 6) a
formal demand for a published correction.93
b. Leaks and Publications
"Leaks" t,) the press are another method of using the media to achieve certain
political feats. These fall into four categories: 1) leaks by officials to attract the attention of
specific government officials, in the hope that said official will order a brief on the subject
or rethink a previously articulated position; 2) leaks that occur when a particular official
favors a policy which lacks the support of other officials; 3) leaks that occur when
individual officials disagree with a decision but cannot say so publicly because of the
conventions of collective responsibility and secrecy; 4) leaks to create the impression that
the government made a decision it, in fact, has not. This is the trial balloon to test public
reaction.94 The personality type of a "leaker" as characterized by Lloyd Norman may
assume six different guises: 1) infighter (determined to win regardless of the
means); 2) show-off (a braggart who 1 .es to demonstrate how important he is);
3) whistle-blower (a zealot who is convin;ed that his agency.. .is being mismanaged and
only he has the right answers); 4) the partisan (feels his organization is being zapped by the
rival's more glamorous or impressive weapon system or military mission); 5) the true-
blue good guy (truly believes an informed press is vital to a democracy; 6) compulsive
talker (bubbly with the latest flash.95 Finally, a look at the characteristics of
"Leakology" as defined by LCDR Brent Baker.
Leaks in the context of this discussion are defined as both classified and unclassified.
They include: politicaily sensitive government information that is provided in an
93 See Lee 's The Diplomatic Persuaders for an interesting assortment of such rebuttals, 25, 60-2. 79,
121-3.
94 Cohen, 72.
95 Lloyd Norman cited in The Pentagon Reporners by Robert B. Sims (Washington, D. C.: National
Defense University Press, 1983), M'i5 note 7.
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unauthorized manner to persons who do not have a current government authorization
to have access and a "need to know."
It takes at least two people to spring a leak, an inside source and an outside receiver.
It takes a transmitter (usually a news outlet) to spread or publicize the leaked inform-
ation.
Once a leak is put into the public domain, by such means as the news media, its
future course cannot be controlled by anyone, including the source, receiver, or
transmitter of the leak.
Leaks may have a "multiplier" effect, with one leak stimulating another counter
measure leak championing the opposite position.
Leaks, by their nature and the nature of humans and mass media transmitters, high-
light the more dramatic aspects of an issue and seldom attempt to present a balanced
or detailed view of complex issues. In short, leaks oversimplify issues.
Leaks are almost impossible to track down, and an investigation of leaks, while it
may be necessary, can itself be counterproductive adding more fuel...96
Leakology would be better considered an art than a science, and as with most elements of
art, it is imprecise and subject to not only the artist's interpretation but the beholder's as well.
The publication of official news magazines is another avenue pursued by embassies
and the USIA. Various embassy publications include: Spain's eight page illustrated
monthly bulletin Spanish Newsletter, and eight page The Week in Spain; India's weekly
India News and daily "Indiagram"; Taiwan's Free China Weekly and monthly Free China
Review ; South Korea's biweekly magazine News from Korea and the quarterly "Korean
Report". The USIA publishes America Illustrated in Russian and Polish, Al Hayat for
Arabic- speaking countries, and French and English editions of Topic targeting the young,
educated, potential leaders of Africa. At the international governmental organizational level,
the United Nations publishes the UN Monthly Chronicle in English, French, and Spanish,
as well as the UN YearbooL
96 Lcdr Brent Baker, USN, "LEAKOLOGY: The War of Words", U.S P.I. Proceedings (July 1977)
Vol 103 No. 7/893, 43-9.
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The production, loan, or rental of embassy documentary films, television programs,
and videotapes are made available to the public as part of the media diplomatic effort. The
USIA produces films of "purpose without popcorn"97 concerned with such themes as civil
rights, development and modernization, living conditions under communism, speeches by
U.S. political figures, nuclear progress, education, medicine, land reform, conservation,
self-help, space programs, cultural events, etc.
c. Media Opportunity
The last official media diplomacy technique to be described is called the "media
opportunity". It is defined as "a happening often of no real importance, which is staged for
the media, in the hope it might appear on the evening news and on the front pages of the
newspapers."98 Four elements are required to ensure the success of such an operation:
1) notify the press corps well in advance; 2) ensure the television and still cameras are in
place; 3) ensure the reporters and commentators are present; 4) ensure the official appears
on time and either greets a visitor, cuts a ribbon, makes a statement, or performs some other
ceremonial function. Media opportunities are manufactured by design.
2. Unofficial: Manipulation is a Two-Way Street
New Journalism has resulted in an interesting style which, by some media
professional's standards, permits "reconstruction of dialogue (direct quotations verified only
from second-or third-hand sources) and composites (combining characteristics of several
different events or people into a single 'representative' scene or individual)."99 Paul
Weaver, media analyst, noted that television news adopts the more personal voice of the
omniscient reporter-narrator, it imposes a more unified interpretation on the day's events;
97 Elder, 235.
98 Sobel, 358.
99 Lichter, Rothman, Lichter, 145.
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and if's attracted to the drama and spectacle that produce good filmaoo The camera does
blink each time selective visuals are used or the process is flawed by an imbalance in
accurately presenting both sides of an issue.
a. Recycled News and Unident'fied Sources
Recycled news is the negative story that wouldn't die. Sometimes it reappears
because reporters and editors "fail to read their own newspapers as carefully as they
should."i0i "Evergreen" are stories with extended time value comparable to the use of
stock footage in television news programs. Both seem timely, both seem new, and
occasionally both may appear to be an exclusive.
Unidentified sources are sometimes used by journalists to build a story. The use of
such terms as "sources say" or "critics say", followed by a -ccusation of some type, poses
a problem in terms of rebuttal. At times, this use of unidentified sources results from a
planned news leak as discussed in the previous section. During an interview, all statements
may be "on the record" i.e. attributable to a specific individual; or "on background" i.e.
nothing is directly attributable to the interviewee, but will appear in the story as "company
sources", "sources close to the matter", "a government official", "a senior ranking officer"
or "our sources"; or "on deep background" i.e. the reporter must appear to be the authority
for the information; or "off the record" i.e. a more well-informed reporter but one who
cannot quote, attribute the information, or link it to the interviewee in any manner.102
b. Interviewing and Outerviewing
Skillful interviewers will use verbal devices to steer the interview in a particular
direction, or to make a particular point. These methods include: 1) the loaded preface;
100 Paul Weaver, "Newspaper News and Television News" in Douglas Cater, ed. Televisioaa
Sial Fore (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975), 92.




2) the either/or question; 3) the pregnant pause.l3 The correct response in each situation
is as follows:
1) "I don't agree with your statements but..."
Articulate some positive aspect here.
2) "Neither"
Move onto some positive statement.
3) The Pregnant Pause is used (mainly on television) to force the interviewee to
extend his answer, overanswer the original question, etc. The interviewee
should remain silent, focused on the interviewer, and smiling. The interviewer
will start talking soon due to the economic realities of dead air time.
These examples depict just a few of the techniques used when attempting to practice
unofficial media diplomacy during the interviewing phase.
Outerviewers may assume one of five different roles, which themselves are not
mutually exclusive. A reporter may become 1) a friend of the court; 2) an adversary;
3) an historian-observer, 4) an institutional analyst; 5) a gatekeeper.o4 The first role,
friend of the court, may be defined in several ways, i.e. one who writes supportive articles
in return for preferred status in the information-dissemination loop, or one who writes
articles that indicate an understanding of the point of view of the official, or one who
ingratiates himself in order to be treated with special consideration. The second role,
adversary, is the one most commonly assumed by the press when describing their role and
function in the realm of government-press relations. This individual approaches most
official encounters from the perspective that authorities may not be telling the truth or are
withholding some aspect of it. The adversarial style is characterized by combativeness and
accusations, and is readily apparent during briefings, press conferences, etc. Grossman and
103 Ibid. 46; Richard M. Clurman addresses the news standards which are used in terms of conducting
interviews in his book Beyond Malice: The Media's Years of Reckoning (New York: A Meridian
Book, 1990). 61. Interviews which are not spontaneous and unrehearsed are prohibited. An interview
is not spontaneous or unrehearsed if. 1) the questions are submitted to the interviewee in advance; 2)
there is an agreement not to use a particular general area as a basis for a specific question; 3) there
is an agreement not to ask specific questions; 4) the film, tape, or transcript of the interview is
submitted to the interviewee for approval or for participation in the editing process.
104 Grossman and Kumar, 47.
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Kumar note the distinction between print and broadcast media in this regard. An accusatory
style may be extremely useful for the cameras but does not necessarily translate well into
print. The third role, historian-observer, has a distinctive style of reporting which chooses
to interpret both the policies and the personalities who design policies, but will do so within
the context of the mood of the times. His story is focused on the character of the
organization rather than any "psuedo-events" or "media opportunities" which may have
been staged for his consumption. The fourth role, institutional analyst, is the one who
focuses not on one individual in the policy-making process, but rather the bureaucratic
process which results in the selection, synthesis, and creation of the final product. The
fifth and final role, gatekeeper,10s is the reporter who talks to the "news source" via
interview or outerview, decides which facts to pass along the chain, what to write, what
shape, color, and importance to give the event. All of these roles may be used
interchangeably by reporters depending upon personal style, angle of the story, and the
employer's philosophy.
The International Press Institute (IPI), profiled in the International Sources section
below, very carefully evaluates the background factors prior to convening either a climate-
creating, or conflict-preventing meeting. These factors include:
Timing - Are the concerned policy-makers likely to be interested?
Is the mass media in one or both of the countries likely to be responsive?
Evaluation of Public Opinion - Will the results of these meetings "make news"?
Choice of Participants - Is the individual's personality and position likely to enable
him to effectively transmit his views?
105 Wilbur Schramm, Mass Media and National Development: The Role of Information in the
Developing Countries (Stanford, California/Paris: Stanford University Press/UNESCO, 1964), 84-9.
Schramm cites Kurt Lewin's thesis regarding the existence of "gates" and "gatekeepers". This refers
to points all along an information channels at which "in" or "out" decisions have to be made. The
power to operate these gates and the rules or personalities that govern their operation becomes crucial
in the flow of information. The previous section discussing styles of journalism by Frederick
Buchstein outlines just such a series of "gates" and "gatekeepers".
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Choices of a meeting place - Does the location indicate a certain orientation? Will
this, in turn, affect participation?
The Agenda - Do the topics consider extremist positions on contentious issues in
all countries? Does the agenda allow for the greatest possible chance for agree-
ment on moderate conclusions?
Semantic problems - Have potential semantic difficulties been identified?
Detailed Special Knowledge - Has participant-selection included consideration of
"experts" in specific problem areas?06
The IPI meetings are both a media opportunity and a media event in and of themselves.
c. Twenty-Two Minute Laws
News is a business, and as such it generates income and outlay. One of the ways
in which it produces income is by selling advertising- space in a newspaper, air time in a
broadcast. The size of what is commonly referred to as the "news hole" in a newspaper is
dictated by the amount of advertising sold for that particular day. The news hole is that
portion of the paper dedicated to news, editorial comments, and letters. Size varies from as
little as thirty percent to as great as forty or fifty percent. Obviously, the publisher would
desire the larger news hole since he is not in the business to sell someone else's product at
the expense of his own. The television or radio news director fills air time and in a thirty
minute broadcast, this news hole is approximately twenty-two minutes.107 When
compared to the print media this twenty-two minutes becomes two, perhaps three columns
of text plus visuals. How are those twenty-two minutes of air time used, and what are the
laws, written or unwritten that govern its use?
Television is theatre in a small package, and the news is the most riveting type of
theatre currently in existence for it is "real". There are techniques which are accepted
106 Meyer in Unofficial DiplomaL 62-4.
107 Buchstein, 535; Mario Pei, Weasel Words: The Art of Saying What You Don't Mean (New York:
Harper and Row, Publishers, 1978), 25-30; Frank Mankiewicz and Joel Swerdlow, .RemoteSCntrl
(New York: Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., In., 1978) 76-77.
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throughout the television news community, and although they are not inherently bad, i.e.
morally objectionable, they are subject to clever manipulation which is somewhat
questionable in terms of journalistic ethics. These techniques include the following:
1. Story Placement - The first story on a network newscast is perceived by the
audience as being the most important news of the day. (It is analogous to
the front page piece in a newspaper.)
2. The Hold Frame - Used to "capture" something the audience might otherwise
have missed. It interrupts the motion to hold on one still picture from the
moving action so that particular frozen image can be examined by the viewer.
3. Selective Segmentation - The objective is to cut out portions of a speaker's com-
ment and, by use of tied-together excerpts in false continuity, make the total
effect different from his original in-context remarks. These are termed "cut-aways".
4. Commentator Speculations that Appear to be Factual - Factual information is
provided, then a "comma", then the speculative part of the presentation is provided.
It is difficult, at times, to discern this effect in an audio-visual form; it is readily
apparent in the written form.
5. The Truth But Not The Whole Truth - Usually the whole truth is known to the
reporter or commentator, but with the design of capturing viewer interest or
attention, only a portion is told. This hook casts an invalid impression by intent.
(Of course, it is also possible to inadvertently do this when air time is limited
and only the highlights of a story are possible.)
6. Catch Phrases - Catch phrasing is a printed-word and audio technique that has
been streamlined by television, e.g. Irangate, with its genesis in the term
Watergate, which in turn was the reporter's shorthand for all the criminal activity
and later charges levied against the Nixon administration.
7. Using the Chemistry of Combined Audio and Visual - Often a visual image gives
one impression, the audio gives another, and the combination of the two creates
a distortion.
8. Visual Emphasis of Audio by Selection of Phrases for the Audience To Read.
9. Pretense Balancing - Usually a combination of a "fresh" story with an "evergreen"
implying that the two are somehow related.
10. Selectivity of Interviewees - Depending upon whom is interviewed, it has the
potential of tilting the meaning of a news event.
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11. Treatment and Respect Given to an Interviewee - The audience is given an impres-
sion about the person being interviewed by the questions he is/s not asked, by the
manner in which he is/is not addressed by a reporter who may either be the adver-
sary or the friend of the court.
12. Prompting an Interviewee - Words may be put into an interviewee's mouth by the
interviewer. Interviewers may phrase questions in such a way so that the question
may be edited out, while the answer is retained as a complete statement. The object
is to coach the interviewee.
13. Methods of Reading - Reading slow or reading fast, or accenting a particular word
are all techniques taught in Speech 101 in order to enliven an oral presentation.
These, in combination with a faint smile, a shake of the head, or a raised eyebrow,
are subtle ways of editorializing.
14. Visual Authority - The posture of the television anchor sitting behind a desk with
papers in front of him or her gives immediate impression of authority. (The type
of clothing is also significant, as are the colors, jewelry, etc.)io8
15. Narration Rather than Visuals - When It Suits the Purpose - At times, a news event
will occur in which visuals will create a negative effect when the producer hopes to
achieve a positive impression. Visuals would then defeat the purpose, and thus,
only narrative is used.
16. Crediting and Discrediting - This newswrizing technique is designed to give credit
to an editorial factor of a writer's choosing.
17. Creation of News - If it is a slow news day but the network has been following a
particular story, then the creation of a related event is sometimes deemed necessary.
One ploy in the Washington, D.C. area is to send a minican and a newsman over
to the Capitol to interview a senator or congressman about "the story". Another
method is to give a relatively unimportant item an extended story length, to have
reporters quote other reporters, or to emphasize the fact that there is no news
regarding the "continuing story."
18. The Inclusion or Omission of Crowd Reaction - When reporting a speech of a
public figure, the film editor is the deciding factor for inclusion or omission of
the audience reaction to those witnessing the speech. Time limitations may be
circumvented by retaining the flavor of the reaction by leaving in the applause
(or catcalls as the case may be), fading it to a low level, and bringing the repor-
ter's voice above the applause.
19. Focal Length - Different lenses give separate impressions of the size of the crowd.
108 John T. Malloy, New Dress for Success(New York: Warner Books, 1988); See also ]3&
Women's Dress for Success Book (New York: Warner Books, 1977) by the same author.
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20. Tragedy and Comedy Reporting - The news anchor as actor or actress, investing
the news with passion.
21. Ignoring Follow-Up Stories/Disregard of Stories - This decision is usually the
result of several factors, such as time, audience interest and attention span,
editorial policy.
22. Story Association and Grouping - Detailing one story, and without pause going
into another story can imply association between the two. This may be achieved
either with or without narrative bridges by grouping stories in succession.109
Twenty-two minutes of air time requires a great deal of creative endeavor, a careful
selection process, and the responsibility of responding to a multitude of needs in order to fill
the time appropriately. The result may be singularly impressive, or mediocre, or infuriating,
but it is rarely dull.
Informal, unacknowledged laws of television newsi 10 have evolved over the last fifty
years of broadcasting: unattractive faces do not an effective broadcast make; a fire at night
is more dramatic than the same fire in daylight; every news story must be complete within
one minute, fifteen seconds, however if it is an in-depth treatment, then one minute, forty-
five seconds is the norm; a story with film will take precedence over one that is read from
the anchor desk or reported in a "stand-up" spot; an action film will take precedence over
the conversation or discussion (denigrated in television circles as "talking heads").
Washington, D.C. is a standard source of news, as the president will always make good
copy, plus the newsrooms are well-staffed. Time zones are taken into consideration as well.
Repeatedly, it has been said that television sets the national agenda simply because it is in
the position to select which news is covered, which isn't, and which isn't even considered
because there was no "gatekeeper" on the scene to recognize it as such. The actual laws
109 The techniques outlined above represent a compilation of the following: Bruce Herschesohn, The
Gods of Antenna (New York: Arlington House Publishers, 1976),50-69; Pei, WeaselY.oId, 20-30;
Grossman and Kumar, 47 and additional commentary by this author.
110 F. Mankiewicz and J. Swerdlow. 77.
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governing the regulation of television will be discussed in the next section on the Freedom
of the Press.
D. FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
1. Constitutional Authority - The First Amendment
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition
the Government for a redress of grievances.
AMENDMENT I to the Constitution
What , precisely, does the above e,-tact from the Constitution mean in terms of the
freedom of the press? There are probably as many interpretations as there are journalists
and those who would oppose journalists. These differing views will be examined below,
and although they are interesting and oftentimes insightful, they do not represent the legally
acceptable standard as defined by the U.S. Supreme Court through the years. "Freedom of
the Press" is predicated upon the earlier concept, "Freedom of Speech" which is a logical
step in view of the history of communications. Man was, after all, transmitting his thoughts
through the spoken word, long before the tools for the written word had been developed.
Legal arguments since the ratification of the Constitution, in general, and the First
Amendment, in particular, have examined several angles when attempting to interpret the
limits of this issue.iii Sir William Blackstone interpreted the freedom of speech or press
"as that which lays no previous restraints upon publications, and not in freedom from
censure for criminal matter when published." Alexander Hamilton is credited with
supplying the formula, "the liberty of the press is the right to publish with impunity, truth,
I See Edward S. Corwin's The Constitution and What It Means Today rev. by Harold W. Chase and
Craig R. Ducat (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1974). 280-93 for a complete dissertation
and analysis. The presentation which follows draws heavily from this source.
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with good motives, for justifiable ends though reflecting on government, magistracy, or
individuals." 12 This is the core upon which the "absence of malice" doctrine is buL. By
1919, Justice Holmes, in reviewing a case based on the Espionage Act of 1917, ruled
protection of free speech will not protect that individual, who speaks "...in such
circumstances...[so] as to create a clear and present danger". Phrased differently, the
character of the act may not be divorced from the circumstances in which the act was
committed, i.e. proximity and degree. Judge Learned Hand in 1950, presented the court
with a new approach by stressing the idea of "a clear and probable danger" rather than "a
present danger". This reading provided the Supreme Court with what it termed "the
balancing approach" as opposed to a formulaic, mechanical, or doctrinaire approach. The
balance is achieved by examining each case on its individual merits, and determining the
appropriate weight to be given to the competing private and public interests. The
newsgatherer's privilege is the right not to reveal sources unless sufficient grounds exist to
indicate the reporter may possess information relevant to a crime currently under grand jury
investigation.
Freedom of the press, as stated earlier, has derived its definition from, and been a
logical outgrowth of, the freedom of speech arguments. "There do exist a number of rulings
which pertain specifically to the press, and particularly to the electronic component of that
media. Previously touched upon was the doctrine of no previous restraint, which basically
forbids censorship of the press prior to publication.113 It should be noted at this juncture,
that "forbidding prior censorship", granting freedom to the press in this instance does not
excuse the press from the other freedom implicit in the privilege, i.e. the responsibility of
112 People v. Croswell, N. Y. Common Law Reports 717 (1804) cited in Corwin, 282.
113 The Pentagon Papers is probably one of the more celebrated instances of this freedom. Cable
News Network (CNN), in November 1990, was restrained from broadcasting the contents of audio
tapes on the grounds that publishing the material could prejudice a criminal case currently under
investigation. The final ruling in December 1990 lifted the prior restraint and cited the freedom of
speech rulings.
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the press. They are both parts of the same equation but periodically, the -allying cry of
"responsibility of the press" is, a) articulated by its opponents in frustration, anger, and in
an accusatory manner, or b) misinterpreted by the press as the responsibility to publish
everything, factual or semi-factual, with or without malicious intent, etc. This is certainly
not an attempt to indict the press, merely a reminder that freedom implies responsibility,
otherwise it is simply anarchy. The other doctrines are those of libel and obscenity.114
Congressional control of the press derives from its controls of the U. S. mail system,
however it may only revoke the "second class privilege" from those items which are
obscene and/or fraudulent. Freedom of circulation is predicated on freedom to publish, and
certain materials, by law, may not be published. The Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) established twin doctrines of "equal time" and "fairness". These
elements require radio and television broadcasters to air discussion of public issues, as well
as opposing viewpoints which shall be permitted an equal amount of time for rebuttal.
Failure to abide by these requirements may result in a station losing its broadcast license,
and since licenses are in short supply (the reality of a limited spectrum of frequencies,
channels) and must be renewed triennially, it behooves the station owner to comply with
these restrictions.115 The next question to ask is how does the press itself interpret this
freedom?
2. Definition One: The Press Defines Its Own Freedoms
Rod Serling, a renowned playwright and television dramatist, in commenting on the
challenge posed by the mass media to the twentieth century writer, spoke of the rules which
114 Refer to Corwin, 255-7 for a complete discussion of libel and obscenity and their relation to the
115 For a less legalistic approach to this discussion of the restrictions imposed on the broadcast press,
recommend: Mankiewicz and Swerdlow, 89-90; Michael A. Spitzer, Seven Dirty Words and Six
Other Stories: Controlling the Content of Print and Broadcast (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1986), 43-66; Theodore F. Koop, "Television: America's Star Reporter", ed. by Warren K. Agee
ed., Mas Medi in a FreeSi (Lawrence: The University of Kansas Press, 1969), 51-3.
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a writer should embrace - social critic, protestor, commentator, satirist, etc. The key was to
present a point of view , for "so long as men write what they think, then all the other
freedoms may remain intact. It's then that writing becomes a weapon of truth, an act of
conscience, an article of faith."116 What Serling was exhorting the guild of his fellow
creative artists to do, Thomas Jefferson had so charged the press of his day to do - to
engage in a free marketplace of ideas. At the 1968 William Allen White Centennial
Seminar a group of journalists, print and broadcast variety, gathered to express their
thoughts on the entire spectrum of journalism, its roles, duties, functions, and freedoms.
Distilled below is the essence of those discussions.
Ben H. Bagdikian
The press is the natural vehicle for the expression of local needs; detecting the
breakdowns in the social system. News should inform the public of reality, no
matter how unpleasant. Look for the causes of public episodes and do so
with competence and speed. Make recommendations in editorials when public
attention is engaged. Journalism is an exercise in judgement. Judge what is
important and describe it without bias. Growing cynicism about the press may
be an outgrowth of invoking Freedom of tihe Press and the First Amendment
for business reasons unaccompanied by inspiring editorial performance.
Bill D. Moyers
Journalists look at ideas and events through their own eyes. The mistake occurs
when it is passed off as something other than the pursuit of truth by men less
opinionated than their peers. The great myth of American journalism is objec-
tivity. Journalists enjoy professional longevity, are beyond retaliation, have the
last word due to durability, and do not operate at the end of an electorate's whim.
The president was created by the Constitution and the press is protected by it -
one's mandate is to conduct affairs of state, the other's privilege is trying to find
out all he can about what is going on.
116 Rod Sering, "The Challenge of the Mass Media to the 20th Century Writer". The Quarterly
Journal of the Library of Congress, (April 1968), Vol 25 No. 2, 130-3.
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Theodore F. Koop
A broadcast journalist has the duty of explaining events and putting them in pers-
pective. The documentary is one method for doing so.117
The underlying theme remains the responsibility to transmit information to the public in
such a way that they are better served by the knowledge which they now possess. Implicit
in that gatekeeper role is free access to the sources of information, free exercise of personal
judgement, and free, yet responsible speech. In his introductory remarks to a panel
discussion on "Communications Media at the Naval War College in 1971,118 Nel Sheehan
spoke of the media's responsibility "to be a state unto itself." The journalist stands aside
from the major institutions in society and subjects each one in its turn to close scrutiny and
examination. Sheehan is in agreement with Moyers and Noss, and those before them, in
accepting and announcing the fact that objectivity in the news does not exist. How can it
exist when the journalist believes he has been charged with a greater duty than simply
information relay? Judgements about "what it all means" are necessary and those
judgements "should be communicated honestly and openly to the reader." That is what
freedom of the press means on a daily basis, healthy criticism, openly aired of the
government and the other major institutions of society.
Barry Zonhian, who has worked both sides of the journalistic/diplomatic beat,
"officially" for USIA, and "unofficially" for Time. Inc., defines the media's role (read the
press) within the context of the concept ot an open society.19 This, in turn, implies a
government that is responsive to the people as enshrined in the U. S. Declaration of
Independence. Jefferson's "enlightened public", is only able to assume such a role, i.e.
117 B. H. Bagdikian, "The Press and Its Crisis of Identity". 3-14; B. D. Moyers, "The Press and the
Government Who's Telling the Truth?", 17-36; Koop in Agee.
I L, Neil Sheehan, "The Role of the Press", Naval War College Review (Feb 1971) Vol XXIII No.
6,4-7.
119 B. Zorthian, "The Role of the Communications Media in a Democratic Society", Naval War
College Review (Feb 1972) Vol XXIV No. 6, 1-7.
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passing judgement on the government in question, if it has the information to do so. The
press, in this country, "is the channel to the ultimate goal we have set in our society." Philip
L. Geyelin, foreign correspondent and Washington Post Special Editor, concurs with this
idea of a "direct connection between the kind of press we have..the kind of
government...and a free society. You cannot have one without the other." 120 But he goes
on to characterize the press as being "in the early warning business." Casting the press in
such a role places the onus on the press to be neither a Cassandra, constantly prophesying
doom and destruction which falls on deaf ears, nor a boy crying wolf whose credibility
diminishes with each false alarm. The early warning system brings the discussion full
circle to Justice Holmes and the declaration of fire: when no such emergency exists;
warnings must be issued responsibly or they become an inadvertent weapon of destruction
of the public trust.
Almost thirty years after Mr. Serling's remarks, Dan Rather, anchorman and
managing editor of "CBS Evening News", states that "a public journal (newspaper,
magazine, radio station, or television program), is a public trust...it's a journalist's duty to
report the news and to raise hell.. play no favorites, pull no punches...have no fear of the
results."iia As honest brokers of information, journalists are supposed to pose the difficult
and sometimes disturbing questions, not to "always make America feel good about itself."
So Mr. Serling, purveyor of fiction and entertainment voices the same thoughts as that of
Mr. Rather, purveyor of nonfiction and "infotainment". In fairness, it should be
acknowledged that Mr. Rather also believes that rights of journalism additionally imply
certain responsibilities, specifically leadership. Discernment is the objective here,
120 Philip L. Geyelin, "The Role of the Press in An Open Society", Naval War College Review
(Mar/Apr 1975), Vol XXVII No. 5, 3-7.
121 Dan Rather, "Journalism and the Public Trust", The Humanist (Nov/Dec 1990), Vel 50 No. 6, 5-
7,42.
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characterization of what is merely interesting and what's vitally important, and the
willingness to exercise that judgmental ability. Each journalist in this (admittedly random)
survey returns to the same starting point, they are not merely free to pass judgement on that
data as it is being passed to its public, they are expected to. The problem arises when the
editorializing is not clearly delineated during the course of the broadcast or the length of the
newspaper column.
3. Definition Two: Three Views Outside the Press of the Press
Vilifying the press has been in vogue since the first newspaper published an article or
opinion which didn't coincide with the perception at large. "Media-Bashing" is the
somewhat inelegant term in current use. This section has deliberately been limited to the
presentation of three viewpoints: 1) a professor of political science; 2) a political thinker
and social activist; 3) a politician.22 Neither vilifying nor "bashing" is the object here but
rather the presentation of an alternate viewpoint. Doris Graber, in her cost-benefit analysis
of press freedom, 123 identifies five functions which a free press should perform:
1) reflects the diversity of opinions throughout the country, thus provides forum for
discussion, and adoption of the soundest ideas; 2) furnishes citizens with the information
needed to perform duties of citizenship adequately; 3) articulates the public's interests to the
government and gives voice to public opinion; 4) provides an outlet for public expression
of unpopular minority views; 5) constitutes the citizens' eyes and ears to detect and report
corruption, abuses of power, and other misconduct by government officials; acts as the
watchdog. Graber examines each of these functions and concludes that, in fact, the media is
able to only partially perform those functions attributed to them. Constraints identified in
122 I have deliberately excluded the general public's opinion as this issue will be addressed in
Chapter VII.
123 D. A. Graber, "Press Freedom and the General Welfare," Political Science Quarterly,
(Centennial Year 1886-1986), Vol 101 No. 2, 257-75.
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her study included: 1) concentrated ownership of the media through national and regional
newspaper chains, three major networks and two newcomers (TBS, FOX), and the wire
services of Associated Press and United Press International; 2) news selection criteria
based on audience appeal instead of political significance or civic relevance; 3) the press
seeks out political elites and their views consistently, the average American only rarely;
4) media has a mixed record in championing minority rights except when the "press
freedom" appears to be the issue; 5) investigative journalism depends on two issues -
neither manpower-intensive nor cost-prohibitive, and guaranteed to capture audience
interest. The bottom line of the balance sheet is that w hile the press is unable to effectively
perform all of these functions all of the time, it does work remarkably well in the public
service. It should be noted that Graber does acknowledge the ability of the underground
media to rise up when tue democratic need for it to do so is tapped.
Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of government, to analyze actions
according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions...they have the
power that comes from political liberty from access to information, and from free-
dom of expression.124
These are the words of Noam Chomsky, Viet Nam War critic, written in the 1970s. As a
man of the 1990s, Chomsky argues that the American media machine constitutes "the most
awesome propaganda system in world history."125 He debunks the notion of an
adversarial press, except as it exists on the periphery of society. Characterizing the media as
major corporations in a capitalistic world, they must increase profits and market shares.
This task is only achievable if issues are shaped and modified such that they serve the
interests of established power. Network TV news is the handmaiden to the front page of
The New York Times or the Washington Post. Finally, the public's role is relegated to
124 Noam Chomsky. "The Responsibility of Intellectuals", New York Review of Books. 1972.
125 Rick Szykowny, "Bewildering the Herd: The Humanist Interview with Noam Chomsky", The
tHumanist, (Nov/Dec 90) Vol 50 No. 6, 8-17. See also N. Chomsky and Edward S. Herman.
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passive observer since it is the political-economic-cultural elites or specialized class who is
actually on the receiving end of this propaganda machine. The bottom line of his balance
sheet is that the media is too subordinate to government despite all its rhetoric as a tireless
seeker of the truth, and grass roots movements which spring up periodically because they're
"mad as hell and they're not going to take it anymore" as Paddy Chayevsky's scathing
indictment of television declared in the film Network.
The last piece of commentary is from Mario M. Cuomoi26 speaking before the New
York Press Club. Not too surprisingly Cuomo applauds the press and tells them that recent
cases brought before the Supreme Court appear to be attempts to curtail the freedom of the
press which he views as dangerous. For "..the press' job is to find the whole truth...[that]
which is forgotten, ignored, deliberately concealed or distorted by public officials." In his
concluding remarks, Cuomo reminds the press of the "balanced approach" so beloved of
the U.S. legal system:
I am making a case for the broadest possible freedom of the press.
Of course that great gift comes with great responsibility.
The press has: the power to inform - the power to distort
the power to instruct -- the power to mislead
the power to uplift -- the power to demean
You can lead our society toward a more mature and Jiscriminating understanding
of the process by which we choose our leaders, make our rules, and construct
our values or you can encourage people to despise our systems and avoid partici-
pating in them...
You can make us wiser, fuller, surer, sweeter than we are.
Or you can do less. And worse.
You are free to make all the choices.
126 M. M. Cuomo, "A Brief on the Freedom of the Press: To Keep the Miracle Alive",Vital Speeches
of the Day (Feb 15, 1987), Vol LIII No. 9, 265-9; By no means the last word however. See
Robert J. Manning, "The Free Press in a Democratic Society", Naval War College Review (Oct
1963) Vol XVI No. 2, 1-14 who characterizes the press as: 1) jealous of its rights and prerogatives;
2) fascinated with speed and exclusivity.., interest in analysis and interpretation; 3) insistent on its
economic viability...right to make profits; 4) convinced its primary enterprise is disclosure; 5) not
unanimous as to its public responsibilities and obligations; Torbjorn Tannsjo, "Against Freedom of
Expression", Political Studies (December 1985) XXXIII, 547-59; Sanford J. Ungar, "Pressing for a
Free Press", Foreign Policy (Winter 1989-90) No. 77, 132-53 for yet more perspectives inside and
outside of the press.
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Cuomo's comments must be considered within the context in which they were given,
however the bottom line of his balance sheet suggests that a free press has a specific
function to perform, i.e. disclosure. Although it is a constitutionally mandated right, it does
not diminish the responsibility of the grantee to use it wisely and well.
E. U. S. PRESS CONFRONTS THE WORLD
1. Sources of International News
What are the characteristics of the world-wide flow of news? Logically, the majority
of a nation's news will be parochial in nature, thus the newspapers and newscasts will
devote the bulk of the information to that which is local. The proportion of national news
appearing on the wire ranges usually from sixty to ninety per cent. A very small minority
of the news items focus on the international arena, and even then, it will tend to be either the
"superpowers" or the countries immediately bordering the local area.127 Additionally, the
flow of information and its attendant materials between countries will be governed to a
significant degree by certain basic verities. The avenues of exchange, i.e. the international
sources of news, are basically owned by a few countries. It is a point of fact that the five
major world news agencies are owned, publicly or privately, by only four nations. Not too
surprisingly, the nations which own the five world news agencies are also the ones which
house the five world news agencies. The Associated Press (AP) and United Press
International (UPI) originate in the United States; Reuters in the United Kingdom; Agence
France Presse (AFP) in France; Tass in the Soviet Union. According to studies conducted
by UNESCO, AP and UPI focus on the United States proportionally to the focus of Tass
on the Soviet Union. Reuters' area of concentration is on the United Kingdom and the
127 Schramm, 59.
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United States, which is not surprising in view of the fact that they have a mutual economic
arrangement for the exchange of photographic materials. AFP is the only one of the
agencies which has a tendency to report slightly more about the geographic area from which
it is receiving and transmitting information than it does about itself, i.e. France.
Fenby, in his studies of the four major international news services (he excludes Tass in his
studies), shows that in the service provided to the large-circulation newspapers, foreign
news will comprise twenty to thirty percent of the total amount of copy. 128 This foreign
news appears on the "Interbureau" wire. State and local news will then be added to this.
AP radio and television subscribers receive two services: a special news wire edited and
written especially for broadcasters, and an audio service of voice reports and sound
recordings. UPI also discriminates between large- and small-to-medium-circulation
newspapers. Local news will be inserted as well as coverage of sports, business, stock
markets, and special features. UPI pioneered the use of supplemental audio [read voice
reports] live from the correspondent in the field, complete with gunfire. There is one
drawback to this system of news gathering; newspaper and broadcast subscribers cannot
choose what information they receive. News is categorized by region, thus, every
subscriber will receive everything issued for its region in the same order and length as the
others. The editing desk comes into its own under these circumstances, selecting,
condensing, simplifying, synthesizing, and occasionally, deleting. Desk editors do not,
however, originate the story; that is the correspondent's function. Each story is judged on
its individual merits, i.e. it is unusual, evocative, covers a disaster, has special regional
appeal, or it happens to be of worldwide interest, but the pattern declares that it will usually
deal with power, where it is being exercised, who is exercising it, and how it affects the
overall balance of power in the world. Thus the global superpowers appear to receive the
128 Fenby, 84.
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majority of the news coverage. The tone of this coverage is overwhelmingly serious.
Politics and economics tend to dominate the headlines for this is the kind of power, most
commonly exercised. (Military power is also significant but not routinely used by the
global superpowers.)
From the foregoing, it would appear that these agencies are all-powerful, in fact, they
have periodically been referred to as the "agenda setters to the world." In actuality, control
ends the moment the product is delivered. The recipient determines which pieces of news
will be transmitted further along the communications chain thus, a return to Kurt Lewin's
concept of the gatekeeper is perhaps a more appropriate characterization. Finally, the
agencies declare their commitment to accuracy but are reliant upon the foreign
correspondent in the field. If this firsthand, verifiable information is unavailable, then the
agency must, perforce, resort to secondhand news. Rather than taking direct responsibility
for the information in a story, they state that some person or organization reported the facts.
Accurate attribution to sources of information (a problem previously addressed in terms of
backgrounders and unidentified sources) is both honest, and a definite protection against
being held accountable for originating false news.
Embassies and diplomats, both U.S. and foreign, use the U.S. press extensively; the
first to stay abreast of what is happening in the "home office", and the second to discover
"signals" from the government, follow reports on developments in U.S. policy, and take the
pulse of American public opinion. Rubin discusses the "symbiotic relationship"129 between
correspondents and diplomats in exchanging items of information, through the wire
services and more recently, Cable News Network with its worldwide, twenty-four hour a
day news coverage.
129 Barry Rubin, International News And The American Media (Washington, D. C.: The Center for
Strategic and International Studies, Sage Publications, 1977), 16.
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At the international level the media to a significant degree, will represent the same
liberal viewpoints outlined in 11e Media Elite, European journalists will tend to shape
their views of the United States based on The New York Times, the New York Herald
Tribune, the Washington Post, The Economist of London, Le Monde of Paris, and
incorporate those views into their national newspapers.13o This gives rise to what has been
termed "news imperialism" whereby AP, UPI, Reuters, and AFP provide the news to the
world as previously discussed. Satellite communications have complicated this problem as
well, due to cost, access, language, and national control or lack thereof, in an international
environment. 131
The International Press Institute (IP) was established in 1951 in order to "achieve
understanding among journalists of the world and thereby, among the peoples of the world.
World peace depends upon this understanding."132 The IPI is an international non-
governmental organization whose membership is limited to countries where the press is
basically free. Meetings are conducted among editors representing various nationalities.
The objectives of these meetings are: 1) climate creating; 2) conflict preventing. The
meetings may be bilateral, focusing on a wide range of areas concerning two countries, or
multilateral, Ycusing on specific issues and their press aspects, i.e. political, economic,
130 Hannaford, 29; Servan-Schreiber, 160-1.
131 Peter Marshall, "Global TV by Satellite: Choice for Viewers, A Threat to National
Broadcasters", Space Communication and Broadcasting (1989) Vol 6,263-8: Johanna S. DeStefano.
"The Growth of English as the Language of Global Satellite Telecommunications", Space
Communications and Broadcasting (1989) Vol 6, 461-74; McPhail, Electronic Colonialism;
William H. Meyer, "Global News Flow: Dependency and Neoimperialism", Comparative Political
Studies (October 1989), Vol 22 No. 3, 243-64; Anthony Smith, "The Influence of Television",
Daedalus, (Fall 1985) Vol 114 No. 4, 1-15; Michael Tracey, "The Poisoned Chalice? International
Television and the Idea of Dominance", Daedalus (Fall 1985), Vol 114 No. 4, 17-56; Robert V.
Williams, "The Role of Intergovernmental Organizations in International Information Transfer and
Policy", Special Libraries Association (Winter 1988), Vol 79 No. 1, 1-8; R. V. Williams, "Using
the Information Resources of the Global Village: The Information Systems of International Inter-
Governmental Organizations", Special Libraries Association (Winter 1989), Vol 80 No. 1, 1-8;
Philo C. Wasburn, "International Radio Broadcasting: Some Considerations for Political Sociology",
Journal of Political and Military Sociology (Spring 1985), Vol 13 No. 1, 33-51.1 32 Ernest Meyer, "The Bilateral and Multilateral Meetings of the IPI" in Unofficial Diplomats, 56-7.
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legal, communication. This latter is termed "the influence factor potentialities"133 of the
mass media. The influence factor is carefully evaluated prior to setting up an actual
meeting. IPI does not view itself as a replacement policy-maker or as an antagonist to the
government, but rather as an analyst and a publicist. However, the mere fact that the
influence factor is even considered implies that, in fact, the IPI is hoping to effect some type
of change through their focus on a particular country's problems.
2. Foreign Correspondent or Transposed Advocate?
American news reporters assigned overseas or in the southern hemisphere are
expected to report the news of the locale in which they find themselves. To do this
effectively, a working knowledge of the language is beneficial not only to understand what
the translator is not telling him, but to gain an insight into the mindset, the culture in which
he is now immersed. Two problems are readily apparent in this scenario, the average
American aversion to any language except English, and the inability to view the world
through another culture's eyes. Previously, the discussion of diplomacy raised the issue of
the diplomat who "goes native", and then becomes of little use to his country due to the fact
he is no longer able to discern what is in his nation's best interest. A journalist fulfilling the
role of foreign correspondent is subject to the same personality alteration, with the result he
will begin to question his country's foreign policy or its actions in another nation. Reporters
may then become advocates, i.e. portraying the role of exciter, moderator, pacifier, or
amateur diplomat.134 What studies have actually shown 135 is that the U.S. press uses an
133 Ibid, 62.
134 Manny Parashos, "News Coverage of Cyprus: A Case Study in Press Treatment of Foreign
Policy Issues", Journal of Political and Military Sociology (Fall 1988), Vol 16 No. 2, 201-13. For a
complete history of this branch of reporting, see John Hohenberg, Foreign Corresondence: The Great
Reponers and Their Times (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1965); Knightley,
First Casualty of War,
135 Bernard C. Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1963); W. Phillips Davison, Donald R. Shanor, and Frederick T. C. Yu, News From Abroad
and the Foreign Policy Public (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1980); William A.
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"American lens" with which to view the world. This lens is the result of the American
mindset, a tendency to view the world from one's own perceptions and experiences,
especially in terms of societal interactions. It should be remembered also that this liberal
media elite is viewing a world whose conflicts are not merely political or economic but
multi-variate in nature, ranging from regional to historical to ethnic to ideological or any
combination thereof. If a mirror is held up to those societies in an attempt to view the
slightly distorted reflection of a little America, then the journalist has failed in his duty to
report and comment on the news as it affects those who are living it. Paraschos speaks of
the "parachutist" reporter who drops in, looks around, and reports his findings back to the
news bureau while enroute to yet another "drop".136 Is this truly a foreign correspondent?
It would not appear to meet the definition outlined earlier.
3. War Correspondent
The Mexican War introduced the field correspondent system of journalism to the
United States. Emie Pyle, in his coverage of World War II and his death on It Shima in the
Pacific from a sniper's bullet, brought home to the U.S. public the texture of war, the men
who took an oath to defend their country, and the ultimate price extracted from them, life
itself. Ernie Pyle was not a soldier, but he shared in the same risks in his efforts to bring
the war home to the people, to report it as he saw it, and as his fellow "men at arms" lived
it. War correspondents of yesteryear shared a commonality, the majority had served in the
military at one time or another, were familiar with the language, and understood the gravity
Hachten, The World News Prism (Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1987); James E. Larson,
Global Television and Foreign Policy (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Inc., 1988); Rubin.
International News and the American Media:; Eduardo R. Ulibarri, "Covering Conflict in the
Strategic Backyard: U. S. Media and Central America", Strategic Review (Fall 1988) Vol XVI No.
4, 55-64.
136 Manny Paraschos, Greece and the American Press (New York: Krikos Publications, 1986).
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of military operations, battle plans, and the importance of reporting just enough without
saying too much.
War correspondents today may be free lance journalists, may be assigned to an area in
which their expertise is limited but their body is available, may have the best intentions in
the world but are not in fact, adequate to the job. Robert D. Kaplan writing in Soldiers
God discusses the war the west ignored, i.e. Afghanistan.137 The question is posed: Why
did the American press ignore the story? The answers provide an interesting insight into
the ongoing evolution of the war correspondent. Robert Frost once wrote, "Something
there is that doesn't love a wall." 138 Afghanistan was full of such obstacles for the
American press. First, it was a perilous situation requiring journalists to walk fourteen
hours a day through mountains littered with land mines in search of a story. Secondly,
there was no jungle, no war torn cities, no visual relief from the unending monotony of rock
hardened mountains and turbaned men to match them. Third, the mujahedin were not
fanatics and in many ways, did not make good copy. Finally, Kaplan writes, there were
two types of war correspondents who braved the danger, those who were deeply
committed to the mujahedin cause, or those who were danger freaks.139 The others
remained in hotels, complete with satellite hook-ups, lap-top computers, and digital phones
to call in a story they could only see from a distance, if at all. The dangers are real for a war
correspondent, and as the New York Times reported in April 1990, fifty-three instances of
"killing the messenger" were recorded by Amnesty International in the previous year. 140
The dangers are real.
137 R. D. Kaplan, S (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1990).
138 Robert Frost, "Mending Wall". injarlj~a= (New York: Avenel Books, 1981), 80.
139 See Michael Herr's masterful description of these "danger junkies" in Dipa di. the record of his
time in Viet Nam as a war correspondenL
140 "Killing the Messenger", New York Times, 16 April 1990, Sec. 1, A16.
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What has not been adequately explored is the influence of the war correspondent on the
war itself. Eduardo R. Ulibarri examined the U. S. press and its coverage of the conflict in
Central America. His conclusions were remarkably similar to Kaplan's, 1) ill-trained
"stringers" and free-lancers caught up in some sort of ideological commitment; 2) as late
as mid-1985 there were no major U.S. news television networks, wire services, or news
weeklies with a full-time correspondent in Nicaragua; 3) no U.S. combat reporter was ever
assigned to travel with the insurgents; 4) the U.S. press, instilled with the idea of a
government-press adversarial relationship, transferred this relatic-iship to Central American
players who held attitudes and positions paralleling those of the U.S. government. 14 1 The
list could go on from his examples, and his agenda is also quite obvious, but it is difficult to
counter the bare fact of an ill-trained journalist, purporting to be a war correspondent, and
inadvertently dabbling in foreign policy because he provides a potential mouthpiece, instead
of a clarion bell.
Concluding this brief examination of the many aspects of media diplomacy in a
democratic society, the focus will now shift to the nuances of media diplomacy in a state-
controlled system, and how that system is reacting to a media in transition.
141 Eduardo R. Ulibarri, 55-64. Walter Goodman writing for the New York Times comments on the
problem when the journalist becomes the part of the news or helps to create the news in his piece
"Jesse Jackson in Iraq: Reporter is the Story", 5 Sep 90, B 1-2.
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VL MEDIA IN THE USSR - A STATE-CONTROLLED MEDIA
IN TRANSITION
This chapter will examine the influence of the media in the realm of international
relations, specifically the decline of the state-controlled system and transition to Glasnost
during Mikhail Gorbachev's tenure to date in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
Attention will be focused on Asia as a geographic testing zone for this new brand of
diplomacy.
A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVIET UNION'S
DIPLOMACY
A country's diplomacy may have several incarnations as a result of dominant
personalities, its Weltanschauung , and the international environment. The Soviet Union
has exhibited both continuities and discontinuities in this regard, and it may be said to have
"...generational categories representing three schools of Soviet Diplomacy" 142 dating from
its inception following the revolution of 1917 to the current diplomatic initiatives launched
by Gorbachev in the 1980s.
1. First Soviet School Of Diplomacy
The first Soviet School of diplomacy was exemplified by Chicherin and his
successor Litivinov, who were noted for their learning, international sophistication, and
diplomatic skill. These gentlemen would be the architects of Lenin's masterful bi-level
diplomatic foreign policy. Officially, through the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, the
Soviet Union re-established diplomatic relations with Germany by executing the Rapallo
Treaty in 1922, thus ending both the Soviet Union's and Germany's diplomatic isolation as a
142 Committee on Foreign Affairs, "Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior 1979-1988: New
Tests for US Diplomacy". Svecial Studies on Foreign Affairs Issues Vol II (Congressional Research
Service, August 1988) 571.
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result of World War I. Unofficially, the Second Congress of the Communist International
(Comintern) was convened in 1920 with the goal of exporting the rvolution through
adoption of the "twenty-one conditions" for membership 143 The Comintern was an early
attempt at global sovietization through a network of unofficial, supposedly non-
governmental actors who ,ere, in fact, practicing public diplomacy at an international level.
Heller and Nekrich have noted the following phenomenon: "The lack of separation between
diplomatic activity and the innovative moves of tL" Comintern was indicated by the fact that
quite often Soviet iplomatic representatives abroad were at the same time officials of the
Comintern." 1" This early blurring of the distinction between official and unofficial
diplomacy would ultimately result in a loss of credibility for -Roviet diplomatic efforts, and
damaged diplomatic relations with Great Britain following the Zinoviev letter incident in
1924. However, the dual-track diplomacy was succeeding in both Germany and China,
and so despite occasional reversals, it was considered a viable method of executing foreign
policy. The Soviet Union's foreign policy during the Lenin years was essentially driven by
three core maxims:
I. The Soviet Union was the most important factor of world
revolution and thus its strengthening, combined with an
equivalent strengthening of the world revolutionary movement
for the sake of Soviet interests, was the revolutionary task of
Communist parties in other countries.
2. Conflict between the Soviet Union and the capitalist countries
was inevitable, and the revolutionary movement in the capitalist
countries was a reserve force that could help Moscow.
3. The nature of capitalist countries was such that subversive
revolutionary activity conducted against them did not exclude
143 See Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, U piaji Pwr trans Phyllis B. Carlos (New
York: Summiu Books, 1986) 123-5 for a complete discussion of this subject.
144 Ibid, 210-11.
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the possibility of carrying on normal diplomatic and trade re-
lations with them. 145
National, not international, priorities were the dominant factor. These precepts would be
put in a temporary holding pattern once the Soviet Union became involved in the Great
Patriotic War.
2. Second Soviet School Of Diplomacy
The second Soviet School of diplomacy may be dated from the replacement of
Foreign Minister Litivinov by Vyacheslav Molotov in May 1939. Prior to Litivinov's
dismissal, Stalin was, to a significant degree, a shadow player in the realm of Soviet
foreign policy. Infrequently granting interviews and never meeting foreign diplomats,
Stalin entrusted those aspects to Litivinov. As a result of the East Pact or Litivinov
Protocol signed in 1929, Litivinov was seen as representative of the public line of Soviet
policy; a policy based on collective security and resistance to aggression. His dismissal
and subsequent replacement by Molotov, a staunch Stalin crony and collaborator, signaled
that Stalin was firumly in charge of Soviet foreign policy, and without a Jewish Foreign
Minister, was ready to deal with the Germans. This was the first of several
Litivinov/Molotov switches Stalin would make as his foreign policy goals and needs
shifted. 146 During the latter part of the 1930s, Stalin ordered a purge which included the
Chicherin generation of diplomats; these learned, creative, sophisticated, and skillful men
were to be replaced by parochial, orthodox Stalinists who could either support Stalin's
version of foreign policy or become victims of "the meat grinder" as Khrushchev would
term the terror.147
145 Ibid, 213; Alvin Z. Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II 3rd ed.(Ilinois: Scott,
Foresman and Co., 1989) 34.
146 1 am indebted to Professor Claude A. Buss, U. S. Naval Postgraduate School for this observation.
147 Heller and Nekrich, 309-11; Rubinstein, 43-5; Committee on Foreign Affairs, 572-3.
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Ever since the rise of Hitler, the world-wide Communist movement was relegated to
the periphery of Stalin's foreign policy. Stalin found himself executing an intricate dance of
alternating cooperation and confrontation in dealing with his foes. The issue was survival
of the Soviet Union, and the solution lay not in secret treaties with Germany or Japan, but
with the allied powers. A gesture was necessary to confirm Stalin's common purpose with
the allies and so, the dissolution of the Comintern was announced effective May 22, 1943,
basically as a sop to Roosevelt. This multifaceted tool, characterized by the establishment
and manipulation of political front organizations; support for revolutionary movements
abroad; use of mass media and propaganda; use of cultural and commercial organizations
for espionage, was to exist no more. In actuality, the Comintern was not dissolved.
Instead the headquarters was relocated to an undisclosed part of Moscow and it continued
to functi.a in secret. When World War II was over, Stalin resurrected it as the
Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in 1946 as a response to the war-altered
world power relationships. Cominform goals bore a strong similarity to its predecessor:
consolidate the forces of the international Communist movement, coordinate the efforts of
the Communist parties in their struggle for power with the capitalist system, and achieve
this through the same dual-track foreign policy which appeared to have been so successful
in the past. Litivinov had survived the purges of the 1930s, but presented a pessimistic
viewpoint of the new Soviet diplomatic directions. He stated.
...the differences between East and West have gone too far to be reconciled...
there has been a return in Russia to the outmoded concept of security in terms
of territory - the more you've got, the safer you are ...the root cause is the
ideological conception prevailing (in Moscow) that conflict between the
Communist and capitalist world is inevitable. 14
148 Robert G. Kaiser, Cold Winter. Cold War (New York: Stein and Day, 1974) 12-13: Vojtech
Mastny, "The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat Maxim Litivinov and the Cold War" Freign
Afairs Vol 54, No. 2 (January 1976) 366-76.
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And so Litivinov was discarded, and Molotov recalled once again. Foreign policy was
dictated not by Communist ideology, but by Stalinist ideology. As Lenin had learned in
the Soviet Union's infancy, so Stalin would learn, that the art and practice of diplomacy had
many schools.
3. Third Soviet School Of Diplomacy
The third Soviet School of Diplomacy, epitomized by Gorbachev, had its evolutionary
beginnings during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras. The "thaw" engineered by
Khrushchev as part of his de-Stalinization efforts had a profound effect on the Soviet
diplomatic community. Former ministers were sent as ambassadors to different countries,
which meant that career diplomats had lost their monopoly on ambassadorial posts. The
role of Minister of Foreign Affairs, Stalin's stooge Molotov, became increasingly less
important. Khrushchev's Twentieth Party Congress secret speech of 1956 was the
harbinger of glasnost. The intelligentsia became a reliable base of support for
Khrushchev. 149 All aspects of the media were used by Khrushchev to reinforce the de-
Stalinization campaign by publishing such works as "The Heirs of Stalin" in Pravda ;
"Terror in the Outer World", a satire of contemporary Soviet society in Izvetsia ; Silence
and One.Day in he Life of Ivan Denisovich in Novy Mir.150  This pattern of media
manipulation was to be extended on the international front as well. Aleksei Adzhubei,
Khrushchev's son-in-law, was named editor-in-chief of zvetsia and a member of the
Party's Central Committee. In control of the mass media and attempting to obtain control
of foreign affairs151 in addition, he alienated both the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
ministry's organization as a whole. The ranks of the anti-Khrushchev camp were swelling.




Foreign policy during Khrushchev's tenure may be summed up by Adam Ulam when he
wrote:
...thus between 1957 and 1962 Khrushchev's regime pursued two apparently
contradictory policies; one of militant Communist expansionism designed to
weaken the West's position or to push it out of Berlin, the Middle East, Africa,
and even Latin America; and the other a strenuous search for accommodation
(or more) with the United States. 152
This expansion and coexistence identified by Ulam was the key element in the post-Stalin
era's foreign policy.
The Foreign Ministry during Brezhnev's tenure was characterized by organizational
stability, bureaucratic conservatism, depolitization, and increasing professionalism. 153
However, it was hampered by a certain lack of creativity and its essentially negative
approach. 1-54 The Brezhnev Doctrine, a term coined by Western journalists, was outlined
in Pravda as a justification for the Soviet military action in Czechoslovakia in 1968. His
basic premise was that the Soviet Union had not only a right, but an obligation to intervene
in the affairs of a fellow Communist country when, in the opinion of the Soviet Union, the
global interests of socialism were being threatened. 155 Using this one incident as
illustrative of the media's importance and power in the Brezhnevian political machine,
Heller and Nekrich write:
Twelve years later a significant part of the population accepted the invasion
in Czechoslovakia as necessary and just. Soviet propaganda put forward
as its main justification the alleged threat posed by West Germany...The Soviet
propaganda machine succeeded in executing a masterwork of disinformation.
The broad coalition government of Willy Brandt was portrayed as the direct
successor to Hitler. The propaganda machine also availed itself of the feeling
152 Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence: Soviet Foreigm Policy 1917-1973 2nd ed(New
York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, Inc., 1974) 606; Claude A. Buss offers an alternative
explanation in that Khrushchev was attempting to counter the United States, and therefore only
cooperated when he viewed the situation as lacking any viable alternative.
153 Committee on Foreign Affairs, 573.
154 Ibid, 263-7.
155 Ulam, 738-45; Heller and Nekrich, 623-9; Rubinstein 118-23.
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diligently nurtured in the Soviet people that the world should be grateful to the
Soviet Union for the sacrifices it had suffered...during the war with Nazi Germany,
and for the assistance it had rendered, was now providing and would continue
to give to the "fraternal countries". The press harped incessantly on the "ingratitude
of the Czechs and Slovaks"... and this argument struck a chord in many
Soviet citizens. 156
Although this effort did not entirely silence the dissident voices in the Soviet Union, it did
manage to prevent complete world ostracism by employing the media to present their
action in terms of a national and internal problem. The borders of socialism were involved
and these extended as far as the Iron Curtain.
Perestroika, the hallmark of Gorbachev's ,-nestic and foreign policy, intimated a
comprehensive overhaul of the Soviet system of diplomacy. The subtitle of his book
Pexsika "New Thinking for Our Country and the World" emphasized the international
flavor of Gorbachev's initiatives. The 27th Party Congress speech in 1986 outlined his
requirements for admission to the Gorbachev school of diplomacy.
1. Domestic and foreign affairs must be perceived as interwined;
2. New concepts perestroika and glasnost, must be adopted and
archaic stereotypes eliminated;
3. A realistic, creative approach was essential in diplomacy and
negotiations to overcome the "Mr. Nyet" image of yesteryear.
4. The foreign ministry and embassies abroad must expose their
problems to the cleansing effects of glasnost, thus generating
a spiritual renewal.
5. Modesty, understanding, and mutual respect were necessary in
relations with the socialist countries.
6. New initiatives were required in achieving Soviet goals in the
Asian-Pacific region and an active promotion of good relations
with China.
7. Improvement in diplomatic relations with the European community
was essential.
8. Soviet policy in the Third World had to be more carefully rationalized
and the Soviet presence more efficiently structured.
156 HIler and Nekrich, 627. It may be questioned whether this is actually an example of
disinformation or merely an alternative interpretation. The point is that the media was effectively
used to influence attitudes. Although it should be noted that in an instance such as this, a
predisposition to the message would make it easier to accept psychologically, thus resulting in an
attitude change.
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9. Soviet diplomats had to confront the West directly on the human
rights issue, emphasizing the "truly impressive" gains made in the
Soviet Union.157
His concept of "a contradictory but interconnected, interdependent, and essentially, integral
world" 158 is the foundation upon which the Soviet Union is building its latest version of
foreign policy. The key difference, however, appears to be Gorbachev's view of the media
and its role in diplomacy and negotiations. Gorbachev and glasnost are the new coin of
the realm, for in a world experiencing the Information Revolution and interconnectivity via
live satellite transmissions, the illusion of a western-style creation of, and catering to,
public opinion is, for all practical purposes, mandatory. The media is charged with
increasing its effectiveness for "no radical change is possible without it (glasnost,
criticism, and self-criticism). There is no democracy, nor can there be, without glasnost.
And there is no present-day socialism, nor can there be, without democracy." 159 The
media is then co-opted to become a significant player in the government's diplomatic effort.
B. OFFICIAL PRACTITIONERS OF SOVIET MEDIA DIPLOMACY
As presented in Chapter 1, media diplomacy has, in the past, been primarily a Western
phenomenon. With the advent of glasnost in the Soviet Union, its influence is spreading.
A truly state-controlled system determines what the media will and will not report, and
when. With the glasnost imperative, this is beginning to change. The question in regard
to the Soviet Union is: Who are these practitioners of foreign policy?
157 Report on basic theses of Speech by Gorbachev at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs May 23.
1986 "Time for Restructuring" Vestnik Ministerstva Inostrannyka del SSSR in Russian, No. 1, August
5, 1987. trans in FBIS: Daily Report: Soviet Union, August 18, 1987, 1-3; FBIS Daily Report Soviet
Union Sep 2, 1987 23-5; Committee on Foreign Affairs, 577.158 Mikhail Gorbachev, Peestika (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1987) 139.
159 Gorbachev, 79.
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1. Embassy Information Officer
Similarities between diplomats and journalists, and the general tasks of a press
attache were explored in the previous chapter. As noted before, the definition of a press or
information attache will, in fact, alter somewhat when the practitioner himself is asked to
elaborate on the functional aspects of his job.
Miloslav Chrobok, Second Secretary (Press and Political Affairs), Embassy
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
1. Determine how to reach the American press - the information is
made available to them but how to ensure that it is actually pub-
lished. The problem is that:
a) US readers are interested in the pragmatic and the practical.
Czechs are interested in the political, i.e. foreign policy.
b) US press is essentially local and not national. 160
c) US press is expensive, i.e. advertising.
d) US press is self-reliant, i.e. staff reporters are used with
greater frequency than are free lance.
2. Supply the press and others with information brochures.
3. Assist US journalists traveling to Czechoslovakia.
4. Engage in public relations or propaganda.161
Yuri Ivanovitch Bobrakov, Second Secretary, Embassy of the Union of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
1. Diplomatic official dealing with the press.
2. Speaker at press receptions, civic gatherings, university functions, etc.
3. Aid American correspondents assigned to Moscow in terms of filing
appropriate paperwork.
4. Avid reader who pays special attention to material in the local press
that is related to his country and its policy, economy, culture, history,
and current events - the life of its people.
5. Rebut inaccuracies in the local press.
6. Promulgate the aims of Soviet foreign policy i.e. providing for
peaceful conditions for the construction of socialism and
160 These comments are twenty years prior to the estabishment of USA Today, national editions of the
New York Times, etc. However, UPI, AP, the International Herald Tribune as well as some
newspapers with international bureaus were functioning in the Washington, DC area at the time.
161 M. Chrobok, "Promoting Czechoslovakia in the United States" in Lee, 111-15.
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communism, of strengthening the principles of peaceful coexistence
and promote peace in the world.1 62
These two examples serve as representative of the post-Khrushchev/pre-Gorbachev
perceptions of the relationship between the official diplomatic media and the unofficial
diplomatic media.
2. TASS and Novosti
The mass media usually includes newspapers, magazines, television, radio, and
film. The Soviet term is "media of mass information and propaganda (SMIP)', with an
expanded definition to include the theatre and book publishing. Mickiewicz notes that
"increasingly, in the Gorbachev era, SMI is used, dropping ' propaganda' from the
term."163 The two key players in the State news agencies are: TASS, the telegraphic
agency of the Soviet Union; and Novosti which may be considered analogous to the USIA.
Of the two however, TASS remains the "acknowledged authoritative spokesman for the
Soviet political bureaucracy in affairs of State."16 4 TASS was established as the central
organ of information in the USSR in 1935, which gave it a virtual monopoly in terms of
information distribution about the USSR in foreign countries; in the distribution of foreign
or All-Union information within the USSR, and of all domestic information from one
Union republic to another. This situation would remain unchanged until the arrival of
Novosti in 1961. Novosti's functions include: 1) distribute feature material abroad and at
home; 165 2) work with the foreign mass media to gain a "good press" for the Soviet
162 y. Bobrakov, "Red Square to Pennsylvania Avenue" in Lee, 119-20, 127.
163 Ellen Mickiewicz, "Making the Media Work: Soviet Society and Communications" in Soviet
Society Under Gorbachev ed. by M. Friedberg and H. Isham (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1987)
133.
164 Robert Conquest, ed., The Politics of Ideas in the USSR (Connecticut: Greenwood Press
Publishers, 1976) 75; M. W. Hopkins, Mass Media in the Soviet Union (New York: Westview
Publishing Co., Inc., 1970) 265; Jeffrey T. Richelson, Srand hild (Massachusetts: Ballinger
Publishing Co., 1986) 24.
165 Unlike USIA which is prohibited from distributing its product within the United States.
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government; 3) prepare written and photographic material concerning domestic and
foreign affairs of the Soviet Union for the foreign mass media; 4) supply the Soviet mass
media with materials on political, economic, scientific, and cultural developments in
foreign countries; 5) publish magazines, newspapers, and brochures designed to acquaint
foreign readers with the Soviet Union. Novosti established a television section in 1964,
created its own book publishing organization, and became one of the sponsors of Radio
Station Peace and Progress. Alexei Adzhubei, Khrushchev's son-in-law, sat on Novosti's
original board of directors. Conquest noted that Novosti functioned almost as
Khrushchev's personal public relations agency during his tenure.166
3. KGB and Disinformation
The Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or Committee for State Security's role
in media diplomacy derives from its First Chief Directorate or Foreign Directorate with
Service A or Active Measures Service. Originally created in 1958 as the Department of
Disinformation, Service A mans an entire section of the Novosti Press Agency, works
closely with the International Department, the Department of Socialist Countries, and the
Propaganda and Information Department of the Central Committee Secretariat. 167 These
active measures include an impressive range of practices such as written and oral
"disinformation" (forgeries, false rumors), "gray" and "black" propaganda, manipulation
or control of foreign media assets, political action and "agent of influence" operations,
clandestine radio stations, semi-clandestine use of foreign communist parties and
international front and special action organizations, staged or manipulated demonstrations
166 Conquest, 79.
167 John Barrow, KGB Today: The Hidden Hand (New York: Reader's Digest Press. 1983) 444-50;
Brian Freemantle- KGB: Inside the World's Largest Intelligence Network (New York: Holt,
Rinehart, and Winston, 1982); Richelson, 24; Joseph D. Douglass, Jr., Soviet Disinformation",
StraicReiew (Winter 1981) Vol IX, No. 1, 16-26.
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and even in the past, blackmail and kidnapping. 168 The support of the KGB for Soviet
foreign propaganda is almost completely at the covert, or "black" end of the operational
spectrum. "White" operations are conducted by the International Information Department
and the Foreign Ministry through the embassy information/press attaches. "Grey"
operations are the responsibility of the fronts, parties, and various movements under the
nominal auspices of the International Information Department. 169 The International
Deparmnent is credited with the creation and operation of clandestine radio stations, located
either within the Soviet Union proper or in the Bloc Countries as of 1986. There are two
such stations whose target audience is in Turkey - "Our Radio" and "Voice of the Turkish
Communist Party", which used to transmit from Magdeburg, East Germany, 170 as well as
the "National Voice of Iran' which commenced operations from the Baku area in 1959,
and of course, the original "Radio Moscow". Disinformation, and the definition thereof,
is a slippery sort of character. It is not simply falsified information or incorrect data, as it
may include a judicious blend of false data with material and images containing elements
of truth. The difference is the information has been manipulated in a number of ways, i.e.
grossly exaggerated, deliberately misleading, and passed to a pre-selected target audience
in order to fall in line with some given Soviet objective or policy line.
Propaganda is the handmaiden to disinformation, but it "it lacks the precision and bite
of disinformation." 171 The term propaganda is of religious origin. In 1622, the Roman
168 Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency, Soviet Covert Action and
&rwgaganda, February 6, 1980, reprinted with editing as Soviet Covert Action (The Forgery
Offenive) (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1980) 11-4; See Aain Jaubert's Makin
E (Washington: Pergamon Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1986), 7-
38, 77-96, 145-56, 165-74 which traces the Soviet tradition of altering official photographs in order to
substantiate historical revisionism.
169 Paul A. Smith, Jr. "Propaganda: A Modernized Soviet Weapons System" Strategic Review
(Summer 1983) Vol X1 No. 3, 65-70.
170 Richelson, 153.
171 "The Soviet and Communist Bloc Defamation Campaign", Conrvessional Record-House.
September 28, 1965, 25391.
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Catholic Church created a commission of cardinals charged with supervising the activities
of Catholic missions and it was entitled the Congregatio de Propaganda Fide or
Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, or even more literally, "concerning the faith
to be spread." Although its first appearance in English was in 1718, it was not until 1842
that the term propaganda was expanded to include any concerted movement (not strictly a
religious-oriented activity) for the spreading of any and all ideas. Propaganda is neither
good nor bad, it is simply a method to preserve an ideology, its unity, and possibly expand
its scope. Internal propaganda may consist of addresses, writings, or conversations.
Externally, there is the propagation. 172 In the Soviet case, propaganda is media
diplomacy both officially, and clandestinely.
C. UNOFFICIAL PRACTITIONERS OF SOVIET MEDIA DIPLOMACY
1. Samizdat
The Soviet Union does not have a mechanism in place which could be defined as
unofficial media diplomacy, although if Gorbachev's initiatives are carried out in the spirit
and intent in which they were first proposed, such elements may soon come into being.
The media to a large degree was the state and vice versa. The dissident movement with
its creation of samizdat - self-published or underground literature - was since 1966, the
Soviet Union's only unofficial advocacy journalism. Focused on human rights issue, the
dissident movement in the Soviet Union found itself in the quandary of having no viable
means of putting its message across within the country, while being somewhat more
successful on the international front through the use of petitions, letters, etc. A method had
to be found to circulate information internally. Natalia Gorbanevskaya, a poet and
translator, solved the dilemma by founding the unofficial journal A Chronicle of Current
172 Professor T. K. Noss, "I ,)gic and Propaganda" a lecture delivered at the Naval War College
September 1, 1961, published in Naval War College Review (December 1961) Vol XIV No. 4, 1-16;
Hans Graf Huyn, "Webs of Soviet Disinformation" Strategic Review (Fall 1984) Vol XII No. 4, 51-
58.
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Events in 1968. Finally suppressed in the mid-1980s, the Chronicle had been the sole
source of information regarding arrests made, results of court proceedings, and labor camp
conditions. 173
2. Standards and Styles of Journalism
Everette E. Dennis describes four different standards and styles of journalism
which in turn reflect different values and appeal to different outlooks and views. These are:
1. Public Affairs Reporting - which assumes coverage of politics and govern-
ment is preeminent, deserving of surveillance, and consistent monitoring.
The result tends to accentuate the negative.
2. Problem-Solution Journalism - looks at the world as a series of problems -
public or private - which can be corrected with alternative solutions. Tends
to be slightly negative.
3. Descriptive-Analytic Journalism - delivers long stories that include descrip-
tion, detailed explanation, and exploration with a human interest angle and a
link to large humanistic problems.
4. Marketing Approach Journalism - special sections in the newpaper or local
news segments linked to market research and public tastes.174
In a state-controlled system, all of the official media was advocacy journalism, the
government's viewpoint only. Public Affairs reporting accentuated the negativism of the
capitalist world while extolling the virtues of the Communist. Problem-solution
journalism always offered the same solution --- greater adherence to the latest Five Year
Plan. Descriptive-Analytic journalism glorified the latest party apparatchik or tireless toiler
for the socialist cause.
173 Uncensored Russia: Protest and Dissent in the Soviet Union (yew York: American Heritage
Press, 1972); Joshua Rubenstein, "Dissent" in The Soviet Union Today 2nd d. ed. by James Cracraft
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988) 64-76; Richelson, 250.
17 4 E. E. Dennis, "American Media and American Values" Vital Soeeches of the Day Vol LIV No.
11. (March 15, 1988) 351.
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3. Soviet Media Elite
What is the profile of the Soviet "media elite"? Professional journalists receive their
training at one of the following universities: Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Lvov, and
Sverdlovsk, each of which has a faculty of Journalism. About fifty percent will obtain
their degree from Moscow State University. 175 Foreign correspondents are required to
know at least two foreign languages. The most interesting aspects of the Soviet Union's
"media elite" are that there is only one professional union, journalists achieve their
positions based on the Nomenidatura system of personnel selection, a strict division exists
between national and international correspondents, and since it is or was a mass press,
"non-professional writers" are also given an opportunity to contribute. 176 It should be
noted that these non-professionals are usually party, governmental employees, and the
occasional man in the street, all of whose efforts, in the past, would have been scrutinized
closely by Gavlit (the Chief Administration on Matters of the Press and Literature) and
duly censored. The effect of glasnost on journalists will be discussed in the next section.
It should be noted here, however, that journalism had created an "information vacuum" 177
and a journalistic style unique to the Soviet Union, i. e. extremely dry, tailored to express
the Marxist-Leninist view (party line), reflected long-term national interests rather than the
public mood, two-dimensional or shallow in nature, didactic. Journalistic efforts in the
USSR did not have to meet deadlines, consequently speed of service to the subscriber was
not an imperative, adherence to Gaviit's standards was.
175 Terry Heyns, American and Soviet Relations Since Detente(Washington, DC: National Defense
University Press, 1987) 35; See Eleanor Blau, "Soviet TV Journalist at Work in U. 2" New York
Times, (19 Apr 90), B4 profiling one of the soviet media elite gaining experience with the American
free press as a member of the WWOR-TV team in New Jersey.
176 Ibid, 73: Mickiewicz, 294; Conquest, 73.
177 Hedrick Smith, The Russians rev ed.(New York: Ballantine Books, 1976) 459-501.
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D. GLASNOST
Cultural liberalization by Gorbachev has had its greatest impact on the mass media,
altering both the content and the style. Glasnost appears to serve two functions: 1) to
reveal failures in many aspects of government, the economy, and society, thus building a
support hase for reform measures; 2) to expose officials who are incompetent or who
abuse their power and to apply pressure for their removal. 178 Public criticism directed by
the state is not a new phenomenon, but linkage of said criticism to explicit reform
objectives with its attendant publicity is a new wrinkle. 179 The key political appointee is
Alexander Yakolev, who in the summer of 1985 became Head of the Propaganda
Department of the CPSU Central Committee - a position he had forfeited in 1973 for
criticizing nationalist tendencies in Soviet journalism. His star has been in the ascendancy,
as evidenced by his rapid rise in the party apparatus: Central Committee Secretary for
Propaganda and Agitation at the 27th Congress (early 1986), candidate member of the
Politburo (January 1987), full member of the Politburo (June 1987). He is considered to
be "a key Gorbachev foreign policy advisor...whose role in propaganda includes an
international aspect.' " 0
1. New Journalistic Imperato. es
Soviet journalists are now charged by Gorbachev to perform the following
functions:
1. Channel for expressing the people's will, reflecting their views.
2. Initiate a dialogue rather than a monologue.
3. Its critical faculties should always be based on the truth, which in turn
depends on the conscience of the author and the editor, or his sense of
responsibility to the people.
178 Herbert J. Ellison, "Gorbachev and Reform: An IntroducLion" in Gorbachev and the SiLet Fu




4. Unite and mobilize people rather than disuniting them and generating offense.
5. Discuss public and state issues.
6. Broaden control by the public.
7. Counter the efforts of Western information imperialism.
8. Glasnost and Operativnost (openness and timeliness) are the
fundamentals 181
This represents Gorbachev's direct challenge to the traditional attitude of Soviet
governments towards criticism of policy decisions, it was an invitation to open debate.
Public participants in this foreign policy debate include: the International Department of the
Central Committee, the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Supreme Soviet, the press and
the intelligentsia. 182
2. Debate and Dissension in the Ranks
The advent of glasnost hb- itself, engendered debate, speculation, and criticism, not
only in the Soviet press, but also in the Western press.1 83 Krasnov views glasnost not as
an abolition of censorship, but a greater opportunity for Soviet citizens to voice their
opinion; not as a gift, but as an exchange for their support of economic perestroika and to
narrow the credibility gap between propaganda and reality. Bukovsky accuses Gorbachev
of "high-jacking" the 1960s dissident movement's slogans. Glasnost under Gorbachev is
a sham because the "...Party still maintains a monopoly on the truth" and is once again,
181 Gorbachev, 76-9; Mickiewicz, "Making the Media Work", 142-5.
182 J. E. Mroz, "Soviet Foreign Policy and New Thinking" International Affairs Moscow ed. (May
1990)25.
183 See C. Z. Wick, "Glasnost" Vital Speeches of the Day Vol LIII No. 14 (May 1. 1988) 418-20;
C. Z. Wick, "Global Interdependence and the War of Ideas" Vital Speeches of the Day Vol LIX No.
11 (March 15, 1988) 327-30; V. Krasnov, "Beyond Gorbachev" Vital Speeches of the Day Vol LIV
No. 13 (April 15, 1988) 393-6; V. Krasnov, "The Soviet Union and the Asian-Pacific Region in the
1990s" Vital Speeches of the Day Vol LV No. 6 (Jan 1. 1989) 164-6; N. Patterson "The Struggle of
Memory Against Forgetting" Vital Speeches of the Day Vol LV No. 4 (Dec 1, 1988) 101-7: M.
Warder, "Is Glasnost Genuine?" Vital Speeches of the Day Vol LV No. 11 (Mar 15, 1989) 341-4; V.
Bukovsky, "Glasnost - Genuine Change or Illusion?" Vital Speeches of the Day Vol LIII No. 19 (Jul
15, 1987) 596-600; A. Pankin, "Glasnost in Foreign Policy: Ultimate Goal and Intermediate Stages"
International Affairs Moscow ed. (Mar 1989) 104-8; A. Pankin, "Diplomacy and International
Journalism" International Affairs Moscow ed. (June 1989) 94-8; V. Rubanov, "From the Cult of
Secrecy to the Information Culture" The Soviet Review Vol 30 No. 5 (Sep/Oct 1989) 18-35; S. N.
Kondrashov, "An Accurate Image of the World", The Soviet Review Vol XXIXX No. 4 (Winter
1988/89) 87-99.
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demonstrating its skill at manipulating world opinion in an attempt to obtain economic
benefits. Michael Warder also views this top-down version of openness as suspect and
states that glasnost is "...first of all, a political term currently used by the Party and its
leadership." He questions equation of glasnost with a Western definition of free speech
when he points out that criticism of Lenin is not permitted, no legal non-Government press
or publishing activities are in existence, Soviet disinformation machine is still in place, etc.
Patterson outlines the cycles of glasnost which have occurred in the Soviet Union since
1921 to the present, and concludes that "...most are reversed; many are outright
deceptions, and others are just a lot of political blather."184  Charles Wick, former
Director of USIA, is probably the most pragmatic when he states,
Glasnost is a marketing strategy targeted to the peoples, to the world.
The image is one of openness designed to present an image-with-appeal
to the West, create Soviet-informed world public opinion, and pressure
free world governments to act in a way favorable to Soviet interests.-85
Wick remains hopeful that it won't simply become "gloss-over-nost."
The most telling comments however, come from within the Soviet Union's ranks of
journalists. Interestingly enough, a similar theme is sounded, perhaps most frequently by
Alexei Pankin: "First, glasnost should be proclaimed indivisible; it should be equal in all
regions and spheres. Second, the freedom of personal opinion should be ensured. And
third, the right to receive and issue information should be placed solely on a legal basis." 186
The mere fact that these concerns have been articulated in the Soviet press indicates the
transitional and ephemeral nature of jorbachev's initiative to date. Pankin and Rubanov
both come to the same conclusion, the lack of a specific concept of national security, and
subsequent articulation of the national interest have continued to hamper journalistic efforts
184 Patterson, 106.
185 Wick, "Glasnost'. 420.
186 A. Pankin "Glasnost in Foreign Policy: Ultimate Goal and Intermediate Stages", 107-8.
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in the foreign policy arena.18 7 Areas still censored include: some facts of history,
relations with allies, cases of rectifying mistakes in such a way so as not to lose face, and a
vast amount of factual information concerned primarily with defense. 188 Kondrashov
argues that with the advent of glasnost, international journalists have failed to keep pace
with their domestic counterparts because despite all the rhetoric of global interdependence,
reporting of Soviet life is more pertinent, important, and interesting to the average Soviet
citizen than it was in the past. Foreign Soviet correspondents, additionally, have
experienced difficulty in meshing two essentially antithetical approaches to news reporting:
1) the sober realistic viewpoint of foreign life and politics, as far as possible without filters
or blinders; 2) the set viewpoint illustrative rather than investigatory, focused on
dogma. 189
He is in agreement with Gorbachev that the journalist is the spokesman of public
opinion, but in a society increasingly preoccupied with national issues, and still denied
access to foreign policy information, this restructuring is not occurring. Unofficial media
diplomacy appears to be an issue in the Soviet Union, not because hasn't evolved during
the transitional phase of glasnost but because it has done so at a pace too slow for the
Information Revolution.
E. GORBACHEV'S FOREIGN POLICY GOALS
1. General Outlines
Historically, Soviet foreign policy rested on three basic maxims: 1) imperative to
control territory; 2) imperative of amassing as much military force as possible; 3) practice
187 Pankin, "Diplomacy and International Journalism", 94; Rubanov, "From the Cult of Secrecy to
the Information Culture", 34.
188 Ibid, 95; Ibid. 26-8.
189 Kondrashov, "An Accurate Image of the World", 92.
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of economic autarky. 19° Gorbachev, in his book Prerika. and in numerous speeches
since, has reassessed past foreign policy and concluded the following:
1. Common interest of all nations demands peaceful coexistence between
the two systems of socialism and capitalism in order to ensure survival.
2. Ideological conflict between the two systems should not be extended to
the sphere of peaceful coexistence.
3. Security is achievable not by military-technical means alone, but through
political means as well.
4. Interdependence requires international or collective security.
5. Domestic and foreign policy must complement each other.191
In order to achieve these goals, Gorbachev has opened a dialogue with the world, one in
which he espouses support for public or citizen diplomacy wherein the peoples of the
world are addressed directly, and thereby, invited to share in the diplomatic process. In an
effort to narrow this field of vision, a brief examination of Gorbachev's foreign policy
goals in the Asia-Pacific region and the examples of the methods of media diplomacy used
to date will be discussed in the next section.
2. Asia-Pacific Knot
The "Asia-Pacific" 192 or "Strategic Quadrangle" has played an increasingly
important role in Gorbachev's foreign policy rhetoric. His goals appear to be: 1) create a
more benign strategic environment in Asia and the Pacific for Soviet strategic
interests; 2) transform the USSR into a legitimate power player in the region; 3) stake a
claim for Moscow in Asia's dynamic economy; 4) politically isolate the United States
19 0 Seweryn Bialer and Michael Mandelbaum, The Global Rivals (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1988) 175-7.
191 Gorbachev, Ch. 3; Margot Light, The Soviet Theor of International Relations (New York: St.
Martin's Press, 1988) 297-9; Viacheslav Dashivhev, "East-West Quest for New Relations: The
Priorities of Soviet Foreign Policy" in Gorbachev and Glasnost Viewoints from the Soviet Press ed.
by Isacc J. Tarasulo (Delaware: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1990) 225-37; F. Fukuyama. Gorae
and the New Soviet Aenda in the Third World (California: The RAND Corporation, 1989) 5-9.
192 Gorbachev, 180; Bialer, 141.
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through denial rather than intimidation. 193 His task is to undo the Brezhnev legacy of
military intimidation and virulent rhetoric. Specifically, he outlined his foreign policy goals
at Vladivostok, beginning with the premise that "...the Soviet Union is ...an Asian and a
Pacific country" thus identifying the USSR as much more than simply an Eastern
European power. His proposals included the establishment of a cooperative framework in
the Helsinki style; offered closer bilateral relations with China, Japan, individual members
of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); support for reduction of naval
activity and anti-submarine capabilities in the Asian and Pacific waters; creation of nuclear-
free zones and other confidence-building measures; and Soviet leadership in convening an
Asian and Pacific conference as a step toward forging a regional security system.'19
Two years later, speaking at a meeting at Krasnoyarsk with representatives of the
Krasnoyarsk Kray, his closing remarks would turn to the international front, more
specifically the Asian-Pacific region. Seven new proposals for Pan-Asiatic security were
advanced, ranging from reduction of naval forces, base closures, and the like, to
establishment of a negotiating mechanism, flexibility and liberalization in economic
enterprises, and transforming the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. 195  These two
speeches have been considered the keynotes in Gorbachev's overture to the Asian-Pacific
region. Vladivostok and Krasnoyarsk represent masterful examples of official media
diplomacy. The question is, what constitutes official media diplomacy methods, and more
specifically, what other examples may be gleaned from Gorbachev's activities?
193 Lief Rosenberger and M. Leighton, "Gorbachev's New Strategic Designs for Asia" in Seudiy.
Strategv. and Policy Response in the Pacific Rim ed by Y. W. Kihl and L. E. Grinter (Colorado:
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1989) 55, 69.
194 M. S. Gorbachev, "International Affairs: Asia and the Pacific Region" Vital Speeches of the Day
Vol LII No. 23 (Sep 15, 1986) 706-11.
195 Speech by M. S. Gorbachev to Knsnoyarsk workers 16 September 1988, brans in EBIS..Daily
Reort Soviet Union 19 September 1988, 43-60.
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F. MEDIA DIPLOMACY METHODS
1. Official Soviet Publications
The publication of official news magazines is an avenue pursued by the Soviet
embassies through the offices of Novosti. Various publications include: SovietLand in
India in twelve different languages; Sovie .WeeW in England; Soviet Union Today in
Japan; and SieLj& in the United States; Additionally, the production, loan, or rental of
embassy documentary films, television program, and videotapes are made available to the
public as part of the media diplomatic efforts.
2. Birth of New Age Soviet Media
The Birth of the new age Soviet media may be traced to Gorbachev's activities prior
to, during, and after the 1985 Geneva Summit meeting. 196 Gorbachev's use of a post-
summit press conference, scant minutes after the closing ceremony, was not only a
masterful example of capitalizing on a media opportunity, but also a clear signal of his
understanding of the linkage between the negotiation itself and the influential nature of the
external environment. The media was his bridge between the two.
3. Asia-Pacific Media Events: A Test Case
In a speech in the USSR Supreme Soviet in Moscow on November 27, 1985,197
he debriefed the members on the events of Geneva and raised the issue of the importance
of the Asian and Pacific regions. This theme would be expanded in 1986 in Vladivostok,
in 1987 in his book Prtika, and in 1988 in Krasnoyarsk. Two significant media
events occurred with regard to China during this time frame as well: 1) Moscow ceased
broadcasting from its clandestine Ba Yi radio station198 which had been used to broadcast
196 See Committee on Foreign Affairs p 310 for a succinct summary of this event and the Soviet
media's part in iL
197 M. Gorbachev, "The Geneva Meeting: Domestic and Foreign Policies" Vital Speeches of the
Day Vol LII No. 7 (January 15, 1986) 194-203.
198 C. M. Ekedahl and M. A. Goodman, "Gorbachev's 'New Directions' in Asia" Journal of Northeast
Asian Snudies Vol VIII No. 3 (Fall 1989) 6.
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disinformation within the Chinese People's Liberation Army; 2) the Chinese published an
interview with Gorbachev in their weekly paper Liaowang, the first time a Soviet General
Secretary had been given access to the Chinese media in three decades. 199 Media
diplomacy was beginning to display results.
Gorbachev's "charm offensive" and "smile diplomacy" 20 0 has begun to make inroads
with other Asian-Pacific nations as well. Although China has been the major beneficiary
of Soviet attention and media blitz, Japan has hosted Shevardnadze, and is preparing for a
future Gorbachev visit. The Soviet-Indian relationship has been touted as the premier
example of good interstate relations and one worthy of emulation.20 1  In 1986
Gorbachev and Rajiv Ghandi conducted a joint news conference at which time the New
Dehli Declaration was announced. A cursory examination of the transcript from that press
conference2° 2 reveals three interesting points: 1) Gorbachev's speech lasted three times
as long as Ghandi's; 2) Gorbachev fielded twelve questions to Ghandi's five;
3) Vladivostok themes were reiterated and expanded upon. It was, most emphatically, a
Soviet show. One final example of media diplomacy by Gorbachev concerns the interview
granted to the Indone6ian newspaper Merdeka in July 1987203 in which regional
collective security was addressed yet again. The key difference was that he used this
country's media to announce his double zero option/proposal for the elimination of
intermediate range ballistic missiles. Indonesia, as a professed member of the non-aligned
199 Ibid. 9; E. Wishnick, "Soviet Asian Collective Security Policy from Brezhnev to Gorbachev"
Journal of Northeast Asian Studies Vol VII No. 3 (Fall 1988) 9.200 j. Poden and S. Ansovin, eds., I o (Ncw York The H. W. Wilson, Co., 1988) 94;
Fikuyama. 38; D. S. Zagoria, "Soviet Policy in East Asia: A New Beginning?", Foreign Affairs:
America and the World (1988/89), 126.
201 Gorbachev, Perestrika, 186; Fukuyama.
202 "Joint News Conference" with Rajiv Gandhi 28 November 1986 in M. S. Gorbachov Speeches
and Writings Vol II ed. by R. Maxwell (New York: Pergamon Press, 1987), 84-94.
203 L. Buszynski, "International Linkages and Regional Interests in Soviet Asia-Pacific Policy",
Pacific Affairs (Summer 1988), Vol 61 No. 2, 222; Gorbachev, Perestraika, 181-2.
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movement, saw its prestige increase when this story broke. Gorbachev achieved two goals
with this media diplomatic effort: the Soviet Union publicized as not only a leader but an
innovator in the realm of arms control, and Indonesia as a willing ASEAN partner. These
examples represent a microcosm of the Gorbachev media diplomacy offensive in the Asia-
Pacific region. What are the implications of this diplomacy for the Soviet Union in the
futures?
G. IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET MEDIA DIPLOMACY
Since diplomacy, both official and unofficial, is now in the process of being
conducted through the media, what are the implications and ramifications of this method in
the case of the Soviet Union?
The technological revolution altered both the form and the substance of international
relations.2 ° 4  Specifically, it 1) increased the influence of public opinion in world affairs;
205 2) added the cultivation of public opinion to the principal tasks of statecraft; 3)
redirected some countries' energies and economies to compete on the "influence" level as
well as on the military, economic, or cultural levels.2° The Soviet Union is one of those
countries which is engaging in the public diplomacy that has so altered the classic style of
foreign policy which used to be conducted in secret among elites. Johanna DeStefano, a
sociolinguist and tele-educator, muses that "It is also possible that glasnost in the Soviet
204 Congress, House, Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, "The Future of
United States Public Diplomacy" report submitted by Mr. Fascell, 91st Cong. 1st Sess. 1969, rpt no.
91-30. Ch I traces the rise of this phenomenon.
205 The question of public opinion in the Soviet Union has been of long-standing interest to
researchers for years. Since actual data on the state of Soviet public opinion were limited, Western
scholars have tended to rely on historical interpretation. The Soviet Interview project was a study
conducted in the late 1980s. See R. D. Grey, L. A. Jennisch, and A. Tyler, "Soviet Public Opinion
and the Gorbachev Reforms", Slavic Review, (Summer 1990), Vol 49 No. 2, 261-71 for the results of
this study.
206 James Cable, Dlomacy at &A (Maryland: The Naval Institute Press, 1985). 81-102.
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Union is, in large part, a direct result of information exploding through the fingers of the
bureaucrats whose sole job in the past has been to keep information from getting out.,,2o7
1. The Third Industrial Revolution
Gorbachev's biggest challenge and consequently, the greatest obstacle is the lack of
an adequate infrastructure to support the Third Industrial Revolution - The Information
Revolution. In the midst of "...the age of complex communication systems, the enormous
and previously unimaginable expansion of information collection, retrieval, and exchange,
in combination with the rapid change in durable consumer goods through electronics and
miniaturization", 208 the Soviet Union has found itself odd-man out. The Asian-Pacific
region, with Japan considered one of the "Big Three" international information technology
players, (the United States and the United Kingdom are the others.); Korea and Singapore
with a significant share in the market, and the Peoples Republic of China representing a
vast potential market, 209 has resulted in a different type of strategic quadrangle powered
by economics, electronics, and information, but ironically, one in which the USSR has no
share. The USSR is far below the world standard in the implementation of advanced
information technologies and the manufacture and use of modern computers.2 10
"Information is power" is a maxim no less true in world diplomacy, however, the USSR
finds itself lacking this currency.
2. The Language of Diplomacy
The world of diplomacy has seen a shift from French as the language of diplomacy
to English. The rise of the United States as a superpower and the international spread of its
207 j. S. DeStefano, "The Growth of English as the Language of Global Satellite
Telecommunications", Space Communications and Broadcasting (1989) Vol 6, 661-74
208 Bialer, 77.
2 0 9 D. H. Brandin and M. A. Harrison, The Technology War (New York: John Wiley and Sons,
1987).
210 W. P. Dizard and S. B. Swensrud, Gorbachev's Information Revolution (Colorado: Westview
Press, Inc., 1989); Mickiewicz, "Making the Media Work", 132-3, 141-2.
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influence through the media have resulted in another problem for the Soviets, as noted by
DeStefano.
Most international news is gathered and disseminated by Associated Press,
United Press International, and Reuters -- headquartered in the United States
and Britain, and written in English. As Wardhaugh has put it "English has
become the lingua franca of the modern world." What is the effect of using
English? Is it a mirror? a window? or a kaleidoscope, giving it a fractured,
distorted image of the message? It is the language of wider communication
(LWC), the link language. 211
An editorial in Internaional Affairs addresses this problem from the Soviet viewpoint and
comes to the conclusion that a single information and political elite is emerging, and it is
the West 212  If the Soviets do not have the capability to capitalize on this phenomenon
then, their influence will continue to wane.
3. Media at the Crossroads
The art and practice of journalism is at a crossroads in the Soviet Union. Vadim
Perfilyev, Deputy Head Information Directorate, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
USSR, at a roundtable discussion sponsored by International Affairs 213. raised several
issues which have the potential to create more problems in the foreign policy area than they
would solve. These included: introducing the practice of testing the soundness of
diplomatic decisions with the aid of public opinion and democratic institutions, become
accustomed to pluralism of views on foreign policy matters, realize that a publicly
expressed opinion differing from the official point of view does not equal either a lack of
patriotism or an attack on State interests. He cautions against lobbying and diversification
of players in the journalistic foreign policy process but does not offer a solution to this
211 DeStefano, 461-74.
212 "Information Revolution: The Challenge", International Affairs Moscow ed. (April 1989), 60.
213 International Affairs Guest Club, "Internationalizing the Dialogue and the Negotiating Process",
International Affairs Moscow ed. (Feb 1989), 131-40.
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dilemma. Public opinion is essential to the foreign policy process, but he has not resolved
the issue of how to maintain some type of control over it, and still remain democratic, once
glasnost is truly achieved. 2 14  At the same gathering, Victor Kremenyuk, Head of
Sector, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the USA and Canada, in his discussion of
negotiating style speaks of "...the imperative to merge all national negotiating styles, to
form a culture in this respect." 2 15 However, he fails to realize that this culture is being
developed, at least superficially, by the advent of the media connection.
The USSR is in a transitional phase in terms of media diplomacy. Gorbachev
understands the persuasive and pervasive power of this tool but has yet to resolve basic
infrastructure and educational problems to increase its viability in the international process.
The information revolution in the USSR had several consequences for Gorbachev. These
included: information boundaries became porous; regime had underestimated interest in,
and ease of transmission of the new technology; activism of the West in penetration of
national borders; and the demand for information which will continue to increase. 2 16
Pandora's box has once again been opened, Gorbachev's problems are just beginning. He
is the key practitioner of Official Media Diplomacy, but he will not remain the only one.
This exploration of a state-controlled media in transition is completed. The next chapter
will examine media diplomacy as it was practiced in a military-dominated society, i.e. the
Brazil of the 1960s to the 1980s in Latin America.
214 Neither has anyone else resolved this issue. It is the continuing challenge; the tension between
freedom of the press and governmental control.
215 International Affairs Guest Club, 135-6.
216 Mickiewicz. "Making the Media Work". 137-8.
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V. MEDIA IN THE THIRD WORLD
MILITARY ELITE MEDIA CONTROL
Several Third World countries in the last twenty years have experienced a militarily
dominated government. To an American this would appear to be a reversal of the
traditional role of the military to support the civilian dominated political process. Viewed
through the international lens, military rule is seen as a practical alternative to the failures or
inadequacies of a civilian dominated government. Certain patterns have emerged.
Similarities have been noted between a military-run political process with that of a
totalitarian structured organization such as the Soviet Union had in place since the Russian
Revolution of 1917. This section will not attempt to examine all of these military
governments but instead will use Brazil as an example of the media methods which were
used to first, help establish the legitimacy of the army government, and second, to help
topple that self-same army government. In direct contrast with this phenomenon in the
Southern Hemisphere, is the U.S. military and its role in the political process of the United
States, particularly in the realm of international relations and foreign policy, as will be
outlined in the next chapter.
A. MILITARY-AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA
Military coups were not an infrequent nor a totally unexpected factor in the political
arena of Latin America. What was unusual was that in the 1960s the military were willing
to retain the power which they had seized, to continue in the business of governing, and to
do so with no intention of holding elections to establish a sense of legitimacy. 217 Instead,
that legitimacy was to be earned by the positive socioeconomic changes wrought.
217 James Petras, Politics and Social Structure in Latin America (New York and London: Monthly
Review Press, 1970); George Philip. "Military-Authoritarianism in South America: Brazil, Chile.
Uruguay. and Argentina," Political Studies (Mar 1984), Vol XXXII No. 1, 1-20; Additinal analyses
of the role of the military in new and/or developing nations include: Morris Janowitz, I1CMilima in
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The question then arises, how to classify a government as either military or civilian?
Hanneman examines the extent and form of military elite participation in the political
executive selection and succession process, as well as the military role in executive
participation. 218 Operationally defined as the "indirect role", is the distinction between a
government installed by a coup and those installed by appointment, election, or inheritance.
Obviously, the government installed by coup is the most extreme case of executive
selection and succession by the military. Operationally defined as the "direct role" is that
executive participation measured by three quantifiers. First, the government is
characterized according to the affiliation of the chief executive, i.e. active military officer, or
an individual who recently served as a military officer indicates a military executive if he
was not freely elected. Second, presence or absence of military personnel on the
executive councils. One or more is interpreted as having the power to exert a more direct,
and stronger influence than a council without a military representative. Third, does the
chief executive retain direct operational control o-- the military? If the answer is yes, and
the executive is military or recently affiliated with the military, then the government is
characterized as a military one with the military providing a personal power base for the
chief. If the answer is yes, but the executive is a civilian (as in the United States), the
military is seen as a potential power resource in the democratic sense of government and
not the individual sense of persoriality. Brazil was characterized as a third cluster type,
meaning that although the government was dominated by militv-y elites, the participation
tk Political Development of New Nations (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1964); S. E. Finer,
The Man on Horseb .k (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962); John J. rhnson, ed , R
Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Uti;,orsity Press, 1962);
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Chanting Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968), 192-263.
218 Robert A. Hanneman, "Militray Elites and Political Executives", Journal of Political and Military
Sociology (Spring 1986), Vol 14 No. 1,74-89.
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was primarily corporate military interventions as opposed to military strongmen in the
single party context.
1. Military as a Mirror of Society
Imaging the Latin American military in terms of its political behavior received a
significant amount of study in the 1960s. Exploring the "Seven Old Ideas" 219 as they
pertain to the following areas: historical origins, foreign influence, superpower in politics,
civilian attitudes, equipment and size, social class, and professionalism, Hyman concludes
that both the favorable and unfavorable characterization-, ace in error due to incomplete
information available at the time of the original studies. Only two will be examined in this
section, the social class of the military and its self-perceived role in politics.
Military personnel are drawn from the middle or lower middle class segment of
Brazilian society. Civilian executive elites have been dominated by the upper class in the
past, although the trend in recent history indicates a shift to the middle class politician.
Electing to serve in the military, particularly in the case of officers, tends to be driven by a
family tradition of military service to the country.22o This is not the profile of an elitist
219 Elizabeth H. Hyman, "Soldiers in Politics: New Insights On Latin American Armed Forces",
Political Science Quarterly (Sep 1972) LXXXVII No. 3, 401-418. The seven old ideas are
characterized as either favorable (F) or unfavorable (U) and may be summarized as follows: 1)
historical origins - unique nationbuilding role(F) or alien institution(U); 2) foreign influence - has
been toward democratic practices (F) or strengthened the military's influence in such a way so as to
harm democratic development(U); 3) superpower in politics - officer corps intervention provides
needed stability (F) or self-interested military who repress democratic forces (U); 4) civilian
attitudes - military role has wide civilian acceptance (F) or all civilians oppose the use of military
force in politics (U); 5) equipment and size - military equipment and firepower promote
"professionlism" and keep soldiers out of politics (F) or the same attributes have a direct correlation
to military assertiveness and the use of force in politics (U); 6) social class - middle class social
origins of the officers create military support of socioeconomic reform (F) or social origins cause them
to defend the status quo(U); 7) professionalism - professional armed forces are politically neutral (F)
or a large and professional military establishment is likely to become involved in politics (U). See
Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Miliary Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1988) for a reexamination of this issue in view of his previous work, 3he
Milit-y in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1972) which Hyman cites as one of the proponents of the seven old ideas.
220 Stepan, The Military in Politics- Ch 3.
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group concerned with maintaining some form of oligarchy strictly for the benefit of an all-
powerful military clique. It does, however, indicate a group whose social roots are in that
nebulous form of society labeled "the middle class." These individuals are usually
educated, derive their income from employment not inheritance, and may have, only
recently, been on the lowest rung of the middle class ladder. Middle class values and
attitudes share a commonality amongst most countries, i.e. in the military sector, the
officer corps has a strong identification with the nation, its image and philosophy, and a
recognition of the direct correlation between effort and reward in terms of opportunities for
personal and professional advancement. This may be considered a vivid contrast to what is
occurring in the civilian sector.
Translating that belief system into a political role for the military in Latin America, in
general, has manifested itself in three ways: 1) developmental; 2) nationalist;
3) populist.221 Agrarian reform, redistribution policies, and industrial growth are
examples of this developmental approach. Expropriation of foreign-owned entities, e.g.
U. S.- based Columbian Broadcasting Company-owned Cadena de las Americas, and the
National Broadcasting Company-owned Cadena Paramerica was a method to reaffirm
national control over one's destiny. Major businesses and industries such as oil companies
were the primary targets, but communications/media facilities were also viewed as
important to the reestablishment of a national identity. Populist concerns were focused on
socioeconomic improvement for the peasant while simultaneously ensuring effective
mobilization did not occur. Imposition of a military dictatorship driven by these three
goals resulted in forced, rapid national modernization , the growth of an urban industrial
work-force, and Brazil's complete integration into the international economy. This
221 James Petras and Nelson Rimensnyder, "The Military and the Modernization of Peru", in Politic
and Social Structure in Latin America, 130-1.
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bureaucratic authoritarian regime allied the military to civilian technocracy and big
business, and contributed to the military's transition from the "Old Professionalism of
External Defense" orientation to the "New Professionalism".222
2. Military and Civilians: An Uneasy Alliance
Military intervention in politics, and in some instances, the actual usurpation of
the civilian role in government may occur as the result of varied factors. As mentioned
earlier, the military regime attempts to gain its legitimacy through successful
socioeconomic reform. If the previous civilian leadership has proven ineffectual and
indecisive, then military seizure of the government may appear to be a viable alternative.
The military may be viewed as a legitimate option when the populace is presented with the
choice of a lax, self-indulgent, and possibly corrupt civilian-controlled government.
Military organizations, specifically the Army may be viewed as a symbol of the nation and
the protector thereof. Additionally, the professional military is characterized by
organizational cohesiveness, discipline, and an ability to mobilize large portions of the
population for modernization. If there is a low level of economic development, then the
military usually has the technical skills lacking in the civilian component to achieve
industrial growth and progress. Finally, if an attempt is being made to shift from a
traditional agrarian to a modern society (a pattern repeatedly followed in Latin America),
222 Alfred Stepan, ed., Authoritarian Brazil: Oriin.. Policies. and Future (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1973). See specifically his article, "The New Professionalism of Internal
Warfare and Military Role Expansion" in which he outlines the contrasting paradigms of the "The Old
Professionalism of External Defense (OPED) " with "The New Professionalism of Internal Security
and National Development (NPISND)". The characteristics of the OPED are: function of the military
is external security; civilian accept the legitimacy of the government, military possesses highly
specialized skills which are incompatible with political skills, military professional action is
restricted, the impact of professional socialization renders the military politically neutral, impact on
civil-military relations contributes to an apolitical military and civilian control. The NPISND is
characterized as follows: function of the military is internal security, some civilian segments of
society will challenge the government legitimacy, highly interrelated political and military skills,
unrestricted scope of military professional action, the impact of professional socialization politicizes
the military, and the impact of the civil-military rclation; contributes to military-political
managerialism and role expansion.
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then the centralized command, hierarchy, and discipline found in the military may be what
is needed to redistribute the power of the land-owning classes, institute land reforms,
organize both organic and inorganic resources, and maintain control of the disaffected
masses.
Actual boundaries between military and civilian within the political system may not be
so clearly delineated as defined above.223 If the military is not performing a direct role,
i.e. military presidency complete with military constituency, then it may perform a number
of secondary or indirect roles, i.e. a shadow government, a veto group, or an arbiter
between the government and some opposition force(s). Domestic policy will usually be
the focus of military attention, as inward-looking policies are necessary for the successful
resolution of the scenarios outlined above. Foreign policy decisions are not the direct
concern of the military unless it is a matter of national security, and so specific foreign
policy decisions are left to those agencies with greater international legitimacy.224
Consequently, the military's role in diplomacy is limited. Finally, when the military
ultimately relinquishes power, the authoritarian tradition will have already been established,
thus increasing the difficulty for a civilian government to succeed.
3. Two Track Rule
Two track rule in the Soviet Union was defined as the conduct of foreign policy on
two levels. Officially, the Soviet government instituted legitimate relations with other
nations and their leaders; unofficially, the Comintern-Cominform-KGB organizations
were used to reach the mass public and establish a world-wide Communist movement.
Dual track rule in Latin America presents a different image entirely. Due to its inward-
looking focus and almost complete concentration on domestic issues, the military power
223 In the case of Brazil, see Stepan's works previously cited.
224 Ronald M. Schneider, Brazil: Foreign Policy of a Future World Power ( Boulder, Colorado:
Westview Press, 1976), 68-77.
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elite will eventually disagree among themselves as to means and methods of achieving
those developmental, nationalist, and populist goals embarked upon previously. Since
legitimacy is interpreted as a direct derivation from socioeconomic progress, and since
visible evidence of such progress is an imperative, the regime may find itself using
increasingly repressive methods to mobilize the masses.2Zs
Repression is a suspect means of control particularly in those instances when the goal
was to improve the average individual's station in life. Philip outlines the leadership
problem inherent in the decision to repress. Initially, the decision is to repress or not to
repress, later, the questions are more difficult - What degree of repression is to be
applied? How much power should be granted to the "repressive" officers? How will this
affect the internal balance of power? Philip concludes that an increasingly oppressive
approach will be necessary, will cause a split between the ranks of the military elite and
those rigidly opposed to political liberalization, and increasingly involved in acts of
repression.2m This latter group will assume the balance of power.
Political acceptability and legitimacy of the regime with the populace is suspect or non-
existent at this point. One of the proven ways to recapture their "hearts and minds" is to
establish a cult of personality, to personalize the ruler. Historical examples of this method
abound, but two of the most successful attempts in the twentieth century were Adolph
Hitler and Josef Stalin. Both held the key to achieving this status, carefully controlled mass
media. As will be noted in the following section, the military leaders of Brazil chose this
method as well.
225 A. Stepan, The Military in Politics Ronald M. Schneider, The Political System of Brazil:
Emergence of a 'Modernizing' Authoritarian Regime (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971);
Juan J. Linz, "The Future of an Authoritarian Situation or the Institutionalization of an Authoritarian
Regime: The Case of Brazil" in Authoritarian Brazil. 233-54; Philip, "Military-Authoritarianism in
South America", 17.
226 Schneider in.Brazil comes to the same conclusion, 69.
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B. OFFICIAL MEDIA DIPLOMACY
Focused on domestic issues, the military in various Latin American regimes, used the
mass media as an official adjunct to the government. In order to understand how a
government could assume complete control over the communications apparatus of a
country, a brief historical examination will be conducted. Specifically, the evolution of
media policy in Brazil will be surveyed through its four phases as identified by Elizabeth
Fox.227
1. Phase One: Public Policy of No Policy
A strong tradition of private newspapers was joined by radio in the 1920s as most
of Latin America embraced the latest media technology. A privately owned Brazilian radio
station was not simultaneously considered a commercial enterprise, but rather a club or
association financed by subscriptions. Radio programs had a cultural, literary, or
educational slant, and were designed with providing a public service in mind. The
government's role lay in levying taxes, both on the broadcast stations and on the receivers
owned by the individual. Actual content control was not yet an issue as the literary-
cultural format did not appear to function as an information conduit of hard news, but
simply entertainment. Fox notes that no actual media policy was established at this
juncture.
2. Phase Two: Monopolistic Media Enterprises
Commercial advertising was finally permitted in Brazil by the mid- 1930s. National
artists in music, comedy, and soap operas began to use radio as their main venue. By
shifting to a commercial medium, radio was able to fill three roles: 1) advertising vehicle
to reach a developing mass market; 2) information source; 3) broad-based
227 Elizabeth Fox, ed.- Media and Politics in Latin America: The Struggle for Democracy (Beverly
Hills: Sage Publications, 1988), 172-86.
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entertainment.228 In contrast, government-subsidized highbrow educational-cultural radio
stations found themselves unable to compete and either went out of business or were
absorbed by the burgeoning private sector. Following the revolution of 1932, Brazilian
radio experienced government control and censorship in the form of propaganda and
selective news reporting in an effort to shape public opinion. Coupled with the increasing
U.S. broadcasting company involvement and the daily news service provided by the U.S.
Office of Coordination of Inter-American Affairs, the media in Latin America began to
assume an increasingly monopolistic appearance as well as a striking resemblance to the
form of the U.S. media.
Television arrived in Latin America in the mid-1950s. Diarios e Emissoras, a Brazilian
firm, already in the newspaper and radio business, purchased a small, commercial
television station in 1950. This monopoly remained unchallenged until the early 1960s,
when the upstart TV Globo with an infusion of capital, technology, and professional skills
from Time, Inc., seriously challenged Diarios Associados. Two years later TV Globo had
become the official mouthpiece of the state, and Diarios Associados began a downward
spiral. There was no other serious competition for TV Globo after their demise.
3. Phase Three: National Reform or Deform?
Following the Cuban Revolution of 1959 and Che Guevara's abortive attempts to
export the revolution to Bolivia in 1967, militant dissident groups began to form in an
effort to defy the traditional political elites. Targeting the media for reform, intellectuals
began to criticize the traditional commercial and politically conservative role of the media to
date, i.e. subservient to: a) the government's message, or b) the transnational corporations'
message. Four issues were identified as requiring remedial action: 1) re-establish cultural
autonomy and national content to ownership and programming; 2) make the state
228 Ibid, 13.
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responsible for formulating democratic national cultural and communication policies;
3) fracture the traditional monopolistic private control; 4) increase the representation of
more diverse social groups in the media.229 In July 1976, representatives of twenty Latin
American and Caribbean governments met at a UNESCO-sponsored meeting in San Jose,
Costa Rica, to discuss national communication policies.23o Proposals for a New World
Information and Communication Order (NWICO) were tabled at that time. Recurring
themes in this conference included: 1) news media should be used to effect social change;
2) increased governmental control in terms of external or transnational news agencies;
3) establishment of a pool of Third World Press Agencies to counter the "Big Four". Did
these proposed changes represent true media reform or simply another opportunity for the
government to deform the media through imposition of increasingly strict controls? Fox
identifies three additional subthemes: 1) rise of alternative communication; 2) the lack of
basic freedoms of expression under the military dictatorships; 3) enormous impact of
new communication technologies.23i In the final analysis, former Vice Chairman of the
U. S. Commission for UNESCO, William G. Harley's comments were the most
prophetic.
Government control of regional or national news agencies may not in itself threaten
freedom of the press. The threat arises when one of them acts as the exclusive
disseminator of news for a country or region, and access to information is denied
to foreign or other domestic media.232
By 1976, Brazil in company with seven other South American countries was dominated by
military rule, and media deform.
229 Fox, 23; Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on International Operations, Committee on Foreign
Relations, "International Communications and Information", 95th Cong., 1st Sess., June 8, 9, 10,
1977, 10-31.
230 UNESCO, Conference Working Paper, Intergovernmental Conference on Communications
Policies in Latin America and the Caribbean, (Paris: UNESCO, 1976).
231 Fox, 9.
232 William G. Harley, prepared statement before the Subcommittee on International Operations, 28.
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4. Phase Four: The Military's Media - TV Globo
Formulating a governmental communications policy and attempts at media reform
received short shrift from the military regimes. Basically, communications policy became
a "combination of free market commercial expansion, technological innovation, corruption,
political censorship, repression, and government propaganda."233 Societal institutions
such as educational facilities and journalistic organizations became conduits for a one-way
flow of information, in effect it was a one-source town and the government was the
source. Propaganda served the ideological goal of convincing the populace that the
socioeconomic reforms were working, censorship ensured that dissent was kept to a
minimum. This latter method was particularly effective when the censorship extended to
the actual arrest, disappearance, and murder of journalists.
Sistema Globo was the parent organization of the newspaper 0 Globo, a large chain of
radio stations, and ultimately, Sistema Globo de Television. EMBRATEL, the state-
owned Brazilian telecommunications company in partnership with Time, Inc., funded mis
operation and established the infrastructure that made it possible for TV Globo to
eventually reach an audience of nearly eighty million people. It was "born with the
dictatorship"24 and it served it well through completely biased coverage of the regime's
accomplishments, conducted patriotic campaigns to discourage overt criticism, exaggerated
the existence of armed resistance in the country thereby justifying the regime's repressive
methods, and lastly, encouraged dissidents to engage in "self-exile". General Medici,
supposedly said that he was happy to tune in TV Globo at night because on television news
Brazil was at peace while the newspapers reported strikes, protests, violence, and conflicts
233 Fox, 181.
234 Cesar Guimaraes and Roberto Amaral, "Brazilian Television: A Rapid Conversion to a New
Ordcr" in Media and Politics in Latin America, 125-37.
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in various parts of the world. It was his own personal tranquilizer.235 Stepan reports a
different viewpoint from his interviews with Medici's successors, Geisel and Golbery who
believed that censorship and censors were basically inept and essentially, harmed the
government in its inability to respond to extremist charges. Both believed a gradual
liberalization of the press was in order.26
C. UNOFFICIAL MEDIA DIPLOMACY
"Alternative Media" were a variety of grassroots movements which sprung up in Latin
America as a counter to the repressive censorship imposed by the various military
regimes. Cultural and political resistance to the dictatorships became a worthy cause.
Using community radio, local newspapers, neighborhood theater, and local video
productions to provide information, entertainment, and opinions, the alternative media soon
had a significant following. Unofficial media diplomacy was conducted by these
organizations in an effcvt * ) 1) mobilize the populace; 2) inform the world-at-large as to
the true state of --J rs in the country; and 3) regain control of the information and
communications apparatus. Although there were a number of these movements, this
discussion will be limited to an examination of the influence of the educator Paulo Freire
throughout Latin America in the development of these alternative media, the initiatives of
the Catholic Church, and the transformation of TV Globo from a mouthpiece of the
government to the voice of the people.
1. "Alternative Media" - The Influence of Paulo Freire
During the late sixties Paulo Freire, a Brazilian educator, pioneered the concept of
adult education and literacy works as "cultural acts of freedom". This was to be a means
235 Ibid. 128.
23 6 Stepan, Rethinking Military Plitics, 36-7. Of course, this was not an entirely altruistic move on
the government's part since "courting of the press" was seen as yet another way to manipulate it
officially to serve the interests of the political process.
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of breaking down, and reforming oppressive social structures in order to expand the
individual's capacity for social analysis, political action, and a commitment to the common
good. In his Pedagogy of the Oppressed he outlines the basis for this conscientization.
The central problem is this: How can the oppressed, as divided, unauthentic
beings, participate in developing the pedagogy of their liberation?...The starting
point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be
the present, existential, concrete situation, reflecting the aspirations of the people.237
Freire was particularly concerned with the untapped creative potential of human beings and
the potential loss of their humanity, their essence, if they were deprived of the opportunity
to communicate this self to the world.
"Reading the world in order to transform the world"-,,. wis to be this conscious act of
liberation. Implied within that philosophy was the idea of community, exploration of
society's economic, political, and social forces, popular action, and ultimately, the
transformation of society into one which served the many instead of the few. Freire
wanted to institute a dialogue between two equal learners, not "A vertical relationship-the
imposition of criteria foreign to the consciousness of the subject-is anti-dialogue; it
signifies domination and consequently poisoning of the being."239 It is hardly surprising
that the alternative media adopted both his concepts and his challenge to reform the
military-dominated world in which they found themselves without a voice, without a soul.
2. "Alternative Media" - Initiatives of the Catholic Church
Historically, the Catholic Church in Latin America has had a cyclical influence on
the population at large. Vallier discusses a five stage evolution, ranging from structural
fusion or complete domination of its followers to an integrated, autonomous
237 Paulo Freire, Pedagogv of the OnVssed (New York: Continuum, 1970).
238 Valerie Miller, Between Struggle and Hope: The Nicaraguan Literacy Crusade (Boulder and
London: Westview Press, 1985), 9.
239 Freire, 135.
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relationship.2 1 This discussion will focus on the latter stages, "Social Development",
and "Cultural-Pastoral". Catholic Action was an early organizational approach used by the
Church in an effort to connect with various portions of the laity, but specifically, the
Catholic youth. By the late 1950s the focus had shifted to the creation of social, economic,
and technical programs in an effort to reach those groups on the margins of society. New
initiatives included: vocational training centers for rural youth, cooperatives for the poor,
health clinics, agrarian reform projects, and literacy courses. In order to realize the latter
program of education, the Church began operating radio schools, employing broadcasts as
both an educational and developmental tool. It was this recognition of the power of the
media to reach out to those economically, ethnically, politically, geographically, and
culturally disenfranchised, that marked the beginnings of the Church's shift to a new
mission.
The "Cultural-Pastoral" phenomenon may be dated from the decline of Catholic Action
programs in the early 1960s to the rise of the Comunidade Eclesial de Base (CEB, or Basic
Christian Community), 241 wherein the Church exerts increasingly less influence but
instead adopts the Freire "dialogue between equal learners". Bruneau's studies of these
groups indicates both the influence and the adoption of Freire's principles in terms of
240 Ivan Vallier, Catholicism. Social Control- and Modernization in Latin America (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970), 72. The five stages are: Monopoly, Political, Missionary, Social
Development, and Cultural-Pastoral. He examines ten areas: level of Church ambitions, Church-
society relationship, major basis of influence, secondary basis of influence, target group, dominant
ideology, religious action principle, priest's primary roles, organizational mode, layman's role. Social
Development is characterized by public involvement, social action programs among marginal strata,
and use of the mass media. Cultural-Pastoral is characterized by integrated autonomy, socio-ethical
leadership, and the local church.
241 See Thomas C. Bruneau, "The Church, State and Religion in Brazil" in The Catholic Church and
Relinons in Latin America (Canada: McGill University Centre for Developing-Area Studies,
Monograph Series No. 18, 1984) ed. by Thomas C. Bruneau, Chester E. Gabriel, Mary Mooney, 13-40.
Thomas C. Bruneau, "Brazil: The Catholic Church and Basic Christian Communities" in Religion
and Political Conflict in Latin America (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina
Press, 1986) ed. by Daniel H. Levine, 106-23. Scott Mainwaring, "Brazil: The Catholic Church and
the Popular Movement in Nova Iguacu, 1974-1985" in Levine, 124-55 for a complete examination of
this phenomenon.
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establishing a community to explore solutions :0 economic, political, and social problems,
and then to take action to resolve those problems.242 The CEBs may be said to have
arisen from two momentous events which occurred in the Catholic Church, Vatican H in
1962 and the papal encyclicals which followed, and the Medellin Conference in 1968. The
former represented the response of the Catholic Church to the challenges of the modem
world, its right to address political matters in the event of injustices, particularly among the
powerless, and freedom of worship without state interference. The latter conference
produced sixteen documents, ranging in subject matter from justice, peace, education, and
youth to liturgy, lay movements, poverty of the Church, and the mass media. By 1969
increased violence against the religious by the military was the norm. "Moderates" among
the bishops shifted from their previous apolitical stance and began to assume responsibility
for all victims of repression. Summoning the global assets of the Roman Catholic Church,
the National Council of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB) mobilized their contacts abroad. The
result was a series of protests appearing in the U.S. and European press. The Medici
government attempted to counter "this international campaign, and planted anti-Church
stories in the Brazilian press."243 The Church used both her national resources as well as
her international resources to provide an authentic alternative to the government-controlled
mass media, to create a forum for democratic and participatory communication, and to
politicize the population through organization and education.24
Government censorship had begun in earnest in mid-December 1968 under the authority
of Institutional Act 5, and extended to a period of self-censorship negotiated between the
newspaper owners and the military authorities until 1972. Forbidden topics for news
242 Bruneau, "Brazil: The Catholic Church", 110-11.
243 Thomas E. Skidmore, The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil- 1964-85 (New York and Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1988), 137-8.
244 Fox, 27.
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reporting included: student political activities, workers' movements, individuals stripped of
their political rights, negative stories about the state of the economy, but especially anything
derogatory or critical of the military. As TV Globo was cast in the government's image,
the print media became the target of government censors. Specific weekly publications
which raised the censor's ire, at various times, included: Pasquim, a satirical humor
magazine which ridiculed the military in both cartoon and word; Opiniao , a publication of
center-left views; Movimento a militant leftist offering; 0 Estao de Sso Paulo, a
conservative daily renowned for its defense of civil liberties, the rule of law, and freedom
of the press; Sao Paulo, a periodical of the archdiocese of Sao Paulo; and Veja, Brazil's
leading weekly newsmagazine written from a centrist point of view.245 During the
periods when these news organs experienced jailed staffs, padlocked doors, and silenced
writers, the alternative media assumed the responsibility for "getting the news out."
3. TV Globo Reborn
Geisel and Golbery's efforts to partially liberalize the press had an unforeseen
consequence, the transformation of TV Globo from the government's official spokesman
to an independent voice no longer crying in the wilderness. The campaign for direct
presidential elections, with its attendant rallies and demonstrations between February and
June 1984 proved to be the turning point. According to Guimaraes and Amaral, TV
Globo's news coverage underwent three phases: 1) total disregard; 2) uneven coverage;
3) enthusiastic and proficient coverage.26
TV Globo had a vast operational network in place composed of seven fully owned
stations, six partially owned stations, thirty-six affiliates, thirty radio stations, the 0 Globo
newspaper, a home video division, and a record company. For years these assets were the
245 Skidmore. 134-5; Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics, 37.
246 Guimaraes and Amaral, 128.
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government's assets, but in the space of five months, the power had shifted, and the revolt
of the journalists was complete. TV Globo used such tactics as refusing to give
government censors office space, airing "moments of silence" protests, directly
broadcasting the government party's defeat, and engaging in intertretive journalism.247
Finally, the mass media had become the "watchdog" of the people, however, it had also
experienced the power of shaping public opinion.
Ultimately, the military dictatorships failed, repressive censorship failed, and the
government-control of the media failed. The United States has never experienced this type
of military-dominated government. However, the same tension which existed between the
press and the military, as well as between the military's self-image and the public does
exist. As Schneider so succinctly phrases it.
In the ultimate analysis, the influence of the Brazilian Armed Forces
on foreign policy is derived from its political role as the president's essential
constituency. It is this role, rather than the global defense function on which
the U. S. military's influence on foreign policy rests, that determines the range
and character of the military's international interests and policy impact.48
The next chapter will examine the U.S. military's role in the realm of official and unofficial
media diplomacy.
247 lbid, 129-35; Fox, 29; Oscar Landi, "Media, Cultural Processes and Political Systems" in Fox,
138, 147.
248 Schneider, BraZil, 76.
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VL THE UNITED STATES MILITARY EXPERIENCE AND
MEDIA DIPLOMACY
A. CONSTITUTIONAL MILITARY IN THE UNITED STATES
The Constitution has served as the basic frame for the government of the United States
since its ratification in 1789. It is the alpha and the omega of political power, reflecting
those early delegates' determination to create a genuinely national government with the
power to promote the security, financial stability, commercial prosperity, and well-being of
all Lae states and their inhabitants. The national interest is articulated first and foremost in
the following lines.
We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish
justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general
welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and
establish this Constitution for the United States of America.
This preamble implies the commitment to the ideals of a limited government, civil liberties,
separation of church and state, confinement of military power, and the formation of an
open society. It was meant not merely to guide, but to inspire. In Section 8, Congress has
been empowered to provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United
States. In order to achieve that end, Congress is to raise and support armies, to provide and
maintain a Navy, to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval
forces, and to provide for organizing, arming, disciplining and governing them. What,
then, is to be the character of this armed force?
1. The Military Elite and National Character
As noted above the military had its genesis in the U.S. Constitution. The nature of
the Constitution is a reflection of the political culture prevalent in America at that time.
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Based on a faith in the essentially rational character of man and society, in combination
with the belief in man's ability to define and solve social and political problems, it is a
testament to the art of compromise. The Constitution is a reflection of the democratic
orientation, i.e. to balance conflicting drives, to restrain contending interests, to place the
law above men, to both divide and separate powers, to create a system of checks and
balances, and finally, to permit the capability to amend. It provided for a republican
government in the age of monarchy, a popularly based legislative House, a President, and a
Senate, indirectly subject to the democratic process, limitations upon the power of the
government, and a general concern for civil liberties.
It is a "living Constitution" in that it remains open-ended, ensuring its adaptability to the
political growth and flexibility inherent in a democratic form of government. The
parameters operate within freedom and order but neither so free nor so confined as to result
in chaos or rigidity. The heart of the Constitution is limited government and individual
liberty. It is parsimonious in the powers granted to the former and magnanimous in those
granted to the latter.
The U.S. military establishment is the pre-eminent defender of the Constitution. Each
member swears an oath to that effect, and yet, they are heirs to an antimilitarist political
tradition. Samuel P. Huntington notes that "the Constitution does not envisage a separate
class of persons exclusively devoted to military leadership."249 As a result, a military
elite, in the sense of a German General Staff or Latin American Politico-Military
presidential constituency does not exist in the U.S.. Military elites, in the sense of those
who hold specific positions, and have the opportunity to influence foreign policy decisions,
does exist. The classic example would be the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although these
249 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theor and Politics of Civil-Military
Relations (Cambridge, Msachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1957), 135.
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individuals represent different branches of the military, they share certain common
characteristics.25o This discussion will be limited to the concept of the military mind.
Various studies have been conducted in an effort to determine if there is a military mind,
and if so, how may it be defned?251 Both Bletz and Robinson conclude that a "military
mind" in the positive sense does exist but that it should not be confused with a "militarist
mindset" in the pejorative sense. It may be defined as "that mind which is conditioned by
training, education, experience, and intellect to recognize and place in perspective the
military implications inherent in a given national security problem."252 It is this mind
which is brought to bear on the military dimension of foreign policy questions, and
250 Huntington; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1971); Nancy L.
Goldman and David R. Segal, eds. The Social Psychology of Military Serice Beverly Hills: Sage
Publications, Inc., 1976).
251 Donald Bletz, The Role of the Military Professional in U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger
Publications, Inc., 1972), 186-208, appendix. Focuses on survey results of the 1968 and 1970 classes
of the National War College; CDR William H. Robinson, USN, "An Element of International Affairs
-- The Military Mind", Naval War College Review, (Nov 1970), Vol XXIII No. 3, 5-15. Focuses on
the survey results of the 1969-1970 classes of the Naval War College. Branches of service surveyed
included predominantly the U. S. Navy, followed in descending order of participation by: U. S. Army,
U. S. Air Force, U. S. Marine Corps, and the U. S. Coast Guard. Broad generalizations drawn from
Bletz' study include: 1) The national security interests of the U. S. will be best served by an
increasing emphasis on the thorough integration of political and military considerations; 2) Adequate
governmental machinery does exist for the integration of the nation's foreign and military policies; 3)
The average civilian official, who is involved in politico-military affairs, does not have an adequate
appreciation of the military side of the politico-military equation.; 4) The average military officer,
who is involved in politico-military affairs, does not have an adequate appreciation of the political
side of the politico-military equation; 5) There has been a discernible trend in the past five years
toward more mutual understanding between the military officer and the civilian governmental official
in the area of politico-military affairs; 6) The military point of view is being heard at the highest
decision-making levels in the country; 7) The military point of view is not only being heard but is
being given adequate weight at the highest decision-making levels in the country; 8) Continued
emphasis on politico-military factors will strengthen the professionalism of individual military officers;
9) There is not a place for a politico-military specialist in the military profession in somewhat the
same sense that there are logistical specialists, etc. Robinson concluded from his studies that there is
a marked similarity in the attitudes, work preferences, and values among the officers of the various
services who attended the Naval War College in the years 1969-1970. Relative strengths found
among the military officers were: self-confidence, goal orientation, concern for the welfare of others,
trust and even temper, and a strong willingness to accept responsibility in directing others in the
accomplishment of an important goal. Executives scored higher in the category of the desire to work




specifically so at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) level. The Goldwater-Nichols Department
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was one attempt to cultivate a joint perspective by
assignments, education, and incentives to those officers so selected to serve in a joint
environment.253 How does this military mind interact with or complement the national
character?
To define a nation's character is to place it within its cultural antecedents. Culture, in its
turn, develops from three primary sources: 1) cultural heritage and tradition;
2) environment; 3) historical experiences. The U.S. is an island, a liberal democracy, and
a nation that, for centuries, was free to choose involvement or non-involvement in
international affairs. Miller notes that the essence of the American character may be broken
down to two core values, "belief in the perfectibility of man with the fortuitous availability
of a vast and rich geographical stage upon which to play out that promise virtually
unopposed."z4 Ultimately, the character of a nation is the composite of all that its people
most value, and the Declaration of Independence is the distillation of those beliefs and
values for the United States.
2. The Naval Officer as Diplomat
Due to its island character, the United States, when it chose to become involved in
the affairs of other nations, used its naval fleet for that purpose. The naval officer in
command of the vessel then found himself in the position of amateur diplomat.
According to Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, USN, and Lieutenant Commander G.B.
253 See Carnes Lord, The Presidency and the Management of National Security (New York: The
Free Press, 1988), 42-6 and Mackubin Thomas Owens, "American Strategic Culture and Civil-
Military Relations: The Case of JCS Reform", Naval War College Review (Mar/Apr 1986), Vol
XXXIX No. 2, 434-59 for a complete appraisal of the different JCS reform viewpoints and the
expectations thereof.
254 Jeanne M. Miller, "The Cultural Antecedents of U. S. Military Planning", (M. A. thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, March, 1984) 16-7. See also Professor Clyde B. Sargent,
"National Cultural Characteristics and National Power", Naval War College Review, (Jan 1971),
Vol XXIII No. 5, 17-23, and Anthony Harrigan, "National Character is Decisive", Vital Speeches of
the Day, (Jun 1, 1989), Vol LV No. 16, 507-11.
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Vroom, USN writing in 1914 and 1921 respectively, a naval officer was uniquely suited
for this role.255 By training, a U.S naval officer had to act on his own individual
recognizance for the orders he received from the Navy Department would be of the most
general nature. Selection for command of a ship or foreign duty ashore implied a
recognized aptitude for public affairs, a complete knowledge of the protocol and courtesies
expected to be practiced while in a foreign country, and the diplomatic skills of tact,
firmness, and decisiveness in a potentially volatile or embarrassing situation.
Charles Paullin writing in Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers traces
the history of the naval officer as diplomat from 1778 to 1883. John Paul Jones was the
first of the infant navy's diplomats as the French rendered honors to the Ranger upon its
arrival at Brest. Diplomatic treaties were negotiated by Commodore Decatur in 1815 with
Algiers; five naval officers over the course of fifty years would attempt to negotiate with
Turkey, Commodore William Bainbridge in 1800, Commodore John Rodgers in 1826,
Commodore William M. Crane in 1828-9, Commodore James Biddle in 1830, and
finally, Commodore David Porter in 1832 who would be successful. All these gentlemen
shared a common bond, they had been empowered by their government to perform the
functions of an accredited diplomat, to negotiate and exchange treaty ratifications. Shifting
from its focus on the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the U.S. Navy looked west to the
Pacific. Commodore Perry's mission to Japan resulted in the opening of a window to the
Orient in 1853. In Perry's case, the mission was carefully planned by the Navy and State
departments with the commodore personally selecting the crew, as well as familiarizing
himself with all aspects of Japanese culture, economy, and geography. His primary
mission was to arrange for an agreement assuring the protection and relief of shipwrecked
255 RADM B. A. Fiske, USN, "The Diplomatic Responsibility of the United States Navy", U. S. N. I.
Proceedings. (May/Jun 1914) Vol 40 No. 3, 799-802; LCDR G. B. Vroom, USN, "The Place of
Naval Officers in International Affairs", U.S.N.. Proceedings (May 1921), Vol 47 No. 219,685-700.
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mariners, or others in distress. His secondary mission, to negotiate a treaty was to prove
highly successful based upon his careful preparation and immersion in the host country's
history, culture, etc.256 Other examples abound, Rear Admiral Benham in Rio, 1894, and
of course, Admiral Dewey in Manila, 1898. The difference between then and now is that
the naval officer is no longer empowered to perform the duties of a diplomat, to negotiate
treaties with foreign powers, to conclude alliances, nor to engage in a potential act of war or
to negotiate a peace settlement. Communications technology has ensured that the
commanding officer is only a satellite hookup away from his Commander-in-Chief.
Warfare technology and the dangers of inadvertent nuclear war have stayed the hand of the
naval shipborne diplomat. Transportation technology has inspired the creation of shuttle
diplomacy but not in terms of naval officers, not even of career diplomats, but rather, heads
of state or their designated government alter-egos. Finally, increased civilian control of the
defense establishment has had an influence on the autonomy of the navy's actions,
especially in the realm of international relations.
The last remaining official diplomatic post still open to the naval officer is that of naval
attache. Under the supervision of the Defence Intelligense Agency (DIA), this individual is
in the information-collecting business, assigned to embassies and legations, and directed to
report to the respective ambassador or minister. Although not directly involved in the
diplomatic process, the naval officer assigned to a Military Advisory and Assistance Group
(MAAG) may find himself dealing with his opposite number in the host nation's navy in
such matters as military training, arms requests, etc. which borders on those areas which
may fall under the diplomat's purview.
It is a truism that all naval personnel, whether assigned to a foreign command ashore,
or paying a port visit are "unofficial diplomats", and it is this role, he or she is most likely
256 Paullin cited in Fiske, 691-5.
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to play in the present age. What is the diplomatic contribution of the port visit by a U.S.
Navy vessel of war? Sir James Cable suggests that these visits are designed to produce an
impression on the government and public opinion of the host country of either power,
smartness, or friendliness.257 The success of the visit will depend upon several variables:
selection of the appropriate objective within the context of the relationship shared by the
two countries, prior consultation between the naval side and the diplomatic side, naval
appreciation for the host country's dignity, and prior planning. Impressions are images,
the port visit is a media opportunity, and the unofficial diplomacy practiced at this juncture
is as effective or noneffective as the personnel and the planning involved.
3. Gunboat Diplomacy
Unlike port visit diplomacy, gunboat diplomacy contains a coercive element.
Such "persuasiveness" may be attempted in one of four modes: 1) definitive;
2) purposeful; 3) catalytic; 4) expressive.25s This is not merely a show of power
but rather, power with a purpose. The Cable definition is:
Gunboat diplomacy is the use or threat of limited naval force, otherwise than as
an act of war, in order to secure advantage, or to avert loss, either in furtherance of
an international dispute or else against foreign nationals within the territory or the
jurisdiction of their own state.259
257 Sir James Cable, "Showing the Flag", U.S.NJ. Proceedings (Apr 1984), Vol 110/4/974, 59-63.
The purpose of smartness is to convey efficiency and civilization. The display of power is aimed at
primarily naval officers, the defense establishment, and the government of the host country.
Friendliness is demonstrated by doing something useful, i.e. disaster relief, medical aid, etc. or
providing some type of entertainment to the local residents. See also J. K. Holloway, Jr. "The Role of
the Services in Support of Foreign Policy", U.S. NJ. Proceedings (May 1976) Vol 102 No. 879, 67-
81 in which he discusses the difficulty of gauging the real effect of "visit diplomacy*.
258 Sir James Cable, Diplmacy alu (Maryland: The Naval Institute Press, 1985),18-9.
Definitive = the creation of afait accompli, victim cannot resist, responds by acquiescence or
escalation. Purposeful = threat of or actual damage inflicted. Catalytic= encourage the victim to
compromise or comply. Expressive= emphasis on one's own attitude rather than an attempt to
influence the adversary's.
259 Sir James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1979: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force
[New York: St Martin's Press, 1981), 39; Cable, "Gunboat Diplomacy's Future", U.S.NJ.
Proceedings (Aug 1986), Vol 112/8/1002, 37-41.
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Limited naval force has been used several times by the United States since Cable's last
recorded entry of October 17, 1979. The pages of Proceedings magazine have continued
to play host to the debate concerning the efficacy of such methods. What none of the
critics or proponents have been able to argue away is the fact that a ship remains a "Great
Communicator" of potential coercive diplomacy. 260 Media coverage of such events,
although addressed only obliquely by Cable, have the potential to rally international
approbation or censure. Commentators providing an instant analysis of capabilities (the
nation's material assets for exerting power), and intenti,)ns (the desires and will existing
within the nation to exert that power) may contribute to the overall "communications
diplomatic" effort. Gunboat diplomacy, by its nature, is a dramatic act and where there is
drama, a camera will not be far behind.
B. OFFICIAL MILITARY MEDIA DIPLOMACY - PUBLIC RELATIONS
Public relations is the art of selling your company or organization to the public at large.
The military finds itself in the same situation as many large corporations, fighting an image
problem. Unfortunately for the military, ensuring that the accurate message is put across
may be misinterpreted as a not-so-subde form of propaganda. This section will examine
the history of the military's media machine, as well as some of the key players.
1. History of Military Public Relations
Woodrow Wilson, World War I, and a journalist named George Creel were the
prime movers in the creation of the Committee on Public Information (CPI). CPI was the
brainstorm of Wilson and Creel with the objective of organizing the nation's
opinionmakers and opinionmolders in an effort to help the war effort. It was to be a
massive propaganda apparatus, relaying the official interpretation of events, and spreading
26 0 CDR Joseph A. Sestak, Jr., USN, "America's 'Great Communicators'", U.S.NI. Proceedings (Dec
1988) Vol 114/12/1030, 80-6.
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the "good word" to the world. Primarily, it was to counter the German propaganda effort.
Prior to the creation of the CPI, the War Department had conducted an "educational
service" known as the Bureau of Information which was in charge of public relations.
Currently serving as its titular head was the young Major Douglas MacArthur. Secretary
of State Robert Lansing, Secretary of War Newton D. Baker, and Secretary of the Nay'
Josephus Daniels were in agreement that MacArthur's operation should be expanded so as
to control the nation's press and propaganda machine during the war effort. Wilson
disagreed, appointed Creel as the head of the CPI and assigned MacArthur as his aide.
This established a presidential precedent that would be followed by Franklin Delano
Roosevelt twenty-five years later.
Mobilizing public opinion in 1942 was the quest of Franklin D. Roosevelt but his
approach was significantly different from Wilson's. According to Sobel, Roosevelt "often
spoke and acted as though information, propaganda, psychological warfare, and espionage
were of a piece." 26 1  The result was a distinction between "black" and "white"
propanganda and psychological warfare activities. The former was to be created for use
overseas, while "white" was for the domestic audience. 262 To add to the confusion, he
delegated the same responsiblities to several different offices. The Army and the Navy
each had intelligence, propaganda, education, and psychological warfare units. The Office
of Facts and Figures, under the direction of Archibald MacLeish, was responsible for radio
and the press, and the recruitment of intellectuals for government service. The Office of
Coordinator of Information, under the direction of Colonel William J. Donovan, was
nominally in charge of providing direction for all the informational units. Donovan
interpreted his tasking a little differently, and set about building an espionage-propaganda
261 Sobel, 200.
262 See Chapter IV, Media in the USSR, specifically subsection B. 3. KGB and Disinformation for
the Soviet view of the black, white, and gray shades of propaganda.
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mechanism. Roosevelt resolved the issue by transferring Donovan to the newly created
Office of Strategic Services, assigning the playwright Robert Sherwood to the OCI
Foreign Information Service, and creating the Office of War Information(OWI) which was
tasked with maintaining domestic morale and providing informational services to the
newspaper, radio, and motion picture industries. 263 OSS would be responsible for
"black" propaganda while OWI would handle "white" propaganda.
The first indication of increased reliance on public relations by the military services was
their postwar decision to raise the status of their public information offices. During the
1920s and 1930s, public information had been a staff function of the intelligence services
of both the Army and the Navy. During the war, both services elevated public information
programs to a separate staff status, however, it was not until the postwar years that public
information or public relations were placed under the direct authority of the Army and
Navy Secretaries, and service personnel were encouraged to pursue the public relations
field as part of their service career. After its establishment as a separate service in 1947, the
Air Force followed the example of the senior services, and established an office of public
relations which reported directly to the Air Force Secretary. Writing in The Fourth Branch
ofL Goxvnlmel, Douglass Cater quotes an anonymous Air Force officer on the importance
of words as weapons.
Facts must be convincing, demonstrated, living salesmen of practical benefits. These
are the only kind of facts that mold opinion and channel the vibrant tensions of public
thinking always deciding issues in the end, altering military policy as surely as defeat
in war - they make public opinion the most powerful tool of all, more powerful even
than war itself.264
263 Anthony Cave Brown, The Last Hero: Wild Bill Donovan (New York: Times Book Division of
Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., Inc., 1982), Ch. 15 The Noble Puppet; William
Stevenson, A Man Called Intrepid (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976), 108-48.250-4.
264 Cater, 166.
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Among the more significant public relations developments of the immediate postwar era
has been the proliferation of civilian support associations - organized to support the
interests of a particular service. These will be discussed in the Unofficial Military Media
Diplomacy section.
2. Military Public Relations Network
The Defense public affairs mechanism is guided and controlled from the top, by
the Secretary of Defense and his civilian aides through the office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Public Affairs. Basically, the Assistant Secretary is assigned the
responsibility for an integrated DOD public affairs program in order to provide the public
with maximum information about the Department of Defense consistent with national
security. This operation is required to initiate and support activities contributing to the good
relations between the Department of Defense and all segments of the public at home and
abroad, and to plan for censorship of the nation's communications media should a national
emergency be declared. Twelve specific areas are under the Assistant Secretary's
jurisdiction, including development of the over-all Pentagon public affairs policies and
programs, security review for all Defense-oriented material proposed for publication,
review of official speeches and press releases to ensure that they are in accordance with
stated policy, and provision of news analysis and information for the Secretary of Defense
and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His network of supporting facilities include: 1) the
Directorate for Defense Information which generates all Defense Department news
releases; 2) Audio Visual Division which is responsible for approval and release of all
television and movie films, radio transcripts, etc. provided by the DOD or the individual
armed services for public consumption. The AV division will also provide technical
advice and assistance to producers of films and television programs; 3) Directorate for
Community Relations is the focal point for the Pentagon's ties to the local communities
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with responsibilities ranging from the scheduling of tours, bands, and speakers to
furnishing of liaison to organized labor and the business community; 4) Veterans and
Civic National Organizations Division is the point of contact for over fv,- ' utiai _. national
organizations including Kiwanis, Boy Scouts, etc.; 5) Business and Labor Division is the
point of contact with business, industry, and labor groups; 6) Dire,'-_ate tor Security
Review monitors Defense Department news releases for security, scans the press for
possible security violations, and passes this information to the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Administration, who will initiate an investigation into news leaks.265
The individual service branches maintain numerous field information offices at major
commands throughout the country and at the larger overseas bases. Every military base
will assign either an officer, an enlisted, or frequently, civilian personnel to handle public
relations for the base. Other informational activities conducted by the services or other
agencies of the Defense Department are as follows. In terms of maintaining an informed
military community, the Armed Forces Information Service (AFIS) specifically targets
active duty military members, DOD civilian employees, military reserves, retirees, and
families of service personnel. Printed material includes the magazine Defense, a monthly
tabloid SSAM ( Soldier, Sailor, Airman and Marine) , Background Notes about potential
foreign duty assignments, and a wide variety of posters, fact sheets, pamphlets, booklets,
etc. The American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) (formerly the Armed
Forces Radio Service)266 is the broadcast arm for the military community. Most AFRTS
265 C. W. Borkland, The Deparment of Defens (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers,
1968), Ch. VIII The Defense Department Faces the Public and Congress; Leonard S. Rodberg and
Derek Shearer, eds., The Pentagon Watchers: Students Renort an the National Security State (New
York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1970), see Derek Shearer's "The Pentagon Propaganda Machine", 99-
144; COL James A. Donovan, USMC (Ret.), Militarism U.S.A. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1970), 29-32, 191-3; Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment Its Imnacts on American
SgiW(New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1971), Ch. 13 The Military Public Relations
Network and Ch. 14 The Pentagon's Handling of the News.
266 Samuel Brylawski, "Armed Forces Radio Service: The Invisible Highway Abroad". The
Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress (Summer-Fall 1980), Vol 37 No. 3-4, 441-57. This
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television news is produced locally by military personnel assigned to the station, although
television news from U.S. commercial and public networks may be accessed by satellite
hookup, i. e. Cable News Network or delayed tape transmission. It should be noted that
although the target audience of AFRTS is the service member stationed overseas, members
of the host nation's local community are also able to tune in as well. In this instance, an
official media service aimed at one audience is transformed into another branch of "official
media diplomacy" by default. Navy News This Week is a videotape program which
highlights stories of particular interest to Navy personnel stationed both in the U.S. and
abroad.
Press Trips or "junkets" may be arranged in an effort to create a media opportunity for
the introduction of a new weapon system, aircraft, or other high profile item. Operation
Desert Shield, a 1990 military operation in Saudi Arabia, arranged these daily for the
reporters in the press pool in order to permit interviews with the troops, and tours of the
base operations.
The Office of Armed Forces Information and education, the Defense Department's
Public Affairs Office, and various other offices at the individual services' level provide a
variety of films on military subjects which are then made available for public showing.
The Hometown News Center reviews and distributes all hometown news releases from
commands throughout the world. The Exhibits Program is designed with mobility in
mind, and will provide a wide range of military-related subjects but usually with the
emphasis on technology. Finally, the Defense Information School at Fort Benjamin
Harrison, Indiana, is the journalism training center for personnel from all the services.
article traces the history of the AFRS and provides an index of selected programs in the Library of
Congress American Forces Radio and Television collection.
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Topics include newswriting, radio and television broadcasting skill development, and
designing internal information activities.
3. Public Affairs Officer
During the mid-1960s the U.S. Navy realized that it was necessary to keep Congress
and the U.S. public informed in regard to the operational needs, missions, and functions of
the IU.S. Navy if funding levels were to be continued.267 At that time the Public Affairs
Manual was drafted and published for use within the navy community. The second
change which occurred at that time was the alteration in the chain of command whereby the
Unified Command System was established. The Navy Chief of Information Officer
(CHINFO) was assigned as a staff member to both the Secretary of the Navy and the
Chief of Naval Operations. His primary responsibility was, and is, to oversee the
administration of the public affairs aspects of all r tval forces, both ashore and afloat.
Public Affairs policy responsibility follows the Unified Command System, e.g. the
Commander in Chief, Atlantic Forces (CINCLANT) would communicate directly with the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs in regard to official statements
concerning movement of forces, policy, and other aspects of command and control. By
implication then, U.S. Navy public affairs issues and policy statements require
coordination with the other services and the government agencies discussed earlier.
Coordination is essential in order to ensure for example, that a disconnect does not occur
in terms of the Air Force advocating one policy in the Middle East and the Navy
something else entirely.26s This concern is also applicable in the foreign service arena in
267 For a brief history of the U. S. Navy's public affairs program and how it has evolved, see: Albert
Eastman, "Public Affairs in an Instant World", US. N. 1. Proceedings (March 1969), Vol 95 No. 793,
78-83 and RADM W. P. Mack, "Public Affairs and Command" Naval War College Review (May
1966), Vol XVII No. 9, 1-12.
268 Eric Schmitt, "Air Force Chief is Dismissed for Remarks on Gulf Plan: Cheney Cites Bad
Judgement", New York Times, 18 Sep 90, Sec. 1, Al, 8; R. W. Apple Jr., "The General's Error.
Others Have Said as Much as Dugan But 'on Background', Not on Record", New York Times, 19 Sep
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terms of what the State Department is advocating and officially broadcasting through the
United States Information Agency and what the U.S. Navy is proposing.
Long range public affahs planning occurs on an annual cycle. The permanent aspects of
the plan are found in the Public Affairs Manual which contains a description of long-range
operations, the methodology to carry out those operations, and other standard operating
procedures and information.269 At the beginning of each year, a plan is designed for the
coming year and will be issued as a Secretary of the Navy Note(SECNAVNOTE). Each
major component of the Navy Department submits those subjects it desires to emphasize
for the coming year. The subjects are compiled, complete with the recommended
emphasis and the proposed public relations methods to be used, presented to the Navy
Policy Council, and a determination is made as to which ones will be included in the
overall Navy Department plan.
The base commander, the commanding officer of a ship or squadron will set the public
affairs policy. Public Relations work will be carried out on a daily basis by the Public
Affairs Officer (PAO). Every unit should have someone who performs those duties, but
since the ranks of the PAO officer corps are not unlimited in number, this position may be
filled by someone with minimal journalistic experience, already overburdened by a variety
of collateral duties. At times, an enlisted member who is a) a journalist , or b) a
photographer's mate may be assigned to fill the billet. 'ie question which arises is: what
should the PAO's qualifications be in order to function effectively in this position? First,
the individual will have to have some type of training in public relations, how to sell this
commodity known as the U.S. Navy, how to learn the in's and out's of his market, and
90, Sec 1, A7. These two articles cite a recent example of military personnel failing to coordinate
with the State Department in terms of information considered releasable to the media.
269 Department of the Naw Public Affairs Re2ulations SECNAVINST 5720.44 14 June 1974 with
Change 2 inserted dtd 26 Nov 1976 ( Washington, D. C.: Office of Information, Navy Department,
1976), Ch. I Purpose and Applicability, Ch. 2 Principles, Missions and Objectives, Ch. 3
Responsibility and Organization, Ch 4 Public Information, subsection 0405 Media Relations.
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how to present what s/he is offering in a credible manner. This also implies that the PAO
should have a strong grasp of the missions of the Navy in general, that command in
particular, as well as an awareness of the technical aspects of the organization. The Public
Relations Manual provides general guidance which then should be augmented by the
resident experts at the command. Public affairs is not a business for amateurs, however, it
appears to be just that when untrained ensigns or junior lieutenants are placed in the
position of speaking not only for the commanding officer, but the U.S. Navy as well. 270
As a result of junior personnel placed in such a position, the PAO may not be privy to the
more sensitive command issues, or the classified issues. The reality of public affairs is that
these are precisely the areas which will require a prompt response to the media and by
someone who presents an image of crediblility.
C. UNOFFICIAL MILITARY MEDIA DIPLOMACY
Unofficial military media diplomacy may be the print or "broadcast" type, the latter
actually being transmitted by various veterans groups or service related organizations. Of
the print variety, the Stars and Stripes newspapers are not government publications. They
are however, an authorized yet unofficial daily newspaper published under the authority of
the Department of Defense. There are two newspapers, one serves the Pacific area, is
edited and printed in Japan; the other serves Europe with offices in Darmstadt, Germany.
In order to operate, the newspapers must be self-supporting. This goal is achieved by
selling newspaper subscriptions, advertisement space, and other revenue-producing assets
such as the Stars and Stripes Bookstores found on most U.S. military bases overseas.
The Army Times publishirg company is a commercial enterprise as well, offering the
270 Mack, 6; Colonel William v. Kennedy, USAR(ReL.), "Telling It Like It Isn't", U.S.NJ.
Proceedings (Apr 1986), Vol 112/4/998, 45-53; Commander Joseph M. Palmer, Royal Navy(Ret),
"P. R.- "...As Others See Us", U.S.N. 1. Proceedings (Jul 1973), Vol 90 No. 7, 61-6.
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Army, Navy or Air Force Times, via subscription to personnel in the U.S. or stationed
overseas. These publications are not considered quasi-official newspapers.
1. Veterans' Groups
As noted earlier, many of the Pentagon's public relations programs are designed to
reach the local community, and overall they have been successful in this endeavor.
However, it should be noted that the support associations have also contributed to the
military media diplomacy effort. The American Legion and the American Legion
Auxiliary conduct a wide variety of community relations activities not directly related to the
military: junior baseball, toys for needy children, hospital work, American Education
Week, high school oratorical contests, etc. The stated aims of these two organizations are
to: uphold and defend the Constitution, maintain law and order, foster and perpetuate a
100 per cent Americanism, and inculcate a sense of individual obligation to the
community, state, and nation. The Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) lists its objectives
as fostering patriotism, and continuing io deferd the United States from all her enemies.
Both of these groups are considered to be powerful lobbyists on Capitol Hill.
2. Service Related Organizations
Service related organizations are private groups, which may or may not have active
duty or retired military as members. There are six key organizations. The Association of
the United States Army (AUSA) seeks to promote public understanding and support of the
U. S. Army through advertising, their magazine Army, and a public relations program
aimed at the industrial members of the association. The Air Force Association is interested
in promoting not only the Air Force, but also the general goal of aerospace power, civilian
as well as military. It publishes the monthly magazine, Air Force and Space Digest The
Aerospace Education Foundation provides educational materials to high schools and
universities, and holds annual seminars. The Foundation is an affiliate of the Air Force
143
Association. On the Navy side is the Navy League of the United States, whose focus is not
only on the U.S. Navy, but also the nation's commercial maritime posture.271 The
National Guard Association of the United States is designed to promote the interests of the
Army and Air Force National Guard and does so usually by arranging open houses at the
local Guard facility, and coordinating speakers and films at local civic events. The Reserve
Officers Association of the United States has stated its objectives as "to support a military
policy for the United States that will provide adequate national security." They also
participate in lobbying actions on Capitol Hill.
D. THE MEDIA MEETS THE MILITARY
Antagonism between the press and the military centers around the fact that the military
operates in a low profile manner, especially in the realm of sensitive national security
matters. By its nature and function, the press views its responsibility as a watchdog that
has a mandate from the people to provide information about all the inner workings of their
government, including its military organizations and their operations. This tension has
existed from the beginning. Two examples have been selected to illustrate attempts by the
military in recent history to address this apparently adversarial relationship.
1. Naval War College Miitary Media Symposium 1974
"The Newsman in Viet Nam"
The Naval War College hosted a conference in November 1972 entitled "The
Military and the Media: Toward An Understanding". Participants included national and
regional media representatives, the Service chiefs of information, and other civilian
attendees for an initial two day session. The second session, entitled "The Military and the
Media: Mutual Responsibilities", was held in November 1973. The third phase occurred
271 Morgan L. Fitch, Jr., "The U. S. Navy and the Public", Naval War College Review (Sep 1969),
Vol XXII No. 1, 14-19.
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over the next year as students had the opportunity to host two-to-three day visits by
individual members of the press, both print and broadcast variety. The primary objective
was achieved whereby a constructive dialogue was established between the military and
their counterparts in the media.272
The catalyst for a seminar such as the one described above was, in fact, the Viet Nam
War and the military's impression of slanted coverage of it. Five basic criticisms have
surfaced in regard to the media's handling of that conflict. They include: 1) position
reporting - the reporter assumes a position or bias thus, all the news reported by him will
support that position and mindset; 2) crisis reporting - sensational events are overplayed
such that adequate background information is not provided to the reader/viewer. The
result is an ill-informed rather than a misinformed public; 3) uninformed reporting - this
usually occurs as a result of inexperience in journalism, or ignorance of the military
situation due to inadequate investigative background work. Occasionally, it is
demonstrated by the individual, such as in Afghanistan, who did not leave the hotel room
but relied on second and third hand accounts of the action; 4) factual reporting - a
newsman is a professional who must rely on facts and accuracy to maintain both his
reputation and his credibility. Errors do occur as a result of deadline prescures, or editorial
decisions which may leave part of the story on the newsroom or the splicing room floor,
5) not-on-the-team - this is the attitude that reporting an unpleasant event, even if factual, is
detrimental to morale and the victory momentum. The problem is that by eliminating
constructive criticism, the press becomes a member of the military team at the expense of
the mandate from the people. Numerous studies conducted of the news coverage of the
Viet Nam War have in fact faulted the press for only one of these five criticisms, the
272 Set and Drift, "Military-Media Symposium at the Naval War College", Naval War College
Review (Jan-Feb 1973), Vol XXV No. 3, 49-5 1; Commander Jack M. White, USN, "The Military
and the Media", U.S. N. 1. Proceedings (Jul 1974), Vol 100 No. 7/857, 47-51.
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tendency to engage in crisis reporting. One study, in fact, accuses the press of reporting the
government's party line. 273
2. The Military Media Relations Panel -Sidle Commission 1984
"The Newsman in Grenada"
The Military-Media Relations Panel met February 6-10, 1984 at the National War
College in Washington, D.C. General John W. Vessey, Jr., then Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, tasked Major General Winant Sidle, USA with the project of convening a
panel of experts from the media and the military to answer the question, "How do we
conduct military operations in a manner that safeguards the lives of our military and
protects the security of a military operation while keeping the American public informed
through the news media?" Participants included four former newsmen with print and
broadcast experience in wartime, a former dean of a journalism school, a former Chief Of
the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office in Saigon, representatives of the Organization of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, and all four of the
DOD military services. At the outset a statement of principle was made: "...the panel
believes it is essential that the U.S. News media cover U.S. military operations to the
maximum degree possible consistent with mission security and the safety of U.S.
273 LCDR Ralph W. Blanchard, USN, "The Newsman in Viet Nam: Responsible or Irresponsible?",
Naval War College Review (Jun 1968), Vol XX No. 11, 14-42; LCDR R. W. Blanchard, USN,
"The Newsman in Viet Nam", U.S. N. I. Proceedings (Feb 1969), Vol 95 No. 792, 51-57; George
Arthur Bailey, "The Viet Nam War According to Chet, David, Walter, Harry, Peter. Bob, Howard,
and Frank: A Content Analysis of Journalistic Performance by the Network Television Evening News
Anchorman 1965-1970" (1973) Ph. D. The University of Wisconsin, Ann Arbor, Michigan; Major
Michael C. Mitchell, USMC, Television and the Viemam War", Naval War College Review ( May-
Jun 1984), Vol XXXVU No. 3, 42-52, Mitchell raises the issue of the Twenty Two Minute laws, the
Media Elite, and the problem of visuals taking priority over in-depth reporting; Daniel C. Hallin, The
"Uncensored War": The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); Peter
Braestrup, Big Story Vols. I and II-(Boulder Westview Press, 1977); Edward S. Herman and Noam
Chomsky, ManufaCturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media (New York: Pantheon
Books, 1988). This last study, specifically. Chapters 5 and 6 build a case for Chomsky and Herman's
thesis that the press is really a propaganda machine for the U. S. government, that an adversarial
relationship does not truly exist, and that the Viet Nam war coverage taken as a whole reveals a
definite slant in favor of the government. Their thesis continues to generate controversy as indicated
in the Humanist article cited previously.
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forces."274 The commission went on to debate such questions as: the public's right to
know, the media's First Amendment rights, the issue of bias in the media, the sheer
volume of press members (free lance or on assignment), and censorship. Their solution
was the establishment of a national press pool.
The catalyst for the convening of such a panel was the decision to exclude the press from
the Grenada Operation "Urgent Fury". The debate was underway almost immediately,
with the press outraged over the military restrictions on journalists, the U.S. public not
entirely sure it was a bad idea, and the military basking in the glow of a "successful"
operation unhampered by journalists. The decision to restrict journalistic coverage is
usually based on five arguments: 1) protect reporters from gunfire, or being taken
hostage; 2) media cannot keep secrets since the commercial imperative is too great,
therefore military lives could be at risk; 3) liberal bias among the media will prevent
accurate reporting; 4) First Amendment rights do not necessarily apply in wartime, nor
was it meant to be complete protection for all forms of speech; 5) the people's right to
know must be balanced in times of crisis or danger with the people's right to be protected.
The only two considerations which appear to have some validity are, the idea of limited
censorship implied in number four, and protection idea outlined in number five.
Journalists who accept an assignment to a war zone accept the risks inherent in that
assignment, much as a military member does. Excluding them on the basis of potential
death or becoming a hostage is not acceptable, as long as the public understands that the
risk is there and the journalist's situation will not be allowed to control the military
situation. Educating the press in terms of security will resolve the commercial imperative
to some degree although, there will always be the unethical exception who releases
274 MAJGEN Winant Sidle, USA (RET.), "The Public's Right to Know", U. S. N. 1. Proceedings (Jul
1985), Vol 1 1/2989. 37.
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information prematurely. This does not condone unlimited censorship. The liberal bias
documented earlier is a reality, however, it should be understood that the same liberal bias
extends to all areas of the news, not simply military operations. The Viet Nam studies
indicated that, in fact, the liberal bias did not prevent fair and accurate reporting, but the
crisis imperative, and the visual imperative did at times. 275
3. Media: Force Multiplier or Force Divider?
World War II war correspondents, as noted earlier, were a different breed than the
journalists performing those duties today, or even twenty-five years ago during the Viet
Nam War. Attitudes towards the war effort were carefully cultivated on the home front
through the Office of War Information and sustained from the front by patriotic reporting
designed to maintain morale. Reporters trained with the troops and were subjected to the
same danger. There was a sense of oneness which permeated the reports from the field.
This media, composed of radio broadcasts, newsreels, and print journalism, were force
multipliers. Specifically, they acted as watchmen providing reports on an environment
beyond the reach of the families back home. They became a liberating force, breaking the
bonds of distance and isolation, and developing the quality of empathy, the sense of
belonging with the other allies. They served to focus attention and by so doing, planted
ideas which further helped to support the war effort. They were able to raise aspirations,
to combat fatalism and a fear of failure, to challenge those "whose arms were too weary".
Finally, they created both an informational and intellectual climate which stimulated
275 LT J. Morgan Smith, USN, "Wanted: A Responsible Free Press", U.S.N. I. Proceedings,(Jul
1984), Col 110/7/977, 77-85; MAJGEN Winant Sidle, U.S.A. (Ret.) "The Public's Right to Know",
U.S.NJ. Proceedings (Jul 1985). Vol I 1P7989, 37-43; James F. Pontuso, "Combat and the Media:
The Right to Know Versus the Right to Win'. Strategic Review (Winter 1990), Vol XVIII NO. 1,
49-60; Richard M. Clurman, Beyond Malice: The Media's Years of Reckoning rev. ed. (New York:
New American Library, 1990), 24-25; Major Mark Adkin, RA, Urgent Fury: The Battle for Grenada
(Massachusetts: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath and Co., 1989),257-9.
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people to alter their perspective and entertain the idea of alternate futures, i.e. one in which
victory was a reality. 276
If the press could do all of the above, thus employing themselves as a force multiplier,
is the opposite not true? Reverse the equation, and do they not become a force divider?
The criticisms presented in the previous section would seem to indicate that the answer is a
resounding "yes". In the view from NATO, Robert Delaney indicates that
communications and the media have introduced an indirect approach into warfare and its
setting. Specifically, the lessons are that: public opinion can arrest as well as encourage
war, and it is the press which mobilizes public opinion; the freedom of the press must be
understood as a potent weapon in the political arsenal; the psychological factor in national
security and how the press affects this has become an issue in military planning. 277
Apparently, it is the slant, the bias, the angle of the journalistic endeavor which will
determine if the overall press effort is to be a force multiplier or force divider. The more
well-informed the press is, the more likely the reporting will be accurate, and the end result
will be a force multiplier. This is not to imply that the purpose of the press is to become a
cheerleader for the military and its operations. However, failure to provide the minimum
accurate information to them at the outset, is a certain guarantee of "divide and conquer".
The problem is that the military will be the entity so divided and conquered.
The next chapter will focus on the military negotiator and the dilemmas posed for him
by the media, the negotiation process, and what options may be available to resolve this
issue.
276 This is an adaptation of Wilbur Schramm's role of the media in developing countries, 127-32.
277 Robert F. Delaney, "Communications, Subversion and Public Diplomacy: The View from
NATO", Naval War College Review (Winter 1977), Vol XXIX No. 3, 73-8.
149
VII. MEDIA DIPLOMACY:
THE DILEMMAS FOR THE MILITARY NEGOTIATOR
U.S. military negotiators find themselves in the situation of presenting not only the
U.S. point of view, but also the military point of view when engaged in negotiations.
Although various studies have been conducted which focus on national styles of
negotiation, there is a paucity of information on the military style of negotiation, if such a
form is even in existence. Studies conducted by the Center for the Study of Foreign
Affairs have resulted in fifteen general guidelines which should be followed by the U.S.
negotiator. They are as follows:
1) Know your substance and be well prepared because your interlocutor
probably will be.
2) Have clear objectives and know your bottom line.
3) Understand the negotiating style of the country you are dealing with.
4) Do not negotiate with yourself.
5) Do not stake out extreme positions but be consistent.
6) Be patient and use time deadlines sparingly.
7) Develop personal relationships with your interlocutor, but be careful
not to be manipulated.
8) Seek opportunities for informal sessions because they are where most
agreements are made.
9) Use appropriate protocol because the other side will probably be status
conscious.
10) Use media pressure carefully because it could backfire.
11) Understand the national sensitivities of your interlocutor and do not
violate them unless it is unavoidable.
12) Assess your interlocutor's flexibility and the obstacles to his accept-
ing your bottom line.
13) Know the decision-making process of your counterpart and assess
when it may be necessary to circumvent the negotiators.
14) Be involved in your own decision-making process.
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15) Pin down the details where possible, especially when the other nation
has compliance problems. 278
These are actually, standard negotiation techniques regardless of the country, profession,
or nationality of the negotiator involved. Roger Fisher defines these same issues as the six
categories of negotiating power, however he focuses on the early stage or pre-negotiation
phase. He lists the six kinds of power as: 1) skill and knowledge; 2) good relationship;
3) good alternative to negotiating; 4) an elegant solution; 5) legitimacy;
6) commitment. 27 9 Again, these six elements are important to the military negotiator as
well. As both of these experts indicate, the personality of the negotiator is the key to
successful negotiations. It is to be assumed that all good negotiators will conduct extensive
background research, that they will have some experience in negotiations, but the base
point before engaging in any of this is to have a sense of self.
In the Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation, Jeffrey Rubin and Bert Brown
conducted a systematic exploration of individual differences in background, i.e. sex, race,
age, status, etc., as well as individual differences in personality, i.e. inherent
278 Hans Binnendijk, ed., National Ne&otiatini Styles (Washington, D.C.: Department of State
Publication, Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1987), viii-ix.
279 Roger Fisher, "Negotiating Power: Getting and Using Influence", American Behavioral Scientist
(Nov/Dec 1983), Vol 27 No. 2, 149-66. The powers are delineated as follows: 1) skill and
knowledge - ability to listen, become aware of the emotions and psychological concerns of others, to
empathize, to speak different languages, to communicate clearly and effectively, to become
integrated so that one's words and nonverbal behavior reinforce each other. Analysis, logic,
quantitative assessment, and the ability to organize ideas are also importanL Knowledge pertains to
the people involved, the interests involved, and the facts, i.e. history, geography, economics,
scientific background of a problem, as well as its legal, social and political implications; good
relationship - involves trust and the ability to communicate easily and effectively; a good alternative
is to consider the alternatives to reaching an agreement with a particular negotiating partner, to select
the most promising, and to improve it to the extent possible; the elegant solution is one which
generates multiple options designed to meet as well as possible the legitimate interests of both sides;
legitimacy is the result of research completed to find precedents, expert opinion, and other objective
criteria, and to have worked on various theories of what ought to be done; commitment may be
affirmative or negative. The former is the offer of what you are willing to agree to, or what you can do
under certain conditions should agreement fail to be reached. The latter states that you are unwilling
to make certain agreements even though it would be better to than to make no agreements.
Additionally, it may be a threat that, failing agreement, you will engage in certain negative conducL
The earlier a negative commitment is made, the earlier a take-it-or-leave-it position has been
announced, and the less likely the negotiator is to have maximized his position.
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cooperativeness, authoritarianism, cognitive complexity, risk-taking propensity, etc.
Reviewing approximately 200 relevant studies, they attempted to integrate those findings to
Kurt Lewin's two-parametric model of an individual's behavior: E (environment) and
P (person), focusing on the P variable. P, in this instance, consists of the individual's
needs, beliefs, and values. Rubin and Brown posit the existence of a bargaining world
comprised of two fundamentally different types of people, who reside at or near the two
opposite poles of a dimension known as interpersonal orientation or 10. At the upper
end of the continuum is the high 10 who is responsive to the interpersonal aspects of his
relationship with the other. He is both interested in , and reactive to, variations in the
other's behavior. The low 10 is characterized by a nonresponsiveness to interpersonal
aspects of his relationship with the other. His interest is neither in cooperating nor
competing with the other, but rather in maximizing his own gain- regardless of how the
other fares. 280
After reviewing the individual differences in background Rubin and Brown noted the
following characteristics. The general finding about age was that young children tend to
behave like low 1Os, becoming more interpersonal in their orientation as they grow older,
college students generally behave more like high 1Os. The race variable indicates that
individuals tend to bargain more cooperatively with an opponent of the same race than with
one of another race; blacks tend to bargain more cooperatively than whites. Nationality or
cross-cultural factors were indeterminate due to the discrepant pattern of findings and
paucity of research in this area.281  Intelligence (as measured by various tests of
intellectual aptitude) was found to be unrelated to bargaining ability or behavior. Studies
280 Jeffrey Z. Rubin, and Bert R. Brown, The Social Psychology of Bargaining and Negotiation (New
York: Academic Press, 1975). 157-91.
281 This is not to imply that national styles of negotiating do not exist. This fact is well-documented,
but rather that one nationality negotiating with a wide variety of other nationalities may or may not
exhibit different patterns of behavior.
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using religious affiliation as the basis of bargaining behavior were too few in number to be
statistically significant. The status factor was determined to have an effect in terms of
compliance or exploitation. Negotiators display considerable deference toward high or
higher status others by engaging in frequent compliance with their threats, and by
submissive behavior. Low status individuals were routinely exploited. In terms of
gender, females tend to bargain like high 1Os, while males behave more like low lOs. The
bottom line is that an individual's age, race, status, and gender will have an effect on the
negotiating process.
After reviewing the individual differences in personality Rubin and Brown noted the
following characteristics. Generally, high risk takers behave like low IOs and were found
to yield less often than low risk takers but only under conditions of low information. The
perceived locus of control factor as defined by Rubin and Brown is the subjective
probability that rewards are determined by self-effort (internal control) or by an outside
agency (external control). After examining 200 relevant studies Rubin and Brown noted
that this factor showed that internals behave somewhat like high risk takers, or low 1Os.
Externals, however, behave like high 1Os. Cognitive complexity as defined by Rubin and
Brown refers to the processing of information, i.e. abstract processors are said to be high in
cognitive complexity; concrete information processors are said to be low in cognitive
complexity. Negotiators high in cognitive complexity behave like high 1Os, while those
low in cognitive complexity behave more like low 1Os. Intolerance of ambiguity is
defined as a tendency to prefer regularity to change, clarity to ambiguity, balance to
imbalance, concreteness to abstraction, etc. Negotiators who are high in tolerance for
ambiguity are more likely to behave cooperatively than. se who are. tow. Interestingly
enough, Rubin and Brown found that the self-concept variable had a direct correlation to
the type of negative behavior displayed. Rubin and Brown concluded that a negative self-
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concept will result in more competitively negotiating behavior than an individual with a
positive self-concept. The relationship between a negotiator's motivational predisposition
and subsequent behavior is usually measured in terms of three basic motives: the need for
achievement, the need for affiliation, the need for power.28 2 Achievement-oriented
negotiators tend to behave like low lOs. In the Rubin and Brown studies affiliation and
power-oriented negotiators tend to behave like high lOs. In terms of attitude, trusting
negotiators behave more cooperatively than those who are less trusting. Cooperator., not
surprisingly, behave more cooperatively, i.e. like high los, than competitors who behave
like low lOs. Cooperators display an interesting twist, however, in that they will behave
more like the others with whom they interact, i.e. tendency to engage in behavioral
assimilation. Therefore, the cooperator will behave more cooperatively in the presence of
another cooperative entity, and more competitively in the presence of a competitive entity.
The competitor views the world as composed of others like himself. High
authoritarianism is characterized by a power orientation, obeisance to others in power,
disposed to concrete thinking, and a generally suspicious and cynical attitude towards
others. Overall, Rubin and Brown determined that the results were inconclusive when
attempting to relate this attitude to negotiating behavior. Flexible ethicality was defined, for
the purposes of their study, as displaying moderate and conventional endorsement of
commonly accepted ethical principles. A negotiator low in flexible ethicality displays more
extreme and moralistic (more authoritarian) endorsement of these principles. The
negotiator who displays high ethical flexibility will behave more cooperatively than the
individual who displays a low ethical flexibility.
282 The need for achievement as defined by Rubin and Brown is the desire to attain a predetermined
standard of excellence. The need for affiliation is the desire to have friendly relations with others.
The a -e for power or dominance is the desire to exert control over others.
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Summarizing Rubin and Brown's findings in terms of distinct personality types
indicates the following. The individual who ranks high on the interpersonal orientation
scale is characterized as: a low-risk taker, has an external locus of control, high cognitive
complexity, trusting, cooperative, high tolerance for ambiguity, positive self-concept,
motivational need for affiliation and power, and displays high ethical flexibility. The
individual who ranks low on the interpersonal orientation scale is characterized as: a high-
risk taker, has an internal locus of control, low cognitive complexity, suspicious,
competitive, low tolerance for ambiguity, negative self-concept, motivational need for
achievement, and displays low ethical flexibility. Obviously, this represents two extremes
of the scale but it remains instructive in terms of providing a possible profile of the military
negotiator. The military mind was presentec .ni a previous chapter. Based on the Robinson
study, military officers were found to share certain strengths: self-confidence, goal
orientation, concern for the welfare of others, trust and even temper, and a strong
willingness to accept responsibility in directing others in the accomplishment of an
important goal. Phrased differently, the military negotiator appears to have a tendency to
place on the high end of the interpersonal orientation continuum, as defined by Rubin and
Brown.
A. THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS - THE ART OF COMPROMISE
Negotiation may be defined as "...a process in which explicit proposals are put
forward ostensibly for the purpose of reaching agreement on an exchange or on the
realization of a common interest where conflicting interests are present, '283 or as "...a field
of knowledge and endeavor that focuses on gaining the favor of people from whom we
want things. It is the use of information and power to affect behavior within a 'web of
283 Fred Charles Wkde, How Nations Neeotiate (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1964),3-4.
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tension."'2 84 In either case, the possibility arises that the individual negotiator will be
required to alter some aspect of his original negotiating position if he is serious about
reaching an agreement. Compromise, as this alteration is commonly termed, is not to be
confused with collaboration or capitulation. Both of these terms cast the act of
compromising in a pejorative light. Compromise does, however, represent concessionary
behavior on the part of the negotiator. It is also a common facet of Western negotiating
behavior, particularly American negotiating behavior. On the 10 continuum, this
willingness to make concessions in the interest of the greater good is characteristic of the
high 10 personality. A negotiating tactic such as compromise may have unintended
consequences, i.e. viewed as a sign of weakness by the other negotiating party, viewed as
an opportunity to extract more and thus, manipulate the negotiations unfairly, etc.
The artful aspect of compromise is in recognizing when to offer a concession, what to
offer as a concession, and how to make the concession benefit both parties without
damaging the negotiator (and his own nation's interests) who made the initial proposal.
Ike, Fisher and Ury indicate that compromise does not have to occur in negotiations, that
alternative solutions may be found. Ile discusses the non-controversial solution or as
Cohen would phrase it, a win-win situation. Fisher and Ury state that the positional
bargaining game of "softball" or "hardball" should be changed to "negotiate on the merits",
or separate the people from the problem.285 Concessions and compromise are not options
in their framework.
1. Pre-Negotiation Phase
Prior to embarking on any negotiation, there are various phases that routinely are
experienced. These phases may be identified as: 1) defining the problem; 2) gaining a
284 Herb Cohen, You Can Negotiate Anvyint (New York: Bantam Books, 1980), 15-6.
285 ide, 217-8; Cohen, 149-208; Roger Fisher and William Ury, Getting to YES: Negotiating
Ag-eement Without Giving In (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1981),13.
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commitment to negotiate from the other party; 3) arranging the negotiation; 4) the
negotiation itself.2" Essentially, there must be a common issue in conflict and a common
interest in resolving that conflict through peaceful means. If those two elements are not
present, then negotiation will not occur. In order to define the problem and design potential
acceptable resolutions to that problem, the negotiating party must determine what its
objectives are in pursuing this course of action. The aims or objectives can be classified as
five types: 1) extension agreements; 2) normalization agreements; 3) redistribution
agreements; 4) innovation agreements; 5) effects not concerning agreements. 287 Although
military negotiators could be involved in any on, of these either through design or by
default, they are most likely to be involved in extension agreements, and normalization
agreements.
2. Functions and Turning Points
Returning to the earlier discussion concerning suggestions for effective negotiating
techniques, the base line consists of three elements: information, power, and time. The
functions of the negotiation process are linked to these elements in the following ways.
Information is the background research phase which permits diagnosis to occur. It
answers such questions as: what is the problem?, what is likely to appeal to the other
286 Harold H. Saunders, "The Pre-Negotiation Phase", in International Negotiation: Art and Science
ed. by Diane B. Bendahmane and John W. McDonald, Jr. (Washington, DC: Department of State
Publication, U. S. Foreign Service Institute, Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, 1984), 47-56;
Cohen, 164-7.
287 ide, 26-42. Extension agreements maintain the "status quo" by prolonging existing arrangements.
Examples of extension agreements are tariff agreements, renewal of rights in terms of military base
leases, etc., Normalization agreements are used to terminate the abnormal, i.e. a war, or to formalize
arrangements tacitly arrived at, i.e. cease-fire, reestablish diplomatic relations, etc. Redistribution
agreements represent a demand by one side to the detriment of the other side. Examples include a
new distribution of territory, political influence, etc. Redistribution arrangements are usually coercive
in nature. Innovation agreements deal with setting up new relationships or obligations. In contrast to
redistribution, innovation arrangements are considered to be mutually advantageous. Finally, effects
not concerning agreements are the use of negotiations for such purposes as propaganda, intelligence,
stalling, etc. The commitment to negotiate is actually non-existent and the negotiating atmosphere is
used to manipulate the other side based on a hidden agenda.
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negotiating party?, what are the mutual objectives?, what are the stated needs, and what
are the real needs?, etc. If the negotiator has this kind of information about the other party,
then he has power. The power may be used in a variety of ways. Viewed strictly from a
functional aspect, the power of knowledge or information can be used to formulate a
solution or workable principle which will be acceptable to both parties involved. Finally,
this formula or principle may be applied to a specific problem, and the details worked out
over time. 288
Turning points may be considered as a significant change in the negotiation process.
There are three such stages commonly recognized: 1) the moment of seriousness; 2) the
crest; 3) the closing moment or deadline. Stage one is the moment when the negotiators
come to the realization that a possible solution, mutually acceptable to both parties does
exist. The second stage is the recognition that the agreement reached thus far is acceptable,
and now it must be defended, instead of the opposing points of view. The third stage is the
opportunity to close the deal. This is one of the most difficult to reach due to the tendency
in human nature to continue discussing the deal, even though it has essentially been
concluded. If this moment passes without an agreement, then the parties may find
themselves arguing new points of contention not previously considered.2s9
3. Styles of Negotiation
National styles of negotiation do exist, however this section will be limited to an
examination of the negotiator's objective, and how this affects the negotiating process.
S.aiply stated, the negotiator may be characterized as one who pursues a: 1) Win-Lose
strategy; 2) Win-Win strategy; or 3) Hedging strategy. Competition is the hallmark of
the win-lose strategy, with the emphasis on the negotiator achieving his goals at the
288 1. William Zartman, 'Negotiation: Theory and Reality", in International Ne&otiation. 1-8.
289 Zartman, 3-4.
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expense of his adversary. Standard techniques include: extreme initial position, limited
authority, emotional tactics, concessionary behavior viewed as a weakness therefore
concessions will be infrequent and largely symbolic, and finally, time has no meaning as
there is no deadline.2  During the height or the Cold War era, the win-lose strategy was
also known as the Soviet method.
Cooperation is the hallmark of the win-win strategy, with the emphasis on the
negotiators achieving a mutually beneficial solution to the problem. Standard techniques
include: establishing trust, obtaining information, determining the other negotiator's needs
and attempting to meet them, using his ideas, i.e. collaboration in the positive sense, taking
moderate risks, and finally, soliciting his help in solving the problem. Although the two
sides do not start out with the same objectives and priorities, through communication and
active listening, a solution becomes increasingly possible. This win-win strategy is
sometimes compared to the U.S. style of negotiating.
Hedging strategies in negotiations are the attempt to maintain the balance in favor of one
neg. tiating team or the other. Although not quite as one-sided as the win-lose strategy,
neiiner is it as open as the win-win strategy. The willingness to engage in a hedging
strategy indicates that trust has not been established between the two teams of negotiators.
Tec.aniques are characterized by stalling, lack of authority to commit, and shifting
objf ztives.
290 -ohen, 119-39; Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis, "The Soviet Union: The Pursuit of Power and
InflL.nce Through Negotiation" in Binnendijk, 24, 28-34; Gerald I. Nierenberg, Ile Complete
aiawi (New York: Nierenberg and Zeif Publishers, 1986), 187-93; David A. Lax and James K.
Sebe iius, The Manager as Negotiator Bargaining for Cooneration and Comnetitive Gain(New York:
The .-ree Press, 1986), 155-7; Coral Bell, Negotiation From Strength: A Study in the Politics of
Pow j(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963; Roy J. Lewicki and Joseph A. Litterer-Ngoiation
Readings- Exercises and Cases (Illinois: Irwin Press, 1985). The following articles from this volume
outline the elements of the three strategies discussed above. Andrew Tobias, "Winning Through
Negotiation", 6-18; Jack 0. Vance, "Winning: A Leading Consultant Tells How", 64-8; Aric Press
with Charles Glass and Donna Foote, "Winning by Negotiation", 123-5; Robert W. Johnston,
"Negotiation Strategies: Different Strokes for Different Folks", 156-64; Frank L. Acuff and Maurice
Villere, "Games Negotiators Play". 177-85.
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Personal styles were alluded to earlier. According to Spector's focused studies, the
dynamics of negotiation are dependent upon four factors: unique mixture of personality,
perception, expectation, and persuasion. 291 These studies were conducted predominantly of
the negotiator in contrast with his opposite number, as opposed to the other members of
his specific negotiating team. Colosi expands on this theme in his studies of the intra-
group dynamics of the negotiating team itself. 292 Three personality or negotiating styles
are identified: the stabilizer, destabilizer, and the quasi-mediator. Stabilizers are
cooperative to the point of assuming the other side's point of view just so that an agreement
may be reached. Destabilizers are not sure that negotiation achieves anything, consequently
they will counter all in-house proposals, as well as the adversary's proposals. Basically,
they believe that adjudication or a contest of will is the only way to resolve problems.
Admiral C. Turner Joy came to almost the same conclusion based on his experience at the
Korean Armistice Conference. He stated that "...in negotiating with the Communists there
is no substitute for the imperative logic of military pressure. In other words, we learned
that progress in negotiating with them is in direct proportion to the degree of military
pressure applied." 293 Quasi-mediators spend the majority of their time mediating between
the tabilizers and destabilizers within their own group, but also appear to have the ultimate
reoponsibility for the success of the negotiating effort.
291 Bertram 1. Spector, -Negotiations as a Psychological Process", The.Ne.oiato Proess:
Theories and Applications ed. by I. William Zartman (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1978), 55-
66.
292 Thomas Colosi, "A Model for Negotiation and Mediation", in International Negotiation.15-34.
See also I. William Zartman and Maureen R. Berman. The Practical Negotiator (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1982), 16-23; Chester L.Karrass, Give and Take: The Complete Guide to
Negotiating Stratefies and Tactics (New York: Thomas Y. CroweU, Publishers, 1974), 86-7.
293 Allen E. Goodman, ed., Negotiating While Fightine: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the
Koan Armistice Confrnce (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1978),5.
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Finally, in terms of tae military negotiator there is the question of the "culture-
generation" gap.294 The uniformed military remain an island of authority, conformity, and
discipline in an increasingly permissive society. As previously noted, the art of negotiation
is not one of rigidity and the possibility exists that the officer trained in the military
environment will have a tendency to clash with certain democratic and egalitarian values of
civilian society. However, it is equally true that the military emphasizes group
interdependence and team coordination as the basis for survival, and that these qualities
carry over quite well into the negotiating team environment.
B. NEGOTIATIONS: OPEN OR CLOSED?
Open negotiations imply that the public is part of the decision-making process, that
their concerns are being addressed, and that pressure is applied to do what is morally right.
Closed negotiations, hidden behind a veil of secrecy, are stigmatized by the stereotype of
"dirty little deals" wherein the interests of the many are sacrificed for the the interests of the
few. Neither picture is quite accurate. Ide notes the distinction between open and secret
negotiations, formal and informal negotiations. 295 The former may be open or secret,
whereas the latter is usually secret. Informal negotiations are the "feeling out" phase
whereby diplomats cautiously probe the issues, present tentative positions, and understand
that partial agreements are not binding. Personal relationships among the negotiators will
influence the proceedings at this juncture. Formal negotiations conducted in secret
attempt to achieve one of two major effects; either to keep domestic groups ignorant, thus
294 Friedheim, "Strong Free Newspapers", 636-7; Rear Admiral Brent Baker, USN, "The War of
Words", U.S.NJ. Proceedings (December 1989), Vol 115/10/1042, 35-9. Both of these writers
emphasize this gap between the media and the military in terms of a generation-culture gap, but it is
also applicable in the negotiating arena as well. The gap exists because reporters are younger, and
have never seen military service, television has assumed the primary role in "getting the news out".




preventing unnecessary pressure during successive phases of bargaining, or keep third
parties in the dark, thus reducing their influence. Of course, either of these effects may be
manipulated in a reprehensible manner29 which has resulted in secret diplomacy receiving
such negative press in the twentieth century. Secrecy in governmental affairs has been an
anathema to the United States since its founding.
1. The Legal Framework - The Case Against Secrecy
Previously, freedom of the press was discussed in some detail, therefore the
arguments for and against will not be addressed in this section. Instead the focus will be on
specific legal actions which were taken that, in fact, altered the interpretation of freedom of
speech, access to government information, and the public's right to know.
a. The Constitution
The Constitution was defended by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, who wrote a
series of articles to justify ratification for publication in the New York newspapers. The
Federalist Papers are considered classics in the realm of political theory and
commentary. Due to their efforts, the Constitution was adopted in 1789. The only flaw
appeared to be the absence of proper representation of the mass of the American people.
This anomaly was corrected by the First Congress, which proposed ten amendments
known as the Bill of Rights to the Constitution. Ratified in 1791, the Bill of Rights
became the legal guardian and standard for the mass public. Article I clearly delineated the
rights of freedom of speech, and the press. What was not so clearly delineated according
to Justice Potter Stewart was "..the press cannot expect from the Constitution any guarantee
that it will succeed...[in its] battle against secrecy and deception in government. There is no
296 The previous division of the world as designed by the Congress of Vienna, and the later Concert
of Europe, Hitler-Stalin pacts, etc.
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Constitutional right to have access to particular government information. .. "297 The
information which follows represents just such attempts by the press.
b. The Freedom of Information Act
In 1967 President Lyndon Johnson signed into law the Freedom of Information
Act which established the "right to know" criterion for requesting specific types of
information from the government. This superseded the previous standard of proving the
"need to know." Should a citizen request information about a specific government body,
that information was releasable unless it appeared in one of the nine exemption categories.
298 Ile first category specifically deals with the question of national defense and foreign
policy, but for years this issue remained untouched and unquestioned. In 1974, the
"properly classified" caveat was inserted based on the Environmental Protection Agency
v. Mink case. The Court ruled that it could only determine if the requested material was
in fact classified, not on the appropriateness of the classification.2 9
c. The Pentagon Papers and the Amendments
At the same time Johnson was signing the Freedom of Information Act, Secretary
of Defense Robert S. McNamara was organizing a task force to produce an "encyclopedic
297 Quoted in American Intelligence Journal, Vol 9 No. 1. p 37.
298 The nine categories are: 1) information established by executive order to be kept secret in the
interest of national defense or foreign policy, or information properly classified pursuant to such
executive order. 2) information related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency; 3) information that is specifically exempted by statutes; 4) information concerning trade
secrets and commercial or financial information that is privileged or confidential; 5) inter-agency or
intra-agency memorandums or letters that would not be available by law to a party other than an
agency in litigation with the first agency; 6) personnel and medical files or similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; 7)
investigatory records compiled for law enforcement purposes under certain situations; 8) information
contained in or related to examination, operating, or condition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for
the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financiat institutions; 9)
geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning oil and natural gas
wells.
299 Morton H. Halperin and Daniel Hoffman, Freedom vs. National Security: Secrecy and
SuriJlan (..New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1977), 105-6; Also by Halperin and Hoffman,
Top Secret National Security and the Right to Know (Washington:, D.C.: New Republic Books,
197), 47-8.
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and objective" history of the war. This was the genesis of the Pentagon Papers. Leslie H.
Gelb, head of the task force, examined the first volumes upon completion, and decided
after consulting with his superiors that the entire study should be formally classified "top
secret sensitive". In its final form, the study was comprised of a series of volumes
summarizing American activities in Viet Nam prior to Kennedy's election, as well as
particular episodes and programs, i.e. the Diem coup, the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the
South Vietnamese request for American troops, the decision to deploy U.S. forces and
their subsequent buildup, the decision to begin and expand bombing operations against
North Viet Nam, and the history of American negotiations with the North Vietnamese
government. The U.S. intelligence community, which was conducting the research into
this subject, began to question the wisdom of the Indochina policy and raised the issue
within the pages of the study.
Daniel Ellsberg, who was writing a Rand study of the history of American
involvement in Indochina, requested and received permission to view the documents. In
1970, Ellsberg delivered a copy of the document to Senator William Fulbright, who did
not take action on them due to the unorthodox manner in which a government-classified
docurr.-.nt had come into his possession. In 1971, a set was delivered to the New York
Times journalist Neil Sheehan, who produced a series of stories which appeared in print
in the Sunday edition of the Times, June 13, 1971. An injunction against publication was
filed by the government, but seventeen days later, the injunction was lifted. The Court had
ruled that prior restraint was not permissible in this case. In reviewing his experience with
the Pentagon Papers, Sheehan discussed how the press had, in truth, failed in Viet Nam.
According to him, there were three lessons learned by the press as a result of the Pentagon
Papers: 1) failed to raise in their reporting, the essential questions about American policy
in Indochina. Questioning the details and failing to question the substance resulted in
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simplistic analyses of events; 2) the press allowed themselves to be used by the power
managers in the executive branch as tools to further policy (this is the Noam Chomsky
argument); 3) suspicion of power, particularly in the executive branch.3° ° Unfortunately,
the lessons drawn from this event serve to complicate the negotiator's assignment, since
negotiators are viewed as a part of the executive branch. If they are too powerful, too
reliant on secrecy, then there must be hidden agendas, which the public has a right to know
about.
Amendments to the Freedom of Information Act were a residual fallout from the
Pentagon Papers incident. By 1974, Congress had enacted major revisions, including a
number of procedural changes. A request which "reasonably describes" a record in an
agency's possession obliges the agency to review the record and determine if the
information is, in fact, properly classified. Initial agency response must be within ten days.
Finally, administrative sanctions are prescribed where the court determines the information
was arbitrarily and capriciously withheld.
2. The Intelligence Imperative - The Case for Secrecy
Fundamentally, this nation recognizes that although freedom of speech and
freedom of the press are inalienable rights, there is also the right of protection "from all
enemies both foreign and domestic." Under those circumstances defined as in the national
interest or threatening to national security, then secrecy must be considered a viable option.
a. National Security as Legitimate Concern
The government does have a need for secrecy. The puzzling aspect is to
determine, the number of secrets, the content of those secrets, and the length of time
needed to maintain the classified status. There are three operational areas which would
300 Neil Sheehan, "The Press and the Pentagon Papers", Naval War College Review (Feb 1972) Vol
XXIV No. 6,8-12.
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appear to meet the criteria for maintenance of secrecy: 1) military; 2) intelligence;
3) diplomacy. It should be understood that not all aspects of these three should be
classified but, rather specific areas which pertain to the concept of national security.
Information leaks about military plans and strategies, the strength and deployment of
forces provide invaluable intelligence to foreign adversaries. The possession of such
information could result in the ultimate failure of military objectives and operations.
Expanding this idea into the realm of weapons design and research exponentially multiplies
the risk factor, by not only providing the enemy with the force multiplier equation, but also
the ability to mount a counterforce, thus neutralizing the solution. Strategic advantages are
reduced or affected each time inadvertent or deliberate technology transfer occurs.
Intelligence, by its nature, relies on the strict control of information, the sources of that
information, and the methods of collection. Failure to safeguard any one of these areas is
to risk the failure or prejudice the success of the intelligence effort, the compromise of an
agent's identity, and possibly his life. It may engender the loss of faith on the part of allies
in a nation's ability to preserve and protect knowledge for the greater good. "Discretion is
not only the better part of valor", it is the seal of trust between two or more nations.
Finally, secrecy in diplomatic initiatives, as previously discussed, provides latitude and
mobility in the exploration of options. Confidential meetings, "feeling out" sessions may
open previously closed channels of communications, the opportunity to speak candidly
with another government, and to investigate solutions which would not be acceptable
should they be publicized. Meetings minus the media and the subsequent theater it entails,
may provide the answer to the pressing international relations questions of the day. 301
301 William T. Casey, "Our National Secrets: The Intelligence Community and the Press," Vital
Speeches of the Day (Dec 1, 1986), Vol LIII No. 4. 98-100; William E. Colby, "Intelligence Secrecy
and Security in a Free Society", International Security (Fall 1976), Vol 1 No. 2. 3-14; Martin L. C.
Feldman, "Why the First Amendment Is Not Incompatible with National Security Interests", Vital
Speeches of the Day (Apr 15, 1987), Vol LIII No. 1, 394-8; Nick Kotz, "The Government's Need for
Secrecy vs. the People's Right to Know", Naval War College Review (May-Jun 1984), Vol XXXVII
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One solution to this issue of classification is offered by Halperin and Hoffman in their
categorization system. Broadly speaking, they propose that information be assigned to one
of three groupings: 1) automatically released; 2) presumptively classified; 3) requiring
the exercise of discretion with explicit consideration of the information's value for
enlightened public debate.302  A review of the contents of their categories reveals the
same issues addressed above with the possible exception of revealing the location of
nuclear weapons abroad. This latter issue would probably be better left classified in view
of the problems with terrorist organizations routinely burglarizing conventional weapons
stores at military facilities in the past.
b. Surprise and Change in International Relations
Diplomacy may be characterized as routine or creative according to George
Liska. 30 3 Routine diplomacy maintains the status quo, thus allowing the diplomat to
engage in extension or normalization agreements. Creative diplomacy (also termed
surprise diplomacy) radically alters the existing arrangenients between countries, thus
allowing the instigating diplomat to engage in redistribution or innovation agreements. It
should be noted that the creative diplomat may be operating in either an offensive or
No. 3, 36-41. These four articles represent three viewpoints: the intelligence community in the guise
of the CIA, a U. S. District Judge, and a Pulitzer Prize-winning reporter. Although they are not in
complete agreement, each acknowledges the need for a certain amount of secrecy in the three areas
cited above. Opinions abound on this issue but eventually, the concession is made that there are
some aspects of governmental operations which require the protection of classification.
302 Hoffman and Halperin, Io Sre, 57-68. Automatic release would include such information as:
1) Americans engaged in combat or in imminent prospcct of combat; 2) American forces Pbroad; 3)
nuclear weapons abroad; 4) financing of foreign operations or foreign military forces; 5)
commitments to do any of the preceding, or commencement of negotiations contemplating such
commitments; 6) intelligence organizations: existence, budgets, and functions; 7) weapons
systems: concepts and costs; 8) actions in violation of the law. Presumptive classificat:-i would be
applied in the case of: 1) weapons systems: details of advanced system design and operational
characteristics; 2) details of plans for military operations; 3) details of ongoing diplomatic
negotiations; 4) intelligence methods: codes, technology, and identity of agents. Information not
clearly identifiable or categorizable ia these two groupings would then be placed in the third groupine
with the emphasis on release rather than the withholding of such information from the public sector.
303 George Liska, Beyond Kissinger. Ways of Conservative Statecraft (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1975) 25-6.
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defensive mode. A fait accompli, either minor or major, is an example of just such a
diplomatic surprise maneuver. The surprise aspect is limited to the element of timing, but
it is impossible to achieve without secrecy.
The military also engage in surprise "diplomacy", only it is usually antagonistic in
nature, and definitely of an offensive character. The complexity of surprise in the strategic
realm is evident, as it may occur on several different levels simultaneously, and consist of a
diverse array of elements. Handel offers the following variables: area or areas chosen for
the attack; strategy and tactics employed; use of new military doctrines; technological
surprise in the use of new weapons systems; surprise in terms of , ming, etc.304 Media
exposure of any of these elements could result in the failure of the specific operation, as
well as the overall politico-military strategy.
c. Reagan and Information Control - The Pendulum Swings
The presidential approach to intelligence matters, particullxly the classification of
information, has exhibited a recurring pattern. Each time a sensitive issue has been leaked
to the press which limited the presidential options and potential courses of action, there
were attempts made to reform the entire system. Reagan inherited a media environment
which worked well for him in terms of presenting a charismatic personality in a series of
sound bytes. The problem was that this same media environment also had the capability of
both using and being used by government officials through the ignominious practice of
"leakology".
Instituting an information control policy in an attempt to resolve this puzzle, the Reagan
administration focused on the following areas: a revised classification policy, a pre-
304 Michael I. Handel, "Surprise and Change in International Politics", International Security
(Spring 1980), Vol 4 No. 4, 57-85; See also Kenneth E. Roberts, "Lessons of Strategic Surprise:
Pearl Harbor, Cuba, and the 1973 Middle East Crisis", in New Dynamics in National Strategy: The
Paradox of Power (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, Co., 1975), 69-89.
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publication review requirement, and regulation of technical-scientific information
exchange. 305 The revised classification policy was embodied in Executive Order 12356
and included such elements as: the elimination of automatic declassification, the addition
of derivative classification, the provision of cacegory types for the protection for
.i;unination, and the creation of special access programs. In 1982, the DOD instituted the
non-disclosure agreement, which is executed by all employees with access to classified
information. Basically, it is a contract between the employee and the government that no
personal writings of a current or former security-cleared employee will be published until,
and unless, the government has subjected the manuscript to a pre-publication review
process. Lastly, in an effort to control the transfer of scientific-technical information
which could have an effect on national security in the military arena, two existing statutes
were invoked: the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, and the Export Administration Act
of 1979.
Two other initiatives which failed were the Freedom of Information Improvement Act
proposed in 1981, and the draft of an "Official Secrets Act", designed along the lines of the
British model. The FOIA improvements were limited to adding the FBI's domestic
surveillance files to the nine exemptions, and to cease routine granting of search fee
waivers for journalists and scholars. Congress did not pass either of these initiatives. 3°6
305 Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, Strategic Intelligence for American National
Seurity (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 22-9; U. Lynn Jones, "See No
E, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Information Control Policy of the Reagan Administration",
Policy Studies Journal (Winter 1988-89), Vol 17 No. 2, 243-60; Deborah Shapley. "The Media and
National Security", Daedalus (Fall 1982), Vol III No. 4, 199-209; CAPT James E. Wentz, USN,




C. EXTERNAL CONSTRAINTS AND THE NEGOTIATOR
Having explored the internal constraints affecting negotiators, it would be instructive to
examine a few of the external constraints which routinely bedevil negotiators. Three
examples have been selected: summiteering, public opinion, and information control. As
the previous discussion concerning open or closed negotiations would indicate, these three
are only representational, not all-inclusive.
1. Summiteering: The President as Chief Negotiator
Arguments for and against summitry may be distilled down to two issues:
1) personal meetings between heads of state are conducive to better understanding of
intentions, and establishing the habit of communications; or 2) personal meetings between
heads of state limit maneuverability in negotiations, and imply that the court of last resort is
in session. Should this court fail, the repercussions would be devastating, or so some
believe. Actually, the problem is miscast in these black and white terms. The reality is,
that unless a head of state has been carefully briefed and devoted some time and attention to
the problem, he may undo months of work previously conducted at the lower levels of the
negotiating process. This is not entirely the president's fault, for he must contend with the
propaganda and publicity effects his mere presence generates. Ikle likens the summit to a
"huge megaphone for national programs on foreign policy." 307 In the wake of the
Geneva summit, the observation was:
And for diplomacy, it meant that summit meetings, and their surrounding
sub-events, would no longer be confined to the quiet and unintruded negotia-
tions between world leaders but rather could be made into political, indeed media,
events of the first magnitude, whether deserving or not, that could impact upon
global public opinion, and thus on world politics. 308
307 nide, 126.
308 Committee on Foreign Affairs, Soviet Diplomacy and Negotiating Behavior 1979-88. 332-33;
Judith Miller, "King Hussein on Kuwait and Dashed Hope", New York Times (Oct 19, 1990) Al, 8. In
a recapitulation of his efforts to resolve the situation between Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, and George
Bush in Washington, D. C., King Hussein comments that "A dialogue across the airwaves is not
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So what are the constraints posed by public opinion? Is it, in fact, a media creation?
2. Public Opinion and Perception: Media Creation
Opinions are formed as a result of numerous stimuli which the brain constantly
filters, sorts, encodes, rejects, and substitutes for previously known information,
experiences, etc. There are two publics, the attentive and the masses. The attentive public
recognizes the linkage between foreign and domestic affairs, are well informed, vote
according to the issues, and actively participate in the political process. These are the
"switchers in elections"3° 9 or Chomsky's specialized class.
The mass public will vote according to family tradition, the clergy's or local newspaper's
or union's opinion, past political association, etc. If they vote at all, it will usually be in
accordance with anything but the issues. This is the group Nixon would say supported his
policies, "the silent majority."310 however, this is the same group who will turn against a
public official perceived as a liar, or one endangering the national security. "The covenant
between the people and their democratically elected government is a fragile one."31'
What is a well-informed public? Presumably, it is those people who read such
newspapers as the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Christian Science Monitor,
and watch the evening news in conjunction with the MacNeil/Lehrer Report, Meet the
Press, Washington Week In Review, and so forth. However, if these news sources are:
a) exhibiting a liberal bias, or b) espousing the government's propaganda slant, or
c) simply selling newspapers and air time, then whose opinion is reflected in "Public
constructive", thus implying that only a face-to-face meeting will be productive, and not the verbal
blasts carried by the Cable News Network.
309 Roger Hilsman, The Politics of Policy Making in Defense and Foreign Affairs (New York:
Harper and Row, 1971), 101.
310 Ibid. 103.
311 lincoln P. Bloomfield, In Search of American Foreign Policy (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1974), 106.
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Opinion"? The answer varies with the critics. Michael Parenti takes the visual medium to
task for being a "make-believe media; they make us believe", 3 12 such that the viewer
becomes an active accomplice in the indoctrination of the television's viewpoint, the so-
called liberal bias. Giovanni Sartori details three characteristics, 1) salience acquired by
protests but with only time to present one viewpoint; 2) false statistics or the casual
interview whereby five on-the-spot interviews are presented as public opinion; 3) the poll
trap which is actually a play-back of what the media has been presenting all along.313 In
his analysis, the news is a case of "narrowcasting", public opinion without public contents.
This theme is repeated by other media watchers as well, 314 but as will be noted in the
"External Benefits" section, not all critics are in consonance.
3. Control of Information is Power
There are several ways to control information: 1) restrict access to only a few
individuals; 2) release it incrementally or selectively; 3) inundate the receiver to such a
degree that the information cannot be properly processed due to overload; 4) restructure it
to support an ideological viewpoint, etc. In the negotiating process, various "information-
controllers" may be in effect at any time. The negotiator may not have the necessary
information about his opposite number, the peripheral issues which may be affected by the
312 Michael Parenti, "The Make-Believe Media", The Humanist (Nov/Dec 1990), Vol 50 No. 6,
18-20.
313 Giovanni Sartori, "Video-Power", Government and Opposition (Winter 1989), Vol 24 No. 1,
39-53.
314 Russell Lee Williams, "American Public Opinion and Strategic Planning: Considerations and
Case Studies", (M. A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA) June 1984, 10-14; Arlene
Balkansky, "Through the Electronic Looking Glass: Television Programs in the Library of Congress",
The Quarterly Journal of the Library of Congress (Summer-Fall 1980), Vol 37 No. 3-4, 458-75; Lyn
Ragsdale, "Presidential Speechmaking and the Public Audience: Individual Presidents and Group
Attitudes-, The Journal of Politics (1987), Vol 49 No. 4, 704-36; Neil Postman, Amusiig
Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business (New York: Viking Penguin, Inc.,
1985): W. Russel Newman, Thc Paadox of Mass Politics: Knowledge and Opinion in the
American Electorate (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986); Selma H. Fraiberg, "The Mass
Media" New Schoolhouse for Children" in iolenrj in the See ed. by Shalom Endleman
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968).
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negotiating process, the options under consideration at the upper levels of decision-making,
or third party factors which may intrude, i.e. the media and the public are two such
examples.
If the negotiator is not in control of the information process, then the difficulty of
coming to an acceptable agreement is intensified. Credibility may be sacrificed as the
negotiator reads in the newspaper information which directly contradicts his publicly stated
position. Details of the negotiations may be released which then damage his reputation and
call into question his skills in the realm of discretion. "Leaks", as previously discussed, are
not controllable even when the selective release of information was the goal.
D. EXTERNAL BENEFITS AND THE NEGOTIATOR
Interestingly enough some of the same issues which appear to be constraints to the
negotiator, when viewed through a different lens may become benefits. This discussion
will be limited to two: ethics of journalism, and public opinion and perception.
1. Ethics of Journalism
Professionals, whether they are doctors, lawyers, or members of the military, have
established a code of ethics for themselves which has evolved over the years. When an
officer receives his commission, he does so because special trust has been placed in his
patriotism, valor, abilities, and fidelity. This latter is his commitment of faith to the nation
and its principles, the U.S. Constitution which he has sworn to protect and defend. All
military members, by virtue of their enlistment or commissioning oath, have accepted the
military code of conduct. In essence, the code states that: an American fighter will
maintain his honor despite the attacks made upon it; he will not quit the fight; he will never
betray the trust through word or action; he will never disgrace his uniform and what it
symbolizes; in captivity, he will join with other loyal Americans to aid them and then
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himself. On the day-to-day level, the code of behavior stems both from the individual's
background and the American principles embodied in such documents as the Constitution,
the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, etc. Ideally, these principles include:
1) dedication to human rights' 2) respect for the dignity of the individual; 3) fair play to
all and favoritism toward none; 4) active concern for all aspects of human welfare; 5) to
deal with each person as if he were a blood relative. How else could a man be expected to
volunteer to fight, and possibly die for another? Realistically, not all members of the
Armed Forces may achieve these goals, but they serve as a guide which is the true function
of an ethical code.
The profession of journalism too, has its code of ethics, its journalist's creed. Frank
Luther Mott required his history of journalism students to memorize this creed and write it
on the final exam.315 This creed or oath states that the public journal is a public trust,
therefore the workers are trustees for the public, and acceptance of lesser service than this is
a betrayal of the public trust. Both the journalist and the military member then, have
incurred an obligation to the American people by the mere selection of a specific
, rofession. The Journalism Code of Ethics 316 lists twenty guidelines, however, this
presentation will be limited to four which reinforce its most controversial and frequently
vilified role, watchdog on the government in order to protect the people's right to know.
Summing up, they include: 1) to seek truth and to enlighten; 2) to guard freedom of
speech, including unpopular opinions and criticism of the government, as an inalienable
right of people in a free democracy; 3) to embrace the common carrier concept of public
discussion and information; 4) to actively censure and try to prevent violations of these
315 Earl R. Hutchinson, Jr., "To Kill a Messenger The Ethics of Journalism", Vital Speeches of the
Day (Jul 1, 1987), Vol LIII No. 18, 572-76; See also Frank L. Mott, American Journalism: A
316 Code of Ethics, "1983 Journalism Ethics Report".
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standards. Lofty ideals, not always attainable, nevertheless, passed from one generation of
journalists to the next. Not all are capable who take up the pen, as not all who take up the
sword may be, but the fact remains that both groups view themselves as answerable to the
American people. Neither can betray that trust and maintain the public support and
confidence so necessary to survival. In a four month study conducted of two major
network news broadcasts, and two news magazines, 317 Herbert Gans identified eight
enduring values portrayed in the American news. They are: 1) ethnocentrism - America
first and foremost, international news always in second place; 2) altruistic democracy;
3) responsible capitalism; 4) small town pastoralism; 5) individualism; 6) moderatism;
7) desirability of social order, 8) need for national leadership in maintaining that order. A
free press is critical by its nature, the U.S. press is critical of the country and its leaders,
thus, these eight values in terms of stories are constantly dissected, held under the
microscope, criticized or commended. The bottom line of the balance sheet reveals that
this code of professional ethics, when followed, benefits the negotiator as well as the
public. A public trust implies a public responsibility, and to violate that by publishing
classified or sensitive information that serves only to provide a scoop and possibly
endanger lives or negotiations in the national interest is a mockery.
2. Public Opinion and Perception
How does the public perceive the media? According to surveys conducted in 1979
and 1980 by the Public Agenda Foundation, 318 the U.S. public believes the following:
1) the press is too powerful; 2) credibility of the press' sources of information is
317 Herbert J. Gans, Deciding What's News: A Study of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News.
Newsweek and Time (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); W. Charles Redding, "The Enemies of
Responsible Communication: The Voices, The Silences", Vital Speeches of the Day (Sep 1, 1988),
Vol LIV No. 22, 702-4; Oliver C. Henkel, Jr., "The Press, The Process, and Gary Hart: We Cannot
Be Intimidated by the Apparent Power of the Press", Vital Speeches of the Day (Sep 1, 1987), Vol
LIII No. 22, 697-700.
318 Hannaford, 35-8; Servan-Schreiber, 117-120, 275-6.
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questionable at best; 3) the press uses practices which are abusive, unfair, or unethical.
These practices do not coincide with the liberal described earlier, but perhaps do with
someone who is alienated from traditional norms and institutions. The base line is that
although the media believe they are the spokesperson of the people, the people, are in fact,
listening with their critical faculty engaged and at times, articulated in opposition to the
media.3 19
There are certain characteristics about "public opinion" which should be delineated. It
may be defined as "the collective opinion around an issue of differences", "the voice of the
people", or "views and attitudes on domestic or foreign actions and issues held by the
people of a nation, community or group."320 Public opinion manifests itself at elections,
in the choice of political party and candidate; through legislative bodies; through volunteer,
special interest, and pressure groups or lobbies. However, public opinion is not "...total
and determinant, static and all-inclusive. There is no 100% public opinion that includes
every adult in the U.S. on any one issue. '321 There are majorities and minorities, strong,
weak, or no interest in particular issues, latent or dormant opinions, etc. but there is no
complete group consensus. Even Reagan's landslide election evidenced this phenomenon,
as there were those, in the minority admittedly, who did not vote for him and his platform.
How is public opinion formed? Up to this point, the focus has been on the mass media,
but that is not to undervalue the role of social institutions, ethnic backgrounds, personal
influence of the leader, and significant actions taken by those in leadership positions.
Propaganda is used to win converts through such techniques as name calling, the glittering
319 John Tebbel, "From Rags to Riches: The Media in American Society", The Quarterly Journal of
the Library of Congress (Winter 1981), Vol 38 No. 1, 42-50 briefly traces this on again/off again
relationship between the U. S. public and the U. S. press from the colonial printing press to the
satellite hookups.
3 2 0 Kenneth Minogue, "Journalism and the Public Mind", Government and Opposition, (Autumn
1989), Vol 24 No. 4, 473-88; Edward L. Bernays, "Public Relations - A Contemporary Concept".
Naval War College Review (Jun 1962), Vol XIV No. 9, 1-16; Piano and Olton, 83-85.
321 Bernays, 9.
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generality, transfer association, testimonial, "plain folks" appeal, card stacking, and the
band wagon. These are all attempts at persuasion or manipulation of an individual's
opinions or beliefs. The mass media, in particular television, has been accused of being
one of the "great persuaders." Studies, however, do not confirm this impression.322
The error one makes in granting television or the press such power lies in ignoring the
personal element, the freedom of choice, and the tendency for a human being to read those
newspapers and magazines or watch those news programs which appeal to hisor her own
personal beliefs. The average American will not read the daily newspaper cover to cover
but will take the smorgasbord approach. In this era of television remote controls and
multiple cable channels, the viewer will "click" past those stories which do not capture his
or her interest. The press must vie with the personal filter of each member of its audience.
An audience, which is not captive but has the capacity and the inclination to buy a different
newspaper or change the channel if the news coverage does not match its pre-conceived
idea of what it wants or needs. This independence of thought and action may or may not
be extended to the military negotiator and his or her efforts, but it does augur well for the
opportunity to at least receive balanced consideration.
322 Robert M. Enunan, "How the Media Affect What People Think: An Information Processing
Approach", Journal Of Politics (May 1989), Vol 51 No. 2, 347-70 concludes that the media
contribute but do not control the structure of publicly available information, and that the process itself
is an interdependent one composed of political, social, and cultural elements; Scott C. Paine,
"Persuasion, Manipulation, and Dimension", Journal of Politics, (February 1989), Vol 51 No. 1,
36-49 concludes that the existing beliefs of the "actors" themselves play an important role in the
process of manipulation, i.e. must be convinced of the benefits of conversion; Jon Hurwitz and Mark
Peffley, "Public Images of the Soviet Union: The Impact on Foreign Policy Attitudes", Journal of
Politics (February 1990), Vol 52 No. 1, 3-28 find that when foreign policy "experts" disagree, the
public will rely on prior beliefs to formulate opinions; Silvo Lenart and Kathleen M. McGraw,
"America Watches 'Amerika': Television. Docudrama and Political Attitudes", Journal of Politics
(August 1989), Vol 51 No. 3, 697-712 conclude that some attitudinal changes occurred but that the
impact of informal peer discussion on political attitudes tended to counteract the effects of direct
media influence; Spitzer, Ch. 4 reviews several brain wave studies conducted while the test cases
were viewing television and notes that the results are inconclusive, contradictory, and subject to
alternative interpretations.
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E. EASING THE TENSION: EXPLORING THE OPTIONS
If the dilemma for the military negotiator posed by media diplomacy is multi-faceted,
then how is the problem to be addressed? Selected for consideration are four areas:
1) media reform; 2) military public affairs; 3) limited censorship; 4) information
strategy. This is not all-inclusive but representative of different options to ease the tension
which now exists between the military and the press, the negotiator and the newsman.
1. Media Reform: The Educational Care and Feeding of Journalists
or Self-Criticism can be Enlightening
Quality control for journalism is an oft-debated subject both inside and outside
journalistic circles. The discussion of public opinion above and the findings that the public
does not have complete faith in the news organizations and their reporting would appear to
indicate that a change is needed. Everette E. Dennis of the Gannett Center for Media
Studies addresses this issue, stating "Quality control for journalism is unlikely to occur
unless there is a commitment to high standards of news gathering, editing, and
dissemination at the very top of an organization." 323 He offers six suggestions for
improvement: 1) increase the currently low salaries of journalists; 2) develop
imaginative in-house training programs, support industry-wide training efforts, and help to
develop new education and training facilities where needed; 3) support journalism
education; 4) the industry should seek out the best and the brightest students, from all
fields, and encourage them to join the journalism family; 5) genuine research and
development activity is lacking on the part of people in the news media; 6) all news
organizations should dedicate a portion of pre-tax profits to education, training, and
research development. His idea is to attack the problem at the source. Examine how the
323 Everette E. Dennis, "Quality Control For The Media: Education Training and Research
Development", Vital Speeches of the Day, (Nov 15, 1986), Vol LIII No. 3, 93-6.
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journalist is educated, trained, and nurtured to discover why the news media appears to
have lost its credibility, its direction, and its commitment to quality.
The second approach is to set a "watchdog" upon the "watchdog." Writing in 1965,
William L. Rivers, journalist and Associate Professor of Communication at Stanford,
stated that the press needed a critical apparatus that would encourage professionalism. 324
Modeled after the British Press Council, it would receive complaints, place calls to the
responsible editors for explanations, and then pronounce judgement. The Council has no
ultimate authority, no means of imposing penalties, but it does have the power of publicity,
and it is this weapon which the press would understand. He cites Barry Bingham, then
editor and publisher of the Louisville Courier-Journal and his idea of local press councils.
These councils would be composed of three to five community leaders who would receive
complaints. Newspaper executives would appear to present "the journalist's case", and
public reports of decisions would appear on television or in the newspaper periodically.
Harold Lasswell proposes a rebirth of the Committee on Public Communication. Only
this time, it should be composed entirely of representatives of the mass media - those who
are "suspected of integrity." 325
Former presidential press secretary Jody Powell notes a striking similarity between the
problems that beset those in politics and those in journalism. Neither institution is held in
particularly high regard by the American public; both are always making decisions based
on woefully inadequate information; and both exhibit an oversensitivity to criticism. 326
He mentions the Columbia Journalism Review and the Washington Journalism Review as
attempts to censure one's peers but believes the problem deserves a multi-variate approach.
324 William L. Rivers, The Oninion Makers (Boston: Beacon Press, 1965)194-200.
325 Harold Lasswell, The Language of Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1965),
42.
326 Jody Pow:2, The Other Side of the Story (New York: William Morrow and Co., Inc., 1984), 291-
3.
179
Alternative scenarios offered to ease the tension include: 1) introduce real competition, i.e.
if one news source prints or broadcasts inaccuracies, then another should confront them
with it and challenge the veracity; 2) conflict of interest is a possibility whereby the
reporter is covering a story in which he has a personal or financial interest. Why not
impose mandatory financial disclosure statements?; 3) inaccuracies occur because there is
no fear of retribution, consequently, establish limits and threaten adverse publicity or even
fines. This is not to censor the press, but to censure them for sloppy practices.
Finally, thirty years after Rivers' recommendations, Richard Clurman laments the
demise of the National News Council and the inability of the American system to make
such an organization a success. Citing the media's special privileges, i.e. 1) news mdia's
failure to report energetically on themselves and on each other, and 2) their reluctance to
give the public adequate ways to reply after the press has spoken. 327 As the culprit,his
solution is to remiedy this situation by altering the scenario admitting that neither of these
would be easy to achieve, he commends the rise of the media reporters whose assignment
is to report and criticize press practices. As of this writing only the Washington Post, the
New York Times, Newsday, and the Los Angeles Times have such a position on the paper,
however it does constitute a beginning.
2. Military Public Affairs: Preventive Maintenance
The military cannot reform the media, however the military can reform itself. In
his argument against freedom of expression, Tannsjo outlines three important criterion for
sound mass communication: 1' growth of knowledge in society; 2) pluralism of ideas;
3) equal opportunity for various social and cultural groups and strata in society to acquire




military, for without a pluralism of ideas, there is no basis for rational political decisions,
and the military's continued existence depends upon just such decisions. This was the
ultimate undoing of the Brazilian military dictatorships. Without equal access to the media,
the U.S. military fails to promote knowledge about itself and perpetuates the "Viet Nam
Syndrome" of alienation among military members towards the media. Co-education of
both the press about military matters and the military's role in a democratic society, as well
as the military about media matters and their role in a democratic society is at issue as well.
In order to examine possible alternatives to the existing adversarial relationship between the
military and the media, two viewpoints will be presented: 1) what the media perceives as
corrective action for the military in terms of public relations; 2) what the military
perceives as corrective action for itself in terms of public relations.
A fundamental misunderstanding in regard to the press is that it is part of a
governmental or military team, equal partners in relaying only the good news, never the
bad or embarrassing.3 29 Obviously, if the press has a responsibility to the public, and it is
to communicate a variety of viewpoints, negative as well as positive, then the team concept
is unworkable. Lecturing at the Naval War College in 1972, Barry Zorthian outlined a
press relations doctrine for the military. His nine point plan included the following
principles: 1) respecting the role of the press as a free channel of communication in a
democratic society; 2) the press is the channel to the public and provides the means of
creating an enlightened citizenry; 3) educate the press - avoidance of the press and refusal
to provide information will jeopardize the goal which is an informed public; 4) distinguish
between information and publicity. Information is provision of Detective Friday's "Just the
facts", open to interpretation and commentary by the news media. Publicity is the
329 Sheehan, "The Role of the Press", 4-4; Zorthian, "The Role of the Communications Media in a
Democratic Society, 1-7; White, "The Military and the Media", 47-51; Hannaford, 42-8.
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originator's version directly transmitted to the public without an intermediary's examination
and analysis; 5) need for candor in the act of communicating or how to eliminate the
"credibility gap"; 6) keep the privilege of national security to an absolute minimum, i.e. its
purpose should be to protect the lives of military personnel in situations of danger, or to
protect national interests in situations of great sensitivity; 7) the military should take the
initiative in communicating with the press, particularly in regard to negative events;
8) recognize that there is no compartmentalization of information, no room for interservice
rivalries, or civilian-military rivalries. Coordination and consistency in press
communications is paramount, particularly in the case of sensitive negotiations;
9) recognize that the world itself cannot be compartmentalized and the "global news
village" is a reality.330 Interestingly enough, these same points were characterized as
lessons learned by the Naval War College students who participated in the Military Media
Symposiums conducted in 1973 and 1974.331
The military's response to the problem of military-media relations has traditionally
focused on two individuals, the commanding officer, and the public affairs officer.
Commander Palmer, RN (Ret.) begins his argument for reform with the "top down"
approach, i.e. the commanding officer.332 This individual is the visible authority whose
words, actions, and responses carry weight. Setting priorities in terms of public affairs
management flows from the commanding officer, who will determine both the priority of
effort and the priority of importance. The dilemma is that operational matters are always
high priority items, while the media aspects are often neglected, but should an operational
malfunction occur, the media aspect will become paramount. In order to examine the
330 Zorthian, 4-6; Additional comments provided by this author in regard to principles four, eight, and
nine.
331 White, 50-1.
332 Palmer, "P. R. - '...As Others See Us'", 61-6.
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effectiveness of any command public affairs program, Palmer recommends asking five
questions. How much personal time is the commanding officer willing to give to public
affairs?333 What size command warrants a trained public affairs officer or a collateral-duty
public affairs officer?, i.e. What is the quality of the public affairs staff? Has the
commanding officer received any training in public affairs methods?; Is there an adequate
budget for public affairs, or is this consistently decreased due to operational necessity and
congressionally-mandated budget reductions?; Is the public affairs aspect routinely
included in all facets of command operations (excluding classified and sensitive areas)?
Asking these questions may be the beginning of a preventive maintenance (PM) program
for the military public affairs situation.
Writing in 1977, then LCDR Baker (later to become RADM Baker, Naval Chief of
Information) carries this theme of PM further. 334 Defensive public affairs is a command
operating in the crisis-management mode, being forced to respond to a negative story or
one which is potentially damaging in terms of national security. Reporters are viewed as a
pack of hungry wolves waiting to devour the messenger regardless of which option is
selected for rebuttal. 335  Inadequate preparation and the failure to lay the proper
groundwork in terms of an earlier working relationship with the local news media may
result in serious repercussions. Establishing the dialogue and command credibility before
a crisis situation has the potential to pay significant dividends. These dividends may be
333 Public affairs activities involving the commanding officer's time are defined as talking to the
press; writing, broadcasting, and preparing for the press; discussing public affairs with his own team.
The last is sometimes seen as a deficiency in the U. S. military's approach to public affairs, in that the
public affairs officer is often the last to know and therefore unable to respond adequately to the
media's questions.
334 Baker, Leakology: The War of Words", 48-9.
335 As discussed in a previous chapter, these include: 1) refusal to confirm or deny, "No comment";
2) demand a retraction or write a letter to the editor; 3) issue a statement or a press release; 4)
call a news conference; 5) hold a "backgrounder'; 6) prepare an answer to a query.
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realized in greater media access, balanced reporting, or a "heads up" news tip in the event
of a negative story.
Offensive public affairs may be defined in two ways. It may be considered the daily
and routine interactions between a command's public affairs office and the local news
media. Public affairs activities such as a base open house, ship's tour, Blue Angels air
show, or support for local community programs such as the Naval Postgraduate School
1989 Earthquake Relief efforts, the Marine Corps annual Toys for Tots campaign, the
Washington, D.C. area Project Literacy mailitary volunteers are all offensive strategies in the
public affairs realm. Each type of activity presents a particular image of the military to the
community. Although these "human interest" stories have a certain appeal, unfortunately,
it is the "disaster" story which will prove the biggest drawing card. The crash of a Blue
Angels aircraft, for example, may prove devastating not only due to the loss of life
involved, but also the failure to provide timely and accurate information as to its cause.
Speculative stories may appear in print linking pilot error to drug or alcohol abuse, an
aircraft malfunction to faulty military procurement practices, etc. This is where the second
definition of offensive public affairs may be applied, the strong public rebuttal. Journalists
and the military both rely on credibility to "sell" their product. Repeated public exposre of
a journalist's failure to check his or her facts sends three messages: 1) the military is
literate, well-informed, and willing to take up the pen to correct a wrong; 2) the reporter
fails to meet the basic standards of journalism, as does the newspaper, magazine, or
radio/television station which continues to employ him or her, or 3) the public has the
right to review both sides of the story, and then make an informed decision.
Another area in which the military could reform itself is in the realm of media education
and training. Both Malloy and Hannaford 336 discuss the rise of the image consultant and
336 Hannaford, Tal Back to Lhe Meia; Malloy, New Dress for Success.
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the media consultant. With regard ,o the former, military personnel wear uniforms, thus
an image consultant would be a classic example of overkill; however a sharply pressed
uniform, military hair style, and on-camera poise will speak volumes about the military
long before the individual has begun talking. The idea of a media consultant has been
peripherally addressed by military authors writing in the U.S. Naval Institute publication
Proceedings. Major Michael C. Mitchell, USMC recommends that the following
proposals be reviewed as potential methods to co-educate the media and the military. 33 7
First, offer a military public affairs officer to the major television networks to work in the
editing room on a strictly advisory basis. 338 Second, develop a Department of Defense-
coordinated education program for members of the media in recognition of the fact that the
military tends to be complex and confusing to outsiders unfamiliar with the language, the
organization, and the difference between military and civilian operations. 339 Third,
provide a weekly, one-hour Department of Defense-sponsored television news broadcast
during times of conflict, funded either by the government or by private grants, so as to
provide a "second lens to correct visual distortions caused by the first lens." 4  What is
interesting about Mitchell's proposals is his attempt to reverse the role of the media
consultant. Instead of hiring someone with civilian media experience, he recommends that
the military provide a new kind of media consultant, the iniformed one to educate his or
her civilian peers. Colonel Upchurch returns to the "top down" approach recommending
337 MAj Michael C. Mitchell, USMC,"Televising War", Proceedings (April 1986), Vol 112/4/998,
52-6.3 38 The drawback to this proposal is that networks deal with unions and a military person, alth, igh
not being paid by the network, could be viewed as infringing upon the rights of an accredited military
specialist" journalist. Additionally, unless the situation were handled with discretion, the appearance
of governmental control or military censorship could become the story instead.
3 39 The drawback to this proposal is that the education effort could be misconstrued as an
indoctrination and propaganda effort in the negative sense of the word.
340 The drawback to this proposal is the same as the previous one, a tendency tr he seen as
governmental control of news, plus providing access to the media which the a'. ciage individual or
company does not have despite the "equal time" doctrine currently in existence.
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that the commanding officer receive realistic training and become his own best media
consultant.34 1 His recommendations include: a media course or seminar at all levels of
professional military education, particularly at the command and staff colleges; instructors
should be experienced media representatives; a laboratory-oriented media seminar should
be included; emphasize practical experience with news media representatives, including a
series of no-notice interviews. The purpose of all this training is to acclimate commanders,
to have them "emphasize the positive, clarify or correct the negative, and direct their
answers through the reporter and out to their real target - the public...to suppress hostility
and still project authority and self-confidence."34 2 Operationally, military commanders
constantly exercise the mettle of their troops through surprise inspections and drills,
practice damage control, and perform preventive maintenance. COL Upchurch is simply
recommending the same attitude be taken towards public affairs, train, drill, exercise, and
train again, so that when the crisis occurs, the response becomes second nature. Training is
not enough however. Two hard and fast principles must be remembered and consistently
applied: 1) always tell the truth; 2) never say anything to a media person, anywhere, at
any time, on any subject that is "off the record."34 3 Failure. to abide by these two maxims
will result in disaster every time.
3. Limited Censorship in the National Interest
The discussion of censorship is usually focused on the idea of complete censorship,
a total news blackout such as occurred during the first forty-eight hours of the- "Urgent
Fury" operation in Grenada. Taken to the extreme, all information is of possible value to
an adversary. Consequently, any attempt to categorize what kinds of information are
341 COL Richard L. Upchurch, USMC, "Wanted: A Fair Press", Proceedings (July 1984) Vol
1O/7j977. 68-74.
342 Ibid. 73.
343 Matthew J. Culligan and Dolph Greene, Getting Back to the Basics of Public Relations and
Publici[X (New York: Crown Publishers, Inc., 1982), 7.
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releasable or not releasable becomes a Herculean task. The list will either be too broad or
too narrow, with no median standard available. 344 And yet, M. Tregaskis, an experienced
reporter of wars in Asia comments that "Censorship in war is valid, and necessary to
preserve objectivity."345 In her view, the havoc wrought in Viet Nam came about because
there was no authorized press corps, no basic military assistance granted to the press to
include military travel orders, in-country medical care, no billets, status, or mobility. The
result was that for the price of a commercial airline ticket, a reporter or a recent journalism
gracuate could fly into a war zone, present a letter and receive a press card. Amateur hour
was the result in many cases of wartime reporting. Grenada saw the same scenario
replayed once again. Panama in 1989 saw a press pool activated when, in fact, there were
numerous journalists in-country who could just as easily have covered the story without
importing more players onto the scene. If censorship is necessary to preserve objectivity,
then what type of censorship should it be?
Bill Moyers offers three observations about some factors that influence the President
and his relations with the press.346 It is not difficult to see that these same factors may be
applied to the military operational commander's situation or the military negotiator's
situation. First, some issues cannot be molded to fit an inquisitive media's timetable.
Crises over which the President or a military commander has little control, but for which
he or she must assume great responsibility, are classic examples of this dilemma.
Diplomatic maneuverings and potential military operations can be jeopardized if exposed
too soon to the light of day. These are the instances whereby limited censorship may be
imposed. Second, events and changing circumstances will alter previously articulated
344 Wise, 140.
345 Letter from Mrs. M. Tregaskis to Captain Wayne P. Hughes, USN (Ret.) dated July 19, 1977 cited
in Hughes, "Guarding the First Amendment - For and From the Press". Naval War College Review.
May/Jun 1984, 28-35.
346 Moyers, "The Press and the Government: Who's Telling the Truth?', 32-3.
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strategy or promises. The reality is that policy is not carved in stone, it only appears that
way as long as it is workable. Third, oftentimes conclusions and decisions must be made
from inconclusive evidence. The Commanding Officer of the USS Vicennes in 1989
understood this simple yet profound, reality of life. Military personnel, especially those in
positions of authority and responsibility, deal with this fact daily. The press does not. The
decision made by the editor is to cover or not cover a story, to put it on the front page or
not, to support the status quo or not. The life or death decisions made by the media have to
do with the continued existence of itself, the newspaper, magazine, or station, not with the
flesh and blood of human beings unless irresponsible reporting occurs.
What should be the limits imposed on those who would engage in irresponsible
journalism? William W. Van Alstyne34 7 offers the counterargument that the press should
have lesser rights than private individuals to withhold information about its sources,
because the public needs to judge the credibility of a story, greater liability for damaging
and false reports so that the measure of redress matches the magnitude of the harm, etc.
In other words, there are times when censorship of the press may be in order, and in some
cases, self-censorship is encouraged. Should classified material be leaked to the media,
one author recommends that the following actions be taken in the interests of national
security and self-censorship: 1) read it through and copy those parts, if any, that are
marked "Unclassified"; 2) return the document, in person, to its office of origin and
obtain a receipt; 3) write and publish a story describing the general nature, but not the
classified contents, of the document and the reasons given by the source for bringing it to
press attention, if those have been made known; 4) protect the source's identity;
5) request a meeting with the chair(s) of the congressional committees responsible for the
347 William W. Van Alstyne, Interpretations of the First Amendment (Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press, 1984), 62-5.
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area in question and discuss the matter in full; 6) write and publish a report of the meeting
with the congressional chair(s); 7) aggressively follow up to assure correction of abuses or
other problems that have surfaced.-W
One of the most feasible recommendations to date, in terms of limited censorship is
offered by James Pontuso.349 Simply stated, the government can allow the print media
free access to the battlefield but disallow the presence of television cameras. Print media
will give the public the opportunity to engage in abstract thinking, to examine the reasons
behind the war, and not merely the powerful images of war which may be used to slant
and distort. The presence of print media ensures the freedom of the press but removes the
problem of visuals unaccompanied by thoughtful, insightful analysis. Print and still
photography could replace the canned footage repeatedly shown as if it were a different
day, time, and place. War correspondents could, once again, become correspondents and
not merely actors in a drama. It is a possibility, but not likely to become a popular
alternative for, "disaster" sells, even when it is our own.
4. Information Strategy
One of the problems to date with the military in terms of public affairs has been
its failure to adequately design and implement an effective information strategy. There
may be a variety of ways to approach this issue but in this discussion, it will be limited to
two: 1) the Engineering of Consent,350 and 2) Managing the Crisis: Avoiding the
Diplomatic Nightmare. The first method sounds Orwellian in nature but, it is, in actuality,
a practical approach to an impractical problem, i.e. tinkering with how a human being
348 Colonel William V. Kennedy, USAR (Ret.), "Telling It Like It Isn't", 50.
349 Pontuso, "Combat and the Media: The Right to Know Versus the Right to Win", 58.
35 This phrase was coined by Edward L. Bernays. The discussion about this topic draws heavily from
his following works - The Engineering of Consent- Take Your Place at the Peace Table Propaganda-
Crystallizing Public Opinion. and his 1962 lecture at the Naval War College entitled "Public
Relations- A Contemporary Concept" published in the Naval War College Review as previously cited.
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thinks about an issue. The second approach sounds more pragmatic, especially since it
appears to mesh well with the military maxim of the Six Ps, i.e. "proper prior planning
prevents poor performance." According to Pickard, any information strategy in this era of
globalization and instant communications is reducible to two elements: 1) Information -
knowing the international context of the in's and out's of each country in which the
company (or military) does business; and 2) Coordination - being able to formulate and
implement a plan based on this information.351
The Engineering of Consent approaches any public relations problem from an hexagonal
viewpoint. The angles include: 1) defining the objectives; 2) researching public opinion;
3) deciding on the strategy to govern the public relations activities; 4) isolating the themes
and appeals meaningful to the target audience; 5) determining the organization to supervise
and direct the activity; 6) planning both timing and tactics. Bernays expands on each of
these points. First, the objectives may be defined in terms of time, i.e. immediate,
intermediate, long-term. Obviously the nature of the problem will dictate the amount of
time available to effectively cope with it and find a workable solution. Other objectives
may involve modification of attitudes and/or actions of the intended target audience.
Second, it is imperative to study the existing public opinion in relation to the specific
objectives outlined. By doing this, potential courses of action may suggest themselves.
Two ways to discover the existing public opinion include hiring an outside public opinion
analyst, or in the military's case where budget considerations are always a priority, assign
such a project to students at one of the various military institutions of higher learning.
Libraries contain the appropriate reference material to aid in the design of the project. After
the research has been completed, the original objectives may need to be redefined. One
351 Geoffrey L Pickard, "Bridging the Gap in Joint Venture Communications: Global Public
Affairs", Vital Speeches of the Day, (Dec. 15, 1986), Vol LIII No. 5, 145-8.
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reminder is that public opinion is not static, so it would be best to define core opinions and
not those easily swayed by the latest Hollywood movie effort or military faux pas.
Bluntly stated, the research should not be reactive in nature, but comprehensive and broad-
based.
After studying the raw material of the research, it is time to devise a strategy which is the
third step. Bernays offers three basic ones: 1) intensification - you strengthen the belief
system of those who already believe; 2) conversion - winning over people to your point
of view; 3) negation - blanketing or counteracting the opposing viewpoint.352 The fourth
stage is to select themes which the research has indicated will be acce-table to the target
audience. Presentation of these themes may assume six different forms: 1) by factual
evidence to support the validity of the hypothesis; 2) by reason and persuasion; 3) by
authority, i.e. the viewpoint of a dispassionate expert, or the leader of the military
organization; 4) by tradition, i.e. the continuity of the American way; 5) by emotion.
The fifth stage is engineering the consent of the entire organization, as well as integrating
and coordinating everyone's activities. In military parlance, and in support of the Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act, this is the attempt to produce a "purple suit mentality" whereby all
the services work together by setting aside interservice rivalries. The final stagc is
planning, timing, and tactics. Overt acts are the key here, and so the media is the method
of choice to channel the information to the target audience.
Managing the Crisis or Avoiding the Diplomatic Nightmare is the approach
recommended by those whose target audience is big business, particularly transnational
corporations. 353 However, one writer/researcher, James E. Lukaszewski examines both
352 As previously addressed in the sections on "Public Opinion and Perception: Media Creation" and
"Public Opinion and Perception", the most effective means appears to be intensification whereby the
individual's existing beliefs about a particular topic are reinforced.
353 For an interesting assortment of complementay methods, see Culligan and Greene, "Public
Relations in an Emergency", in Gettinu Back to the Basics; F. D. Buchstein, "Public Relations -
Contacts with Editors and Reporters"; Pickard, "Bridging the Gap"; James E. Lukaszewski,
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the private sector and the governmental response to a crisis and how the public perception
is altered by asking the simple question, who is in charge? He oudines five puwlic
expectations facing an American business in a crisis: perfection in performance; automatic
inference of liability; image of deep pockets; regulation by government to prevent
disastrous errors; anthropomorphism of corporations. Public perceptions and expectations
of the government during disasters tend to be more focused. They include: the
government will manage and resolve the situation somehow; the government is unbiased,
trustworthy, though perhaps a less efficient, source of information and action; the
government is not ordinarily perceived as a source of recovery for damages, suffering, .
fear. If this is true, then the military has a head start Ln the realm of public relations and the
disasters which sometimes occur.
According to Lukaszewski, there are four phases which managers pass through in order
to internalize the tasks to accomodate, cope with, and resolve the disaster situation. He
categorizes these phases as recognition, definition, planning, and raction, and then further
subdivides them. Recognition consists of four elements, surprise, concentration,
containment, and control. The goal of this first phase is to achieve process credibility.
Definition has three elements, fear or healthy recognition that matters are extemely serious,
facts or need for information, focus or accomplishment of specific tasks. The goal of this
second phase is to achieve process frankness. Planning is actually identifying the proper
reaction strategies in three areas: focus on a goal to resolve the emergency or disaster
situation with minimum disruption; use appropriate internal and external resources to
maintain credibility and the organization's reputation; adopt a strategic posture, i.e. prepare
for opposition or adverse reception of messages. As discussed in the Public Affairs
"Corporate and Private Sector Communications Responsibility: Transborder Disaster Situations",
Vital Speeches of the Day (Mar i, 1987), Vol LIII NO. 10, 305-10. This section on managing the
crisis draws heavily from the plan outlined by Mr. Lukaszewski.
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Preventive Maintenance section, the strategic approaches may involve forecasting,
facilitating, and follow-up. Finally, Reaction involves the selection of response strategies,
i.e. stoicism, steadiness or total concentration, stamina or going the distance, and sensitivity
to the politics of the situation. Lukaszewski concludes that the communications responses
generated by an organization in a crisis must be able to pass five tests. The messages
should be: candid about actions, compassionate but tough, targeted directly to the priority
audiences (regardless of external pressures, particularly the media), positive and
consistently persuasive, delivered quickly and accessibly. Defining and focusing
perceptions, establishing realistic expectations on the part of the public remains the goal in a
crisis situation, and according to Lukaszewski the above outlined strategy is one viable
means to achieve this goal.
Finally, the military needs to keep the media in perspective. Both Leider and Zubkoff35
give the reader lessons in how to read the newspaper or view the television news with a
critical eye and ear, and how to fill in the news holes for oneself. The underlying
recommendation by both authors is that the reader should look for the patterns and the
trends, much as an intelligence analyst does, and then interpret the information accordingly.
Although this may be an heretical suggestion, perhaps it would behoove the military to
treat the media as an adversary. At least when one has an adversary, one mounts an
intelligence effort and develops strategies to counter effectively the negative or outright
inaccurate image being portrayed. This is not to suggest a reincarnation of J. Edgar
Hoover's infamous FBI files, but rather a realistic assessment of the situation. The media
is not a team player and never will be, however, if they are viewed as an adversary, then the
military will not simply disregard them as an insignificant irritation in the daily routine.
354 Colonel Robert Leider, USA, "The Press: A Matter of Perspective", U. S. N. I. Proceedings (Jun
1973). Vol 99/6/844, 35-41; Harry M. Zubkoff, "News - Or Views?", Strategic Review , (Summer
1976), Vol IV No. 3, 104-10.
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The media will become an issue, and how to handle them will achieve a status when setting
operational priorities.
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VIII. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF MEDIA
DIPLOMACY FOR THE MILITARY NEGOTIATOR
Both official and unofficial diplomacy is now in the process of being conducted through
the medium of the media. Negotiations as part of the diplomatic effort and the military's
contribution to it are increasingly conducted in the public eye through the glare of the
television camera, and amplified by the reporter's microphone. What are the implications
and ramifications of this method? The technological revolution, as previously discussed,
has altered both the form and substance of international relations. Specifically, it increased
the influence of public opinion in world affairs, added the cultivation of public opinion to
the principal tasks of statecraft, and redirected some countries' energies and economies to
compete more on the "influence" level rather than in the military, economic, or cultural
domains. This phenomenon was apparent in the earlier examinations of the Soviet Union
and its transition to a glasnost environment, as well as the media reform and deform
efforts conducted during the military-controlled government era in Brazil. Public
diplomacy has altered the classic style of foreign policy conducted in secret among elites.
This volume of communications and instantaneously available information does not
guarantee better communication in the negotiation process. Instead it has the potential of
becoming "infopollution", a force multiplier of misunderstandings and misinterpretations.
Foreign opinion, as articulated by foreign journalists is heavily influenced by their reading
of U.S. papers and the impressions received via U.S. news broadcasts. However, it is then
filtered through their particular cultural lens which will alter the meaning even further. This
foreign opinion is, to a certain extent, a reflection or product of the U.S. national mood.
For all intents and purposes, it is derived from what the U.S. says, writes, and shows about
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itself. At the official level. U.S. embassies and the USIA produce one type of propaganda,
while the unofficial media present another through the offices of AP, UPI, and the free
lance foreign correspondent. The U.S. military, through its efforts at gunboat diplomacy
and community relations presents yet another image of the U.S., and the military's rightful
role and place in it.
Media diplomacy creates the dilemma of an audience for whom the determining factor is
no longer what actually happened, but the perception of what happened, or what s/he
believes happened. Arbitrary determination of what's newsworthy, aggravated by
economic pressures (circulation/rating points = advertising dollars), personal agendas
(advocacy journalism), and the reality that negativism sells may fail to present "the truth
and nothing but the truth" to the consumer. Images without substance, created news,
subjectivity presented as balanced information, become not diplomatic efforts but
diplomatic deceit. The media is another political tool, but in order for it to be effective at
both the official and unofficial levels, certain realities should be taken under consideration.
These include, but are not limited to the following.
1. Images and words are powerful. Both must have standards governing their quality
and accuracy.
2. Practitioners of media diplomacy should take responsibility for their creative role in
shaping the news.
3. Standards of conduct can only add to the overall credibility of the product.
4. Free access to the media will contribute to sustaining the quality of the product by
ensuring the presentation of widely differing viewpoints.
5. The media speaks to the citizen and the world. What is being said?
6. National security and freedom of the press are not incompatible, although the tension
between the two has yet to be successfully resolved.
7. The military is a political tool as well. Does the military recognize its own
shortcomings in the realm of media diplomacy?
8. Negotiators, increasingly, have lost the luxury of secrecy. Do negotiation methods
reflect this change? Has the educational preparation been altered as well?
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The military negotiator must take all these factors into consideration when determining his
or her information strategy. The first key, though, is self-knowledge. There is a militaiy
mindset, not a militarist mindset, which is brought to bear on negotiation issues. It is a
mind conditioned to recognize, categorize, and formalize the military implications which
are inherent in any given national security problem. However, it behooves the military
negotiator to be aware of the self-same tendency to combine politics with strategy, by
viewing the world in terms of ally and enemy. Neutral players or third party entities are
often disregarded and yet, can prove useful to the negotiator if, first one recognizes their
potential contribution, and second, one understands how to use these to his or her
advantage.
Focusing on one branch of service, the U.S. Navy, demonstrated the existence of an
historical diplomatic tradition. Selection for command of a ship or foreign duty ashore
implies a recognized aptitude for public relations, a complete knowledge of protocol and
courtesies to be executed while in a foreign country, and the diplomatic skills of tact,
firmness, and decisiveness in a potentially volatile or embarrassing situation. Military
advancement and promotion results in a pyramidal structure whereby individuals are
constantly evaluated against their peers and those who have gone before them, in an effort
to select the "best and the brightest". Increasingly, the trend has been to ensure that those
selected to flag rank demonstrate the characteristics of the Renaissance Man or Woman, i.e.
possessing an operational speciality, the ability to transition from one's own service
requirements to the joint arena and back again, to speak with authority, intelligence, and
candor when needed both at home and abroad, to function as a military diplomat as
needed, etc. Naval officers no longer have the power to negotiate treaties with foreign
powers, to conclude alliances, nor to engage in a potential act of war, or to negotiate a peace
settlement as they were able to do in the early part of this century, but this does not mean
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that they have ceased to engage in certain diplomatic activities. Delegation of authority is a
fact of life in the military, and as is evidenced in daily military operations, the commanding
officer does not do it all, neither does the flag officer. Consequently, those public relations
qualities so necessary to those in the most visible military positions, are equally important
at the lower levels. The naval "diplomat" today may be any rank or rating, may be engaged
in gunboat diplomacy or coercive diplomacy, may be on a friendly port visit or a host for a
ship's tour. Although the options of diplomatic behavior have decreased, those remaining
are apt to generate a tremendous amount of media attention.
Critics or proponents of naval diplomacy have been unable to argue away the reality
that a ship remains a Great Communicator. Media coverage of a routine ship's visit or the
deployment of a ship to a potential trouble spot have the potential to rally international
approbation or censure. Commentators will provide an instant analysis of capabilities and
intentions, whether accurate or not, and this too, will contribute to the overall "military
communications/diplomatic effort". Ships bristling with communications gear and
armament, aircraft soaring, a tank rolling off a ship or suspended from a heavy lift
helicopter all have the potential to engage in dramatic acts, and create a dramatic picture,
and where there is drama, a camera will not be far behind.
At times, the military will find itself actually negotiating with the media, particularly in
those situations whereby the media is viewed as an encumbrance to the operational effort
or a risk to security. War correspondents during the second world war were viewed as
force multipliers, watchmen who provided a liberating force, focused attention, raised
aspirations, and created an informational and intellectual climate which appeared to fully
support the war effort at home-and abroad. The Viet Nam experience altered this image of
the media indelibly. Viewed as force dividers by the military, these were the individuals
who used the crisis imperative and the visual imperative to slant the news, to bias the
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presentation, and to reverse the angle in such a way, that the story did not resemble what
the military viewed as what should be the truth. In reality, the more well-informed the
press is, the more likely the reporting will be accurate, and the end result will be a force
multiplier. Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada resulted in a press blackout for the first
forty-eight hours of the mission. The backlash from this resulted in the military and the
media reexamining their roles in the public information process yet again. Although a firm
solution was not forthcoming, the dialogue was reopened, and the lesson learned and
relearned that the military has an obligation to keep the American people informed, and the
press has the responsibility to ensure that its efforts do not jeopardize lives nor national
security.
Should a military negotiator find him or herself in a war termination situation and part
of the peace settlement team, or simply part of a routine effort to secure basing rights,
certain guidelines are equally applicable to the military as well as the civilian negotiator.
Know your substance, your objectives, and your bottom line. Understand the negotiating
style of your opposite number. Do not negotiate with yourself. Be patient. Develop
personal relationships but avoid manipulation. Seek opportunities for informal sessions.
Always use appropriate protocol. Use media pressure carefully because it could backfire.
Avoid "information leaks", and never speak "off the record" to the media. Be involved in
the decision-making process. Pin down the details. Military negotiators represent not only
the military point of view at the negotiating table, but the U.S. point of view as well.
Books abound which discuss national negotiating styles, however, such information in
regard to the military negotiator or sub-specialist in this field is not as accessible. Any
professional negotiator will conduct extensive background research on the problem, have a
series of possible solutions in mind, and some previous experience not only in the
negotiating process itself, but the attendant features, i.e. diplomatic protocol, and the media
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aspects as well. The military negotiator may not have all of these qualities. However,
bargaining and negotiating behavior studies when juxtaposed with military mindset studies
indicate that the military officers who have attended one of the war or staff colleges have
certain strengths which may prove useful at the negotiating table.
The existence of a "culture-generation" gap between military personnel and media
personnel does exist. When defining the military, such descriptors as authority,
conformity, discipline, group interdependence, and team coordination tend to come to
mind. When defining the media, such descriptors as free-wheeling, irreverent, highly
skeptical of authority, independent, and basically opposed to institutions are the images
produced. Since the advent of the all-volunteer force, the young journalist of today has
little or no experience of the military, and yet is expected to report about something of
which s/he has minimal knowledge. There is one reassuring factor in all this, both the
military and the journalist abide by a code of ethics, and part of that code reiterates that
they are, in fact, granted their powers in order to act for the public good. It is a public trust
which implies a public responsibility. On the grand scale, both groups are composed of
professionals who have a reputation to maintain,and a credibility factor to protect. There
are always a few who evince less than sterling qualities, but this problem is to be expected
when confronted with any diverse, yet large group of people. Additionally, there will be
some journalists who will take the time to become self-educated about their opposite
numbers in the Department of Defense, but the military should face the reality that if they
don't educate the media (and do so in a manner that does not seem propagandistic in
nature), then no one will, and the coverage will continue to be less than adequate. Military
public affairs programs, unfortunately, are often run by individuals with little or no formal
training themselves, and with only a manual or official DOD or branch of service
instruction to rely upon, the result could be catastrophic.
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An examination of possible options was explored in attempting to resolve the military
negotiator's dilemma with the media, and the concept of public diplomacy. These were
outlined as reforming the media through education and self-criticism, performing
preventive maintenance on the military public affairs program, acknowledging that limited
censorship in the national interest is necessary at times, and designing an information
strategy. What do these mean for the military negotiator? First, the military has no control
over the self-criticism of the media, however it can provide constructive criticism in the
form of rebuttals to grossly inaccurate stories which appear in print or on broadcast
presentations. It is imperative that the military negotiator continue to monitor the media's
coverage of the ongoing negotiations for two reasons: 1) information may be "leaked"
from a third party or from within the negotiating process itself which may damage the
effort; 2) inaccuracies may be printed which may not jeopardize the overall effort but
could damage the credibility of the negotiating team(s). A response should then be
forthcoming in a timely fashion otherwise, the impression will remain a negative one, and
the media will not have been taken to task for their inability to report the news in a
professional manner.
Public relations is as much a part of the negotiation process as any other command
activity. If a negotiator has not been trained in the public relations aspects of his or her job,
then self-education may be the key. The military does not always have the luxury or the
budget to provide specialized training to all its members for all their collateral or alternate
duties. At times, the individual will simply have to take the initiative to learn more about
the problem, and how to effectively counter it." Forewarned is forearmed", however,
developing such an information strategy should become an imperative. There are two
angles from which to approach this problem, the engineering of consent, which is what
public relations is all about, and managing the crisis or avoiding the diplomatic nightmare.
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Both require two basic elements, information and coordination. The first refers to the
military's operations and methods in dealing with a particular country or community. The
second refers to the military's ability to formulate and implement a plan based on the
information currently in one's possession. Both also require a previously well-thought out
approach, a certain amount of research or intelligence gathering, and if possible, a specific
tailoring to the various types of crises which may arise. Obviously, it is not simply a
crisis-management response or reactive process if the aim is to be successful. Specifically,
the engineering of consent must include such elements as: identifying objectives,
determining the target audience, selecting a strategy, i.e. intensification, conversion, or
negation, isolating themes most likely to appeal to the target audience, determining and/or
designing the organization to implement the strategy, and planning both timing and tactics.
The ability to respond rapidly and correctly to a crisis or emergency is ingrained in the
military. What has not been ingrained and trained into the military is the ability to remain
calm, cool, and collected with a multitude of microphones waving in one's face, journalists
swarming around like so many insects, and minicams providing the glare of publicity.
True, there is no education quite like experience, but there is no opportunity as apt to
damage command credibility, the military reputation, and the operational mission as that
provided by the novice spokesperson, inadequately prepared, and minimally trained. A
standard has to be set, and it is in the military's best interest to set it.
Military negotiators, commanding officers, and official governmental spokespersons
will each find themselves in the same quandary one day. The specter of classified
information will be raised in a non-secure setting by a member of the media, and it will
require a response. There are some instances when "no comment" is the only possible one
based on the sensitivity of the subject matter, but it cannot become the catch-all phrase.
"No comment" is an open invitation to a journalist to do even more investigative digging.
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Unfortunately, this digging may uncover the wrong answers to the question or worse, yet,
compromise additional sensitive information. Now is the time to set the ground rules with
the media in regard to classified material. Some information is easily releasable, i.e.
Americans currently engaged in combat, U.S. forces abroad, financing of foreign
operations or foreign military forces, commitments to do any of the preceding or
negotiations contemplating such a commitment, the fact of intelligence organizations, the
costs and concepts of proposed/existing weapons systems. Some information would
require presumptive classification, i.e. details of advanced weapons systems designs and
operational characteristics, details of plans for military operations, details of ongoing
negotiations, intelligence methods. Any information which was not clearly identifiable or
categorizable as either automatically releasable or presumptively classified, should then be
placed in a category with the emphasis on release rather than withholding such information
from the public sector. Control of information is power but restricting access to only a
few individuals is not always feasible, releasing it incrementally or selectively may be.
Public affairs officers will tend to release it in a restructured format so as to support an
ideological viewpoint, or command-mission orientation. The media finds that, in some
respects, it may be inundated with so much information that not all of it can be properly
processed due to overload. With the proper information strategy already designed, the
military can ensure that the media receives just what it needs without clouding the issue.
In the final analysis the military must keep the media in perspective. It is neither as all-
powerful nor as all-knowing as they would have you believe. They are not omnipotent and
they certainly aren't infallible, but they have given themselves such "great press" over the
years that they have become a threat in the eyes of those who don't routinely deal with
them. Know your enemy, exploit his or her weaknesses, and learn to work with them.
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Team players they will never be, but a healthy respect for their capabilities and intentions
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